

PSEUDO-PLATONICA

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF ARTS, LITERATURE AND
SCIENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO IN
CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

W. A. HEIDEL

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PREFACE.

One who undertakes the task of criticising any considerable body of classical literature must avail himself of the facts gathered by the labor of many predecessors. But if his work is to possess independent value he must exercise his own judgment to an extent that renders his results in a sense properly his own. At times it becomes, consequently, rather perplexing to determine just what kind of acknowledgment he should make to those from whose works he is conscious of having derived benefit. In the following pages it has been my aim to concentrate whatever of value was to be gathered from all sources accessible to me and yet to be perfectly free in determining upon the precise application of particular data. To give credit for a reference to a passage or for an observation which was to be put to a slightly or wholly different use, without at the same time entering upon an unprofitable explanation or polemic, seemed to be unfair and uncalled for. I have, therefore, concluded that it would be best to make a general acknowledgment of a far-reaching indebtedness to those authors whose works have particularly influenced my studies.

For a knowledge of the problems and methods I owe most to the writings of Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, Hermann, Stallbaum, von Stein, Steinhart, Ueberweg, Susemihl and Zeller. In regard to individual dialogues special acknowledgments are due. The fifth and sixth volumes of that portion of the Metzler translations of Plato which contains the suspect and spurious works have been of peculiar value because of Susemihl's introductions and notes. I regret very deeply the failure of my efforts to procure the third and fourth volumes until my essay was in press, when only a partial use of them was possible. Fritzsche's admirable recension of vol. VI, sec. II of Stallbaum's Plato has saved me from repeating many errors of former critics in regard to *Theages*, *Anterastae*, and *Hipparchus*, and well exemplifies the supreme advantage of having a good edition of the works under consideration. Boeckh's "In Platonis qui fertur Minoem," 1806, has formed the basis and starting-point for all subsequent criticism of that dialogue, and so I have felt at liberty to incorporate into my work such of his observations as appeared to me to be sound. Cobet's scant notes on

Alcibiades I in *Mnemosyne*, nova series, vol. II, p. 369 ff., are almost all very judicious and have been utilized very fully in my section on that dialogue. In regard to the *Letters* proper acknowledgments will be found in their appropriate place. To the numerous dissertations on individual works which I have consulted, I am aware of owing very little, except where a reference to them in my notes owns the obligation.

I would feel that I had signally failed to show due respect to my teachers if I refrained from mentioning among those to whom I am most indebted, Professors Kirchhoff, Vahlen, Diels and Zeller, of the University of Berlin, and Professor Paul Shorey, of the University of Chicago. To the personal interest and instruction of Professor Diels I owe my first introduction to the open questions of ancient philosophy, to the solution of which his own "Doxographi" has largely contributed; and to Professor Zeller, quite apart from the unequalled learning with which he has treated that subject in all its phases, the inspiration of his personal direction in entering upon its mazy paths. It would be to me a source of great pleasure to feel that this study contained fruits worthy of his instruction. Finally it should be said that the incentive to undertake this laborious task came from Professor Shorey, to whose learning and friendly criticism it is largely due that I have been enabled to avoid many rash statements and unfounded objections. Many of the suggestions also which have found a place in the following pages originated with him, though I alone am responsible for advocating them and giving them to the public.

One word more by way of explanation. The order observed in Part II is in general the reverse of the chronological as set forth in Part I, § VII, except that the *Letters* have been placed together for convenience between the so-called *dialogi nothi* and the other spurious dialogues. This arrangement will serve to familiarize the student with the character of these forged writings before he meets *Alcibiades I* and *Epinomis*, the only ones concerning which a doubt may yet be said to exist.

W. A. H.

PART I.—INTRODUCTION.

§ I.—METHOD.

For a century, since the revival of interest by Schleiermacher, there has been unusual activity in the study of Plato.¹ The question as to the genuineness of the works transmitted to us as his productions is of course fundamental. One would naturally suppose that an enquiry prosecuted with so much zeal and erudition must have resulted ere now in practical agreement at least on this point; and, indeed, the opinions of scholars are gradually converging toward the acceptance of certain conclusions which are coming to be regarded as quite assured.² But as yet there cannot be said to exist any clearly defined and universally recognized method. In the earlier stages of the enquiry there appeared a lamentable confusion of the philosophical and philological modes of procedure, which naturally entailed a superficial and subjective judgment seriously prejudicial to the investigation. Although most contributions to the subject even now labor under the same difficulty, it is happily becoming daily more apparent that the task of criticism lies prior to the really philosophical treatment and that, in consequence, it belongs of right to philology. Hence, though a minute knowledge of ancient philosophy is indispensable, *the method must be philological*. Ast's procedure well illustrates the dangers of a want of sober method. For though he distinctly declared that Platonism was not a system of tenets but a point of view or a mental attitude, his criticism consisted largely in a

¹ Convenient summaries of the work of earlier critics may be found in Grote's *Plato*, etc., vol. I; Stein, *Sieben Bücher z. Gesch. des Platonismus*, bk. VII; Huit, *La Vie et l'Oeuvre de Platon*, Paris, 1893. Ueberweg's 8th ed. not only gives a clear résumé, but also adds the bibliography up to 1894.

² One of the most suggestive illustrations of the tendency—peculiarly significant because of the kind dispensation which has so prolonged his scientific labors—is the change which has taken place in Zeller's views between the appearance of his *Platonische Studien* in 1839 and his latest publications. His change of front is all the more praiseworthy because it has been in a large measure the means of producing a like reaction in the views of others.

rigid comparison of individual works with his own conception of Plato's philosophy. And Ast's influence has been very great upon all his successors. When we remember that it was the philosophical revival in Germany that awakened the renewed interest in Plato, we find in that fact the key to the explanation of the earlier method.

The Platonic canon is not an isolated phenomenon. In recent years classical scholarship has been endeavoring to classify and examine critically its inheritance from the past. In so doing it has discovered the existence of a vast body of spurious literature³ which owed its appearance to various but, in the main, determinable causes and conditions. As this process advances, the characteristics of this class of writings begin to be ever more clearly discerned, and their use as a conclusive criterion to be applied to works still in dispute is greatly facilitated.⁴ Clearly, then, the question as to the authenticity of doubtful claimants to a place in the Platonic canon cannot be definitely settled until this method, now only fairly begun, has been quite perfected and the provisional results gained in various fields may be summed up in a comprehensive statement. Meanwhile such provisional data must be gathered, and the present study is conceived as an attempt to contribute to this end by examining the doubtful constituents of the Platonic canon.⁵

³I should here mention the excellent monograph by Dr. Gudeman on "Literary Frauds among the Greeks" in "Classical Studies in Honour of Henry Drisler," 1894, in which he has stated in compendious form much that is highly instructive.

⁴Susemihl's *Gesch. d. Gr. Litt. in d. Alexandrinerzeit*, 1891-2, has in this respect rendered scholarship an inestimable service, which may confidently be expected to mark an epoch in the criticism of suspected literature. Would that we possessed such a hand-book of the whole of Greek literature!

⁵In a more limited sense the method here proposed was already recommended—but alas! not followed—by Hermann, *Gesch. der plat. Philosophie*, 1839, p. 411: "Und so kommen wir denn allerdings darauf zurück, dass es bei weitem nicht so sehr allgemeiner Kennzeichen der Aechtheit als besonderer der Unächtheit bedarf, um die vorliegende Sammlung von ihren unterschobenen Bestandtheilen zu reinigen," and by Steinhart in *Zeitschr. f. Phil.*, vol. 58, p. 57: "Hier wäre es wol gerathen, einmal als Gegenprobe den umgekehrten (Weg) einzuschlagen, und von jenen Dialogen auszugehen, die schon von den alten Kritikern verworfen wurden, um an dem anerkannt Unplatonischen das als platonisch Ueberlieferte zu prüfen."

§ II.—THE ATTESTATION OF PLATONIC DIALOGUES.

When we speak of the attestation of one of Plato's works it is not sufficient to cite the catalogues of Thrasyllus and Aristophanes of Byzantium⁶; for it is now universally conceded that the attempt of Grote⁷ and others to vindicate them as authentic and definitive was wholly unsuccessful. The question then arises whether criticism is entirely without an adequate external support and committed to subjective criteria. Now we have, as is well known, a wholly unique tribunal for the adjustment of claims to Platonic authorship in the works of Aristotle, and to it are finally appealed, so far as external evidence is followed, all cases in dispute. As regards Aristotle's testimony, indeed, there has been some doubt; but it is now quite generally conceded to constitute certainty where it can be clearly made out. As I cannot here enter upon an elaborate critique of this question, I shall refer the student only to Bonitz's *Index* to Aristotle s. v. *Plato* and to Zeller's discussion which supplements it (*Phil. der Gr.*, II A, p. 443 ff.). I may the more readily do this, because the method pursued in this study approaches the question from the other side; but there still remains something to be said. We may fairly ask whether later tradition, as represented *e. g.* by Aristophanes, though possessing in itself no independent evidential value, may not be available as confirmatory in cases where Aristotle shows acquaintance with a work but does not expressly attribute it to Plato. To me it seems clear that in all these instances the unanimous verdict of antiquity must be conceded to be presumably right. Accordingly, unless more valid objections are raised than hitherto, I think we may safely accept for the provisional standard of genuineness in contrast to which the spurious may be placed, the following works as amply attested by Aristotle: *Republic*, *Timaeus*, *Laws*, *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Phaedrus*, *Hippias Minor*, *Meno*, *Gorgias*, *Menexenus*, *Apology*, *Theaetetus*, *Philebus*, *Parmenides*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, *Sophista*, *Politicus*, *Lysis*, *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Crito*, *Cratylus*, and *Hippias Major*. In his youth Aristotle is known to have written dialogues in imita-

⁶ On Thrasyllus see *Diog. L.*, III 56 ff.; on Aristophanes, *ibid.* 61 f.

⁷ Grote, *Plato and the Other Companions of Socrates*, vol. I. See Zeller's criticism, *l. c.*, and for general points, Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Gesch. der Phil.*, vol. I, 8th ed., pp. 144 ff.

tion of his master,⁷ adhering closely to his style and doctrine. Years afterward, when he founded his school and wrote the extant works, his interest in the lighter Platonic dialogues gave place to criticism of the later writings and teachings of his master and his successors,⁸ against whom he had to maintain his charter of independence. That his citations of those earlier dialogues, certainly made in large measure from memory, became in consequence rather vague can occasion no just surprise.

§ III.—GENUINE WORKS NOT ATTESTED BY ARISTOTLE.

It will be observed that there are some dialogues not enumerated in the foregoing list which are not included in the Pseudo-Platonica which follow. These are the *Critias*, *Ion*, and *Euthyphro*. On these, therefore, it seems necessary to say a few words, to which some brief notes on other works may be added. The *Critias* is so inseparably connected with the *Timæus*, that, though a fragment, it is impossible to athetize it without rejecting the latter also.⁹ The only objections urged against the *Euthyphro* are philosophical and entirely subjective, hence it must be accepted unless arguments of a different nature can be produced. If it has no direct attestation earlier than Aristophanes,¹⁰ neither is there anything to cast suspicion upon its authenticity, and it would be surprising indeed if it should ever be proved to be spurious. The *Ion*, too, has been a suspect. Perhaps the best statement of possible objections to it has been given by Zeller.¹¹ It comes in the

⁷ Zeller has shown this of Aristotle's *Eudemus*, which imitated the *Cratylus*; see *Hermes* XV, p. 547 f. On his imitation of the *Laws* in *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας* see note 9 on *Epinomis* and Bywater in *Journ. of Philol.* VII, p. 64 ff.

⁸ Aristotle's own juvenile productions have suffered the same fate, as we possess only scattered fragments of them in the late eclectic literature.

⁹ On the *Critias* see Susemihl, *Jahrbücher f. Philologie*, etc., LXXI, p. 703 ff., and Ueberweg, *Aechtheit u. Zeitfolge der Plat. Schriften*, p. 186 f.

¹⁰ The evident use of *Euthyphro* 7 B in *Περὶ Δικαίου* 372 probably is later than Aristophanes. See *Introd.* §§ IV and VII and note 3 to II. Δ. But the *Minos*, which also imitates *Euthyphro*, is earlier than Aristophanes. See notes 25 and 26 to *Minos*.

¹¹ Zeller in *Zeitschr. f. Alterthumswissenschaft*, 1851, p. 261. The strictures passed upon the *Ion* by Susemihl in his translation published in the Metzler series add some new points of view, but do not suffice to prove the dialogue spurious, as he himself admitted. Subsequently Susemihl (*Gesch. d. Gr. Litt. in d. Alex.* I, p. 23) rejected the dialogue outright, following Zeller and Wilamowitz, *Eurip. Herakles*, I, p. 12. Wilamowitz himself (*Aristoteles und Athen*, I, p. 188, n. 4) has lately in his peremptory manner presumed to pronounce the *Ion* evidently spurious because of the mention

end to this: Though the leading thought and the treatment are clearly Platonic, there is nothing in it so characteristic but that an imitator might readily have contrived it by collating and applying the scattered utterances of Plato which bear upon the subject. Many such passages may be pointed out. And it is not probable *à priori* that Plato would have felt called upon to treat of the art of the rhapsodes, who were of little consequence in his day. Against this charge it may be sufficient answer to point out that if Plato had touched upon this theme he could not have done so in any other spirit than that here appearing, and that the supposed imitations, being free and wholly germane to the subject, may very well be only the result of a naturally fixed point of view arising from Plato's theory of art. Besides, it is clear that what is here said of the rhapsodes is intended also for actors, who cannot be considered very insignificant factors in the Athenian life of that day; and, if we have no direct attestation, there is at least one unmistakable reference to the *Ion* as early as the *Eryxias*.¹² I cannot, therefore, discover adequate reasons for believing the *Ion* spurious. Concerning the *Parmenides*,¹³ which it is still the fashion in some quarters to reject, it must suffice to say that the arguments adduced against it are either philosophical or purely linguistic. The former are, I am convinced, mistaken, and the latter wholly *mal à propos*.¹⁴ At any rate, according to

of Apollodorus of Cyzicus in 541 C, whom he identifies, without the least show of evidence, with Apollodorus the Athenian, who was general in Asia Minor in 340 B. C. His judgment on the *Menexenus* (ibid. II, p. 99, n. 35) is equally arbitrary.

¹²*Eryx.* 403 D to *Ion* 532 D; see note 6 to *Eryxias*.

¹³On the *Parmenides* see Zeller, II a, p. 463 and 475 ff., and Steinhart in *Zeitschr. f. Philosophie*, vol. 51, p. 250 ff. The trite objection that the argument *πρὸς ἀνθρώπου* is used (alleged to be the invention of Aristotle by Schaarschmidt, Ueberweg, etc.) S. meets by showing that the Megarians employed it against Aristotle's distinction of *πρώτη* and *δευτέρα οὐσία*. Professor Shorey has repeatedly pointed out that the argument occurs also in *Rep.* 597 C and *Tim.* 31 A, and that the *Republic* contains *in parvo* every important thought in the *Parmenides*. See Shorey, *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina atque Mentis Humanae Notionibus Commentatio*, esp. p. 26, p. 30 n. 4 and his notes on the *Timaeus* and on Jowett's *Plato* and Jowett and Campbell's *Republic* in A. J. P., vols. X, XIII and XVI.

¹⁴I cannot here enter into a discussion of the evidential value of the researches of Dittenberger, Frederking and Ritter. The severely dialectic and logical form of the *Parm.* naturally entailed monotony in the use of language, and particularly of particles of transition, and hence no legitimate conclusions can be drawn from observations of that character.

the method herein proposed, there appears to me to be no sufficient case against any of the foregoing.

§ IV.—THE CANON.

This leads us naturally to consider the origin of the canon. We do not know what, if any, precautions were taken in the Academy to guard the integrity of its founder's literary bequest. The certainty, however, that we possess all that Plato published betokens effective care on this side; but what assurance have we that measures were adopted to prevent the intrusion of the works of others into the list? The artistic perfection of the master's dialogues, incapable of being fairly epitomized, doubtless preserved them from the fate of Aristotle's works. But criticism shows that in the canon as transmitted spurious writings are included. When, therefore, did it assume its present form?

There probably existed lists of the works in the library of the Academy, but it is questionable whether they specially classified the scrolls by authors. Plato's immediate pupils of long standing would not require such, and others might enquire of them. Perhaps, therefore, several generations may have passed before an authentic catalogue was attempted. At the Alexandrian library such procedure was more necessary; but even there we have no evidence of a canon before Aristophanes, ca. 200 B. C., who possibly was the first to constitute one. Of his method of verification we know absolutely nothing, but his arrangement into trilogies¹⁵ was in part violent and unmeaning. Yet he did not reduce all to this scheme. D. L. says, after enumerating them, τὰ δ' ἅλλα καθ' ἕν καὶ ἀτάκτως, *which seems, at first sight, to imply the whole traditional list*. There is, in fact, only one point at which the catalogue of Thrasyllus adds something which, as will later appear, may not have been known to Aristophanes. That is in regard to the Ἐπιστολαί, which, as a mere rubric, might be added to indefinitely until, as in Thrasyllus' list, the letters were themselves catalogued according to the name of the addressee. If we adopt this view of the essential completeness of Aristophanes' canon, we can readily account for the rejection of the so-called *dialogi notii*¹⁶; for with the single exception of the *Eryxias*, they doubtless did not exist sufficiently long before 200 to be accepted as

¹⁵ A. apud D. L., III 61 has five trilogies, as follows: I. *Rep.*, *Tim.*, *Critias*; II. *Soph.*, *Polit.*, *Crat.*; III. *Legg.*, *Minos*, *Epin.*; IV. *Theat.*, *Euthyphro*, *Apol.*; V. *Crito*, *Phaedo*, Ἐπιστολαί.

¹⁶ Cf. D. L., III 62: νοθεύονται . . . ὁμολογουμένως Μίδων, Ἐρυξίας, Ἀλκυών, ἀκέφαλοι ἢ (?), Σίσυφος, Ἀξίοχος, Δημοδόκος, κ. τ. λ.

Platonic. The *Eryxias* was, quite probably, not received into the list because it was referred to some other author by a tradition later become extinct. But why, we must then ask, did Aristophanes admit *Epinomis*, *Alcibiades II*, *Anterastae*, and *Hipparchus*. It seems necessary to concede that in the case of some or all of these dialogues there coexisted with the common tradition or assumption attributing them to Plato, another which assigned them to a different source.¹⁷ Now, A. is known¹⁸ to have used spurious Aristotelian works in his περὶ ζώων and may well have been similarly misled in regard to the dialogues in question, his notorious conservatism leading him perhaps to disregard dissenting voices, particularly since his studies in Plato were beyond not only his own peculiar province but also beyond that of his predecessors at the library. This consideration applies with even greater force to his acceptance of a work like the *Minos* concerning which there appears then to have been no dispute.

§ V.—CAUSES FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PSEUDEPIGRAPHIA.¹⁹

It is needless here to consider all causes operative in the ancient world to produce confusion, error and deceit in the ascription of literary productions to given personages. It will suffice to refer to such as may have been active in the case of the Platonic canon. In the case of the dialogues, in which the author entirely disappears, the fact of their having no hall-mark, so to speak, upon them may in the first instance have led collectors to class the new claimants with those of Plato merely for convenience of comparison and study; once there, it became difficult to distinguish between false and true. This source of confusion was certainly the more important because Plato's dialogues not only set the example for all others, but so materially influenced almost all writers of subsequent times that his thought and language even recur on every hand. But it is impossible to account for all in this way. The imitation in many cases goes so far that deliberate fraud seems to be the only possible verdict. If some vied with Plato out of conceit of their own powers,—

“Scilicet ut plausus quos fert Agrippa feras tu,
Astuta ingenuum volpes imitata leonem,”—

¹⁷ See my notes to these dialogues, and Zeller, II A, p. 441, n. 1.

¹⁸ See Susemihl, I, p. 442.

¹⁹ Dr. Gudeman, op. cit., has touched upon this subject in its different aspects, varying with the classes of literature, and those who do not wish to refer to Susemihl will find his treatment sufficient.

and claimed their productions; others were satisfied with the secret exultation of having so successfully mimicked him as to have the credulous public accept their work for genuinely Platonic. In the Academy there can have been little call for falsifications to serve the ends of propaganda; but in epistle XII we seem to have an example of a "lie to conceal a lie" floated by the Neo-Pythagoreans,²⁰ for that very purpose of propaganda. Whether pecuniary inducements, on which so much stress has been laid in modern times,²¹ were to any extent operative in calling forth the Pseudo-Platonica cannot be determined. At all events, it is probable that the incessant practice in all varieties of literature fostered in the schools of rhetoric, and the growing interest in biography and antiquities, had far more to do with the presence of these spurious works. If, for example, Wilamowitz is right in calling Antigonus of Carystus (b. ca. 290 B. C.) the originator of scientific biography, we should be able to consider him as an opponent of the already prevalent tendency to imaginary or apocryphal anecdotic narratives of the lives of philosophers, such as appear in the spurious *Letters*.

§ VI.—CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PSEUDO-PLATONICA.

Difficult as it is at this stage of the enquiry, it seems best to attempt some sort of characterization of the Pseudo-Platonica. Since, however, this can be adequately done only after the whole of Greek literature has been examined, as above indicated, we must confine the statement for the present to an enumeration of the more important of such marks as seem to distinguish that body of works from the genuine writings of Plato. But to do even so much in detail in this introduction, apart from the given instances, would lead us too far afield. The following table therefore deals only with the more general categories, omitting such characteristics as are sporadic or admit of no satisfactory classification. Nevertheless, as Plato says, *Legg.* 859 B: οὐ δύσχεραν-τέον, εἰ μεταξὺ νομοθετοῦντες τὰ μὲν ἔθεμεν, τῶν δ' ἔτι διασχοποῦμεν περὶ νομοθέται γὰρ γιγνόμεθα ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐσμέν πω, τάχα δὲ ἴσως ἂν γενοίμεθα.

²⁰ Cf. note 50 to the *Letters*.

²¹ The passages on which this supposition rests are principally Galen, *de nat. hom.*, I 42, and Ammonius to Aristotle's *Categ.* p. 10. Cf. Susemihl, I, p. 25, Gudeman, p. 61, and Bernays, *Heraklitische Briefe*, Appendix 1.

(1). *Post-Platonic and post-classical diction* is naturally the most obvious test, when the wreck of Greek literature permits a decision. (2). *Unplatonian diction* is more difficult to establish, when it does not fall under the preceding head, because of Plato's unsurpassed versatility and freedom; but close observers of his usage readily detect the fraud when his unfailing felicity of expression gives place to bungling. (3). Closely allied to the foregoing is *the distinct want of taste* displayed in cheap rhetoric, tags culled from the poets and insipidly foisted in, unnecessary accumulation of illustrative examples, affectation, and ostentatious parading of erudition. All this is hostile to Attic grace and highly characteristic of the degenerate style affected in the Alexandrian age. But, in applying this test, it must be remembered that many of these tendencies had their origin in the sophistic training which Plato opposed not only by open remonstrance but also, and more frequently too, with sly travesty now almost imperceptible. (4). Here and there a significant *failure in the manipulation of the Platonic dialogue-form* may be detected, frequently due to the overruling *rhetorical interest* of the production. (5). *Commonplaces*, Socratic or Platonic, are received ready-made and juggled with according to the intention of the author, no effort being made to lead up to them. Taking these as its points of departure, the argument then becomes either wholly eristic, or, even where generally legitimate, quite superficial, showing that we are not in the sphere of true dialogues of search, but following an author with a position to develop, though he may prefer to mask it in dialogue rather than resort to direct exposition. (6). In a few instances we find *extensive verbatim quotations from Plato*. (7). But far more frequent is the occurrence of *freer imitations and allusions to striking passages*. Here, however, great caution is necessary. Parallels and correspondences between different passages penned by an author are natural and unavoidable in proportion as his modes of thought are individual. No writer, however fertile, can hope to state his most familiar conceptions otherwise than in the peculiar light in which they first or most vividly impressed him. Hence, taken singly, this cannot constitute a sufficient test; but when on other evidence a production is liable to grave suspicion, nothing can be more conclusive than this characteristic. For the authors of these forgeries were so familiar with Plato's most quotable sayings that their style and language abound in reminiscences of his

works. But these, in turn, range from the most obvious to the almost undiscernible, and must be judged rather as a whole than singly. (8). In a few works there appears *an effort to establish by argument the propriety of certain favorite expressions of Plato's*, as of εἰ πράττειν in *Epp.* III and XIII, of εἰς θεὸς ἐθέλη in *Alc. I* and *Theages*, and of θεῖα μύτρα in *II. A.* This indubitably marks the epigoni. (9). Equally decisive is *the turning to serious account of Platonic jests*, as in *Theages* (n. 10) and *II. A.* (n. 3). (10). *Dependence on works already condemned as spurious.* This test is so obvious that it needs no comment. (11). *Neglect of logical precision* in what purports to be serious reasoning, *eristic quibbling*, and undisguised *contradiction*. (12). *Ultra-religiousness and mysticism.* (13). *A philosophical standpoint entirely unplatonic.* (14). Not a few works reveal *dependence on the writings of Aristotle.* (15). *Even post-Aristotelian thought* occurs.

§ VII.—APPROXIMATE CHRONOLOGICAL RESULTS.

It seems proper here to state in brief the conclusions relative to the probable succession and dates of the several works herein treated, to which the investigation has led. For the basis of this arrangement the reader is referred to the separate discussions in Part II.

(1). The *Epinomis* doubtless appeared shortly after Plato's death under the combined influence of Plato's latest thought and Aristotle's juvenile productions, but no definite traces of its having created interest can be observed in the other Pseudo-Platonica. (2). *Alcibiades I*, however, which was written about 300 B. C., found great favor with all later admirers of Plato and, in particular, with the authors of later forgeries, almost all of which betray a knowledge of it. (3). About the same time with it appeared the *Eryxias*, and (4) somewhat later, *Alcibiades II*, which is conceived, probably by another author, as a companion piece to the *First*. Then came (5) *Ep. VII*, say ca. 290, which seems to depend on *Alc. I* and *II*; and (6) *Theages*, a supplement to *Alc. I*, and subsequent to *Alc. II*, together with (7) *Anterastae*, clearly later than *Alc. I* and perhaps called forth by Peripatetic criticisms of Plato. (8). *Epp.* VIII and III must fall in about here, say 270; and with them (9) *Clitopho*, which uses *Alc. I* as an unquestionable document for the knowledge of Plato's doctrine and depends also on *Anterastae*. (10). *Hipparchus* and

Minos originated about 250 B. C., and between that date and, say, 200, appeared the greater number of (11) *Epp.* II, IV, V, VI, IX, X, and possibly, though not probably, (12) *Περὶ Ἀρετῆς* and *Περὶ Δικαίου*, the latter of which depends on *Minos*. (13). *Sisyphus* and *Demodocus* seem to have been written about 150 B. C. and (14) *Epp.* I, XI, XII, XIII, at dates ranging perhaps from 200 to 50 B. C. (15). *Alcyon* and *Axiochus* scarcely originated before the first Pre-Christian century, nor (16) *Epp.* XIV–XVIII before the third, A. D. (17). The *Definitions*, first quoted as Platonic by Ammonius (fl. ca. 500 A. D.), may not have existed much earlier, though it is possible that they were collected by one of the later Stoics.²²

²² They contain, besides Platonic or quasi-Platonic definitions, some which are Peripatetic and some clearly Stoic. I fancy the compilation of philosophical definitions in this eclectic fashion began with the Stoics under the influence of the lexicographical zeal developed in the Alexandrian age. Thus the *Definitions* of Sphaerus, a pupil of Zeno, were held in great esteem among the Stoics (Cic. Tusc., IV 24, 53). But his were doubtless *Stoical* definitions. The eclectic procedure seen in our *Definitions* must have originated later.

PART II.—PSEUDO-PLATONICA.

§ I.—AXIOCHUS.

The *Axiochus* is one of the many works, known as "*Consolations*," produced in antiquity under the primary inspiration of Plato's *Phaedo*.¹ After Aristotle's *Eudemus* (or περὶ ψυχῆς), which must have been largely of this nature,² the most influential subsequent production was doubtless Crantor's περὶ Ἰένθου. It has now become the fashion to trace all others directly or indirectly back to this, a procedure which seems fully justified by the facts. But it appears to me that Corssen³ has proved so much at least, that the *Axiochus*, like Cicero's *Consolatio* and Bk. I of the *Tusculana* and Pseudo-Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium*, whatever other sources they may have drawn upon, used some authority who blended Stoic and Epicurean⁴ thoughts with the

¹ On this whole series see Buresch in *Leipziger Studien*, vol. IX. But his attempt (p. 9 ff.) to claim *Ax.* for Aeschines the Socratic is futile. The *Ax.* contains thoughts and expressions from *Phaedo* (cf. *Ax.* 370 C with *Ph.* 114 C, *Ax.* 370 D with *Ph.* 114 B), but we need not suppose that its author derived them thence at first hand. The beginning of the dialogue reminds one of *Rep.* and *Symp.*, while § 2 init. recalls *Lysis* 203 A.

² See the long quotation from it in *Plut. Cons. ad Apollonium*, 115 B ff. Cf. also note 7 to 'Introduction.'

³ Corssen in *Rhein. Museum* (1881), vol. 36. I shall have to refer the student to this article for details concerning the relation of Cicero, Plutarch and *Axiochus* to each other and to a presumptive archetype.

⁴ On this see Corssen. In *Axiochus* 365 DE we have an application of Epicurus' argument against the reality of death, cf. *Diog. L.*, X 125; 366 A: ἅτε παρεσπαρμένη <Dümmmler (*Akademika*, p. 281) proposes διεσπαρμένη after *Plut. De Anima* 3, but nothing is gained thereby> τοῖς πόροις, ἡ ψυχῇ, cf. *Epic. ap. Diog. L.*, X 63: ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ σώμ' ἐστὶ λεπτομερὲς παρ' ὅλον τὸ ἄθροισμα παρεσπαρμένον (cf. X 66, in Usener's *Epicurea*, scholion, p. 21 f.); 370 C: εἰ μὴ τι θεῖον ὄντως ἐνὶ πνεύματι τῇ ψυχῇ, cf. the πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον of the Stoics, *D. L.*, VII 157. Whatever may have been the connection of the Stoic θεῖον πνεῦμα with the ἀήρ of Diogenes of Apollonia, this passage is purely Stoic. Dümmmler's argument (o. c., p. 281) is insufficient to prove his point. Besides, *φευκτάς*, 369 B, may show Stoic influence (cf. *Zeller*, III B, p. 25), though *Arist. Eth.* 1172^b 19 and *Sext. adv. Math.* VII, 11 would seem to mark it as Cyrenaic, unless we assume a Stoic recension of Aristotle. Cf. *Eucken*, *Phil. Term.* p. 28, n. 1. The form Ἑκαέργη in 371 A is not found before *Callim. IV* 292, Ἄργη occurring *Hdt. IV* 35.

original Platonic. Whether this was Posidonius or not can hardly be determined, but it is an over-hasty conclusion to infer from a resemblance in its better portions to the fragments of Teles⁵ that it originated, like them, in the third cent. B. C. Those very parts its author professes to derive from Prodicus.⁶ It is, indeed, only too evident that Prodicus could not have written all that is contained in the speech attributed to him, but this does not prove that its reference to him was wholly unwarranted. It is at least very instructive to observe the gradual additions to the list of hardships to which youth is exposed.⁷ If there was no such epideictic discourse by Prodicus, our author was at least clever enough to refer to the one reproduced in Xenophon.⁸ But despite his cleverness, and in part because of it, he has betrayed himself.⁹ In spirit the *Axiochus* stands most closely related to

⁵ As Susemihl (I, p. 22, n. 65) does, following Wilamowitz, *Ant. von Karystos*, p. 295 f., n. 6. The fragments of Teles are in Stobaeus, *Floril.* (ed. Mein.), vol. I, pp. 123-128; II, pp. 65-70; III, pp. 77, 186-189, 234; IV, pp. 49-53, 164. The style of Teles is clear and the language pure; but how is it with the *Axiochus*? See *infra*, notes 8, 11 and 12. Dümmler on general grounds agrees essentially with Susemihl as to the date, fixing it (*Akad.* p. 282) not long after Bion the Borysthenite (fl. ca. 300 B. C.).

⁶ *Axiochus*, 366 D ff.

⁷ I have no doubt that there was once some such production of Prodicus, though it seems impossible to attribute so much of the contents of the argument to that Sophist as Dümmler does, *o. c.*, p. 280. Plato seems to presuppose a work on that topic, *Lysis* 207 D ff.; Sophocles, *O. C.* 1211 ff., dwells in a general way upon the theme; it is caught up in the *Epinomis*, 973 D ff., and then it grows by regular accretion. In Teles (Stobaeus, *Floril.* III, p. 234 f.) the list is long, but contains nothing impossible in the third cent.; in Cebes' Tab., c. XIII the masters specified are: ποιηταί, ῥήτορες, διαλεκτικοί, μουσικοί, ἀριθμητικοί, γεωμέτραι, ἀστρολόγοι, Ἡδονικοί, Περιπατικοί (sic), κριτικοί. It would almost seem that our author tried to complete this list; but he was too well read openly to display his fraud, for (see 368 D: πῶς δὲ πρῶν οἱ δέκα στρατηγοί, cf. *Apol.* 32 B) he tried to give his work the appearance of reality, and so revised the catalogue (366 D f.): παιδαγωγοί, γραμματισταί, παιδοτρίβαι, κριτικοί, γεωμέτραι, τακτικοί. Socrates could not mention *Peripatetics* and *Academics*, but he could single out the (now) famous gymnasiums Λύκειον καὶ Ἀκαδημία! Even if the *Axiochus* should not be later than Cebes' Tablet, which I would date, with Zeller (*II A*, p. 242, n. 6) and Wilamowitz (*Antig. von Karyst.*, p. 293), not earlier than the 1st cent. B. C., it cannot, as will appear, be much earlier.

⁸ *Ax.* 367 A: φροντίδες ἀντικρυς ὑπέδυσαν καὶ διαλογισμοί (= διάλογοι as in *Plut.* 2, 180 C?), τίνα τὴν τοῦ βίου ὁδὸν ἐνστήσεται, cf. *Xen. Mem.* II 1, 21 ff.

⁹ In 367 A mention is made of measures adopted by the Areopagus in the 3rd cent. to correct the vices of the young. These were probably instituted

Alcyon, and the mysticism with which Socrates is surrounded reminds one of *Theages*.¹⁰ Its style, which is quite uneven, is in some passages very like that of Seneca,¹¹ and some of the words employed reveal a kinship with the Pseudo-Pythagorean and forged medical literature.¹² The first century B. C. is as early as we can date a dialogue, which is so uncritically eclectic.

§ II.—ALCYON.

This dialogue is usually published also among the works of Lucian, although no one supposes it to be one of them; for there is reason for believing that it was written before his time.¹ The

so much before his time that he thought they might have originated in the 5th cent.; his avoidance of too evident anachronisms (cf. note 7) making it seem unlikely that, if those ordinances were recent, he would have referred to them. The use of the tell-tale word *κριτικοί* was probably a mere unconscious bit of padding. His cleverness is shown in his fondness for rare words, but this rendered his dialogue strikingly unplatonic, over 100 words and phrases foreign to Plato occurring here in ten pages. Then Plato located Hades *in* the earth; here (371 B) it is at the nadir. The Stoics' interest in astrology and meteorology misled him into such words as these (370 E): *μετεωρολογῶ καὶ δίδειμι τὸν αἰδίων καὶ θεῖον δρόμον*. Again, how impossible with Socrates is this, 370 C: *τὰ τοῦ κόσμου παθήματα παραπήξασθαι πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα, εἰ μὴ τι θεῖον ὄντως ἐνῆν πνεῦμα τῇ ψυχῇ!* Cf. Cicero, *Tusc.* I, §63: "Ne in sphaera quidem eosdem motus Archimedes sine divino ingenio potuisset imitari," and see the *σφαιρίον* in the *Letters*, n. 45.

¹⁰ Clinias says, 364 C: *ὁφθέντος σου μόνον ῥαΐσει*, cf. note 10 to *Theages*.

¹¹ Note the profusion of epithets in 368 D, 369 A, 371 E.

¹² I cannot here go into details; but for *σκήνος*, 366 A (which occurs, to be sure, in Democr., frag. 6, Mullach), see Anton, *De Origine Libelli Περὶ Ψυχᾶς Κόσμου καὶ Φύσιος* Inscripti, p. 270 ff.; for *σῆψις*, 365 D, Anton, p. 360 f.; for *φλεγμονή*, 368 C, Anton, p. 420, n. 612. The case of *σκήνος*, however, shows that this point must not be strongly urged.

¹ Diog. L., III 62: *ἡ Ἀλκυὼν Λέοντος τινος εἶναι δοκεῖ, καθά φησι Φαβωρίνος*; Athenaeus, XI 506 C: *καὶ ἡ Ἀλκυὼν Λέοντος τοῦ Ἀκαδημαϊκοῦ, ὡς φησι Νικίας ὁ Νικαεὺς*. Of Leon we know nothing. Of Nicias' date we are likewise ignorant, but he probably lived under the early Empire (cf. Susemihl, I, p. 505 f.), in which case he may still have been Favorinus' source. Brinkmann (*Quaestionum de dialogis Platoni falso addictis specimen*, Bonn, 1891) makes Nicias a contemporary of Sylla, and hence dates the *Alcyon* in the 2d or 3d cent. B. C. I wish here to acknowledge my indebtedness to Brinkmann, with whose results I generally agree. His dissertation, however, reached me only after I had collected largely the same materials. I shall therefore refer for further details to his work, as it seems unnecessary here to repeat all that is contained in it.

strict observance of the laws of hiatus² and the affectedly poetic color of its diction³ suffice to mark it as a post-Platonic production, while its vocabulary forbids placing it earlier than the 2d cent. B. C.⁴ The Stoic bias of the author is so manifest that Brinkmann's elaborate argument seems almost superfluous⁵; but the imitation of Plato is sufficiently apparent to justify the treatment of this dialogue among the Pseudo-Platonica.⁶ The enthusiastic description of nature in halcyon days with which it begins and the scenic setting of its close, when compared with the corresponding parts of the *Phaedrus*, reveal unmistakably the conscious imitator. Again, Chaerephon's question, §II: πῶς ποτε χρὴ πεισθῆναι τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐξ ὀρνίθων γυναικῆς ποτε ἐγένοντο ἢ ὄρνιθες ἐκ γυναικῶν; is substantially the same as that put to Socrates in *Phaedrus* 229 C. Here, however, it serves only to introduce a Stoic defence of the miraculous conducted with due fervor and unction. The ultra-religious mysticism displayed is as little Platonic as the pantheistic identification of God with nature. Finally, the *naïveté* with which Socrates' supposed bigamy is

² See Brinkmann, p. 7 ff.

³ §I: πολύθρηνος, πολύδακρυς, κουρίδιον ἄνδρα, πύθω φίλιας; §II: ἀκύμαντον, γαλήνιον; §III: βροντᾶς ἀνέμων τ' ἐξαισία μεγέθη (cf. Ps.-Plat. *Ep.* VII 351 D: χειμῶνων δὲ ἐξαισίον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον μέγεθος); §IV: λαίλαψ; §V: ἐκ γενετῆς, πολυμηχανῶν; §VI: ἀμέτρητον; §VII: ἀναύλοις, μέλιτταν ἀπέδειξε (this use of ἀποδεικνύναι and similar verbs was widely copied from Plato, see note 2 to *Hipparchus*) σοφὴν θεῖον μέλιτος ἐργάτιν; §VIII: ἀθανάτων = θεῶν, ὦ ὄρνι θρήνων μελωδέ.

⁴ §I: πλαζομένη, late or poetic; §II: ἤχον, Hellenistic; φιλανδρίαν (cf. §VIII: φίλανδρον) 'love of husband' is late; §III: ἐφικτῶν = 'possible' and ἀνέφικτα, with εἰπεῖν ἐφικτόν (§V) and θεωρεῖν ἐφικνουμένους (§VI) are all late; §IV: τυχὸν ἴσως is Hellenistic, and §IV: ἕως τοῦ νῦν is not Attic. Abstract plurals, like εὐδίας, §II, and ἀδυναμίας, §V, occur indeed in Isocrates, etc., but become common only in Hellenistic times.

⁵ Here I shall refer to Brinkmann, p. 16 ff., mentioning only the figure of the potter, in §IV, or moulder of wax images so common with the Stoics, and the thought, §VII: τέχναις, ὡς λόγος τινῶν, ἱεραῖς αἰθέρος μεγάλου προσχωμένη, which is equivalent to naming that sect.

⁶ The author indulges in Plato's favorite postponement of περί, the use of παντὸς μᾶλλον, the frequent addition of τις, τι, and other familiar devices. Again, συχνὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ νηπιότητα φρενῶν· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ νήπιος εἴοικεν εἶναι πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ ὁ πάνν γέρων, ἐπεὶ τοι μικρὸς πάνν καὶ νεογίλλος ὁ τοῦ βίου χρόνος πρὸς τὸν πάντα αἰῶνα, §III, may just possibly be a reminiscence of *Tim.* 22 B (cf. *Epin.* 974 A and *Rep.* 608 C). The word ἀγραμμάτοις, §VII, seems to occur in this sense of 'illiterate' only in *Tim.* 23 B and *Critias* 109 D in classic authors.

referred to is another mark of a late and unsuspecting scribe.⁷ It seems most probable that the *Alcyon* was written during the first cent. B. C.

§ III.—Περὶ Διχαίου.

This sketch¹ is related to the *Republic* somewhat as Περὶ Ἀρετῆς is to the *Meno*; but its author is more independent of his original. His independence, however, serves only to disclose the fraud; for it consists chiefly in selecting without philosophical insight statements made by various characters in the first book of the *Republic*² in utter disregard of their subsequent acceptance or rejection, and in ignoring, like the *Clitopho*, the masterly solution of the problem of justice set forth in the succeeding books. The conviction thus created of the work's spuriousness receives confirmation from the observation of its indebtedness to other dialogues,³ and not only to genuine ones, but also to the spurious *Minos*.⁴ We have no adequate data upon which to base

⁷ This libellous story seems to have originated with Aristoxenus or Demetrius Phalereus, and, since Luzac, has become universally discredited.

¹ This dialogue and its companion piece, Π. Α., are not even expressly mentioned in the list of *dialogi nothi* (D. L., III 62), but Hermann (*Gesch. der plat. Phil.*, III, p. 154) suggests that they belong to the eight ἀκέφαλοι there noted (if one accepts his conj. ἀκέφαλοι η' for Ἀκέφαλος ἥ) as spurious. See my note 27 to the *Minos*.

² This is too obvious to require proof. Note, e. g., how in 374 B. C. our author uses the argument (from *Rep.* 332 B ff., 335 B ff.), showing that justice cannot be defined as doing good to friends and harm to foes.

³ Π. Δ. 372, μή μοι οὕτως, cf. *Prot.* 318 B; the examples in 372–373 A are derived with little change from *Euthyphro* 7 B ff.; for τὸ ὑπερέχον, 373 E, see *Hipp. Maj.* 294 B; with 373 E: τὸ μὲν κάτω ῥέπον ἐν τοῖς ζυγοῖς βαρύν, τὸ δὲ ἄνω κοῦφον, compare *Tim.* 63 B ff., esp. 63 D: κοῦφον οὖν αὐτὸ προσειρήκαμεν καὶ τὸν τόπον εἰς ὃν βιαζόμεθ' ἄνω, τὸ δ' ἐναντίον τούτοις πάθος βαρύν καὶ κάτω; in 375 A we have τέμνειν καὶ κατεῖν καὶ ἰσχυραίνειν, for which see *Gorg.* 521 E and *Pol.* 293 B.

⁴ Page 372 reproduces *Minos* 313 B, except that in the latter we read ὄψις and λόγος where in the former were ὀφθαλμός and φωνή. This difference leads finally to the confusion of δικαιοσύνη (the correlate of ὄψις, λόγος and τέχνη in the following quotation) and δικαστική (the correlate of ὀφθαλμός and φωνή, as well as ὄργανον) in Π. Δ. 373 A: τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικά τίνι σκοποῦντες διαγιγνώσκομεν ὄργανω, καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄργανου τίνι τέχνη πρόσθεν (=γε πρόσ), and what follows. Hence Socrates, after asking <τί ποιοῦντες διακρίνοῦσιν οἱ δικασταὶ> περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων; helps his hesitating companion by suggesting, 373 C, λέγοντες, φάθι. This exceedingly unplatonic turn is thus translated by Susemihl: "Sie (denken nach und) sprechen

a judgment as to the precise time when this sketch was written, but the use of *πρόσθεν* = 'insuper'⁵ suffices to show that it originated after the decay of the Greek language was far on its way.⁶

§ IV.—Περὶ Ἀρετῆς.

If not an unsuccessful sketch made in good faith by a novice to assure himself that he had caught Plato's manner as well as the substance of his doctrine respecting virtue, *Περὶ Ἀρετῆς* is a cunningly contrived plagiarism from the *Meno*,¹ omitting the distinctively philosophical suggestions² of its original while doubly emphasizing its half-mystical conclusion. In the *Meno*, as elsewhere in Plato, the teachableness of virtue is made to depend upon the prior question as to its true nature, which is here not so much as raised. On the other hand, that demotic virtue, which Plato there concludes must come to man *θεία μοίρα*, is here made supreme; and a mere jest, there casually let fall by the way, is converted into the crowning argument to prove that virtue is not attained *φύσει*,³ an alternative very simply disposed

(dann). Sage, ist's nicht so?" The parenthesis is not in the text: it means merely 'by the use of speech.' See also 373 D: *λόγος ἐστίν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢ τὰ δίκαια καὶ ἀδίκαια κρίνεται*, where *λόγος* = *φωνή*, a very different thing from the statement in the *Republic* 582 D, which our author may have had partially in mind: *λόγοι δὲ τούτων* <sc. τοῦ κρίνεσθαι> *μάλιστα ὄργανον*. In Π. Δ. 372: *καὶ ἐάν με ἔρη ὅτῃ ψυχῇ ὄνομα, ἐρῶ σοι ᾧ γινώσκωμεν*, we have a possible reminiscence also of *Alc. I*, 127 E ff., esp. 133 C: *ἔχομεν οὖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἐστὶ τῆς ψυχῆς κυριώτερον ἢ τοῦτο, περὶ δὲ τὸ εἰδέναι τε καὶ φρονεῖν ἐστίν; οὐκ ἔχομεν*. See notes 28–31 to *Alc. I*.

⁵ 373 A, the passage quoted in foregoing note: unless it can conceivably mean 'previously,' to suggest the priority of the *τέχνη* to the *ὄργανον*; but then *μετά* is not in place.

⁶ I do not believe that either Π. Δ. or Π. A. originated before 200 B. C. Possibly they appeared much later. See *Intr.* § VII.

¹ The bulk of Π. A. is taken verbatim from that dialogue; the corresponding passages are these: 376 A = *Meno* 70 A; 376 B = *Meno* 94 ff.; 377 B ff. = *Meno* 93 D f.; 378 B = *Meno* 94 D; 379 AB = *Meno* 89 B; 379 D = *Meno* 99 D ff.

² Particularly the reference of *ἀρετὴ* to *φρόνησις* (*Meno* 89 A) and the comparison hinted at in 'Teiresias amid the shades' (*Meno* 100 A).

³ *Meno* 89 A: *Οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν εἴεν φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοί. Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν πον καὶ τόδ' ἦν. εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο, ἥσαν πον ἂν ἡμῖν οἱ ἐγίγνωσκον τῶν νέων τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τὰς φύσεις, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἂν παραλαβόντες ἐκείνων ἀποφηνάντων ἐφυλάττομεν ἐν ἀκροπόλει*. In Π. A. this becomes a long disquisition (378 C–379 C), beginning in this serious strain: *ἄρα φύσει φύονται*

of in the *Meno* by the subsumption of ἀρετή under φρόνησις.⁴ A minute comparison of the corresponding passages reveals how utterly the life of the original has been eliminated in making the abstract; but the excerptor aspired also to be artistic and introduced gratuitously an insipid jest of his own.⁵ As in the *Letters* the form of address, εὖ πράττειν, was justified by argument, and in *Alcibiades I*, and at even greater length in *Theages*, the parenthesis, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, so here we discover in the attempt to establish dialectically the necessity of θεία μοίρα, one of the most characteristic marks of forgery. Our author has, moreover, left traces of his indebtedness to other dialogues⁶ besides the *Meno*.

§ V.—DEMODOCUS.

The *Demodocus* consists of four distinct sophistical exertations, which receive their name from the circumstance that one Demodocus¹ is addressed, at the beginning of the first, by the

οἱ ἀγαθοί; καὶ τοῦτο τῇδὲ πῃ σκοποῦντες ἰσως ἂν εὔροιμεν. Who can fail to detect the bungling imitator? And yet Socher fancied this was Plato's first draught! In view of the turn given to this conceit at the close, reminding one of the story of Lot (379 D: ὅταν βούληται θεὸς εὖ πράξαι πόλιν, ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ἐνεποίησεν • ὅταν δὲ μέλλῃ κακῶς πράξειν πόλις, ἐξεῖλε τοὺς ἄνδρας τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς ἐκ ταύτης τῆς πόλεως ὁ θεός •), one wonders whether the author may not have had in mind Antisthenes' saying (Diog. L., VI 5): τότε' ἔφη τὰς πόλεις ἀπόλλυσθαι ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται τοὺς φαύλους ἀπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων διακρίνειν.

⁴ *Meno* 89 A.

⁵ 377 D: ὦν καὶ σύ μοι δοκεῖς τοῦ ἐτέρου ἐρασθῆναι, continuing 377 E, ἀλλ' ἰσως ἂν ἐγένοντο.

⁶ With ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν τούτων ὁμιλίαν σοφός τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς γεγονέναι (376 C) compare *Alc. I*, 119 A: ὅστις αἰτίαν ἔχει διὰ τὴν Περικλέους συνουσίαν σοφώτερος γεγονέναι. Here, therefore, we can again trace the influence of *Alc. I*. The following passage in 376 D: ἔστιν οὖν ὅτῳ λυσιτελεῖ μὴ ἐν ἀγαθοῖς οἰκεῖν ἀνδράσιν ἀλλ' ἐν κακοῖς; πότερον ἔργον ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν βλάπτειν, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ὠφελεῖν, ἢ τοῖναντίον; Τοῖναντίον. Οἱ μὲν ἀγαθοὶ ἄρα ὠφελοῦσι, οἱ δὲ κακοὶ βλάπτουσιν; Ναί. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; Οὐ πάνν. Οὐδεὶς ἄρα βούλεται ἐν πονηροῖς οἰκεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν χρηστοῖς, —is found almost verbatim, *Apol.* 25 CD. It is perhaps worth noting that the author, though he began with ἀγαθοὶ and κακοί, ends with χρηστοί and πονηροί, as in the *Apology*. Compare also 377 A with *Protag.* 326 E ff.

¹ In the *Theages* a Demodocus comes to advise with Socrates concerning his son, and it may be inferred that the character was chosen with reference to that fact; if so, this is one more illustration of the schematic nature of the work. The *Theages* was then already in existence and known to our author.

speaker whose identity is not indicated. The first section proves the futility of taking counsel. This would suggest its probable dependence on *Alcibiades I*, and in fact a few details lend further color to this surmise,² while the *Republic*³ and *Gorgias*⁴ may likewise have been drawn upon by its author. The second seeks to show the needlessness of hearing both parties to a dispute, and betrays no specific imitation of Plato; nor does the third, a quibble on the ambiguity of the term *ἀμαρτάνειν*, leaving undecided the question whether he who fails to loan money to a friend or he who fails of effecting a loan *ἀμαρτάνει*.⁵ The fourth theme is: *ἀνθρώπου τις κατηγορεῖ ἐδήθειαν, ὅτι ταχέως καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι ἀνθρώποις λέγουσι πιστεύοι*, to every element of which exception is taken until in the end the narrator says: *ταῦτ' οὖν λεγόντων αὐτῶν ἠπόρουσιν, τίσιν ποτὲ δεῖ πιστεύειν καὶ τίσιν οὐχ*. The style of the whole is intolerably repetitious,⁶ and the diction⁷ betrays its post-classic origin. Its meagreness, lack of color, and the schematic character of the dialogue are conclusive against Platonic authorship; but the relation of the first section to the *Sisyphus*, though hardly

² *Dem.* 380 D: *ἡ οὐ ταῦτ' αἱ ἐπιστάμενοι ξυμβουλεύουσι πάντες*, cf. *Alc. I*, 111 A ff., esp. 111 B: *οὐκοῦν τοὺς εἰδότας ὁμολογεῖν τε ἀλλήλοις καὶ μὴ διαφέρειν*; where this idea of agreement as a test of knowledge is much insisted on; but this thought is repeated *Minos* 316 D, and in other passages, vid. note 14 to *Alc. I*. Compare also *Dem.* 381 B: *περὶ ὧν ἀπείρως ἔχουσι*, with *Alc. I*, 107 B, where experience as the basis of advice is likewise emphasized, and *Dem.* 381 E: *καὶ ταῦτα παρ' οὐδενὸς μαθόντες οὐδ' αὐτοὶ εὐρόντες*, we have again the familiar disjunction, for which see note 8 to *Alc. I*.

³ *Dem.* 380 D: *ἱκανὸς . . . καὶ εἰς*, 381 A: *ἐνὸς μόνου ἀκούσασι ἐξήρκει*, *ibid.* B: *εἰς ἱκανὸς ἔσται* may have been suggested by *Rep.* 502 B, *εἰς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος*, κ. τ. λ.; but see also *Gorg.* 475 E; *ἐμοὶ δὲ σὺ ἔφαρκεῖς εἰς ὧν μόνος*, and *ibid.* 505 E: *ἵνα μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἐπιχάρμου γένηται, ἃ πρὸ τοῦ δύο ἄνδρες ἔλεγον, εἰς ὧν ἱκανὸς γένωμαι*; though the thought is different.

⁴ *Dem.* 382 A: *οὕτως ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ὄντας τοσούτους*, apparently speaking of jury-pleading, vid. *Gorg.* 455 A (under similar circumstances), *οὐ γὰρ δήπου ὄχλον γ' ἂν δύναιτο τοσούτων ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ διδάξαι οὕτω μεγάλα πράγματα*.

⁵ Although the parallel is not complete, this quibble well repays comparison with the similar one on *ἀμαρτάνειν* in Antiphon's Tetral. II.

⁶ It will suffice to refer to 380 A ff., as also to 383 D-384 A, where *ἐμφανίζειν* and *ἐμφαίνειν* occur sixteen times. In parts III and IV *εἶπε* recurs seventeen and *οἶσθαι δεῖν* four times.

⁷ Note *ἄρχῃν* = 'anyhow' (381 D), *συμπίπτειν* = *συμβαίνειν* (382 D); *τὸ τέλος εὐτυχία* (382 E) would be an interesting witness to late origin if, as seems likely, it is a reminiscence of *τὸ τέλος δυστυχία* in Euripides' *Bacchae* (v. 388), a play especially popular in later antiquity. In 381 E we have *οἶδατε*, vd. *Alc. II*, n. 8.

a mere chance similarity, is not easy to determine. On the whole it is most probable that the two works originated in the same period and under the same circumstances.⁸

§ VI.—SISYPHUS.

In regard to the *Sisyphus* we are chiefly interested to know when and under what influences it may have been written.¹ It consists of a clever but wholly eristic argument directed against the utility of taking counsel.² The vocabulary³ and style⁴ are such that one is compelled to seek its origin in the age of decadence, and evidence of another nature will be found to corroborate these indications. The manner in which the problem of the διπλασιασμός τοῦ κύβου is mentioned in 388 E is highly suggestive of the Alexandrian age,⁵ and the interest displayed in geometry

⁸ For further discussion see the section on the *Sisyphus*.

¹ It is one of the *dialogi nothi*, D. L., III 62.

² It confesses its eristic character in 388 D, 390 B and at the close. Its name *Sisyphus* may have been selected to characterize the fruitless endeavor to attain a comprehension of βουλέεσθαι.

³ Note the lax use of words denoting intellectual processes, like ἐν νόησει, 338 B (cf. the similar use of νόησις among the Sceptics, Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. II 10), ἐπιστήμη alongside of εἰκασία and σχεδιασμός in 390 C. Susemihl's conj. of ἀνεπιστημοσύνη is impossible, and Müller's ἐπίστασις is unnecessary. The sceptical age to which we must refer the dialogue will account for such unmeaning disintegration of a term once connoting a definite act of mind. See also περιεργία, 387 C; ἐσπουδασμένως, 390 B; πρὸς τοῦ Διός, 388 B. This phrase, with the article, I believe is nowhere else to be found. So μεταρσιολέσχης, 389 A, although μετεωρολέσχης occurs in *Rep.* 489 C; but we have no evidence of μεταρσιο in composition in the classical period. Again πολλάκις, 388 A, must be taken = 'perchance' rather than = 'often'; but this use of πολλάκις without εἰ or μή is quite anomalous. In ὅμως ἐπιτυχάνουσι λέγοντες περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τάληθῃ, 388 A, τῶν is evidently to be cancelled.

⁴ Note the occurrence of ὅπως ἂν with past ind. in ὅπως ἂν συνηκροῶ ἡμῖν, 387 A, and ὅπως ἂν ἐδύνασθε, 390 B: cf. Goodwin, MT. §335; περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ ἐπίσταται, 390 A, is a construction quite impossible in classical Greek, and is not really given in the MSS, which read ἐπίστασθε, which is equally impossible; but concerning the parallel case of περὶ ὧν ἂν δέοιτο διαπράττεσθαι, 389 B, there seems to be no doubt, so that it may be taken for granted that our author committed the solecism. There is no sense in 388 C: μὴ μέντοι ἐπίστατο ὅπου εἴη ἐξευρεῖν, οὐχ ὅστις εἴη ὁ Καλλίστρατος, unless by a violent turn you render it thus: "but was ignorant of *where* C. was, not of *who* he was."

⁵ This problem is treated at length by Cantor, *Geschichte der Mathematik*, Ed. 2, vol. I, pp. 198 ff., and pp. 213-222. Much will depend upon the

may be in great part due to the brilliant advance in this science at that time, though Plato's example and particularly the ἐριστικός λόγος of the *Meno* were plainly kept in mind.⁶

But the chief point of interest in the *Sisyphus* is the discussion itself, which grows out of the problem of the χριτῆριον. Aristotle seems to have given the impulse to the questions here raised. He was possibly the first to state definitely that advice pertains to the future.⁷ But he had also restricted counsel to such matters as depend on our free will and are not necessary;⁸ and, at the same time, he maintained that the law of the *excluded middle* did not apply to disjunctive propositions relating to a future event which is not necessary or which depends upon a free will.⁹ Of such an event one may say only ὅτι μέλλει, not ὅτι ἔσται.¹⁰ Now we know that the Stoics, after declaring that everything occurs according to fate, denied this exception to the rule of the excluded middle,¹¹ and chiefly because of their interest in fate and divination.¹²

view taken of the letter quoted as written by Eratosthenes to Ptolemy Euergetes. See Sussehl, I, p. 420, n. 64, 65. It is certainly difficult to decide in what relation Plato stood to the problem if it had taken on just that form in his day. *Rep.* 528 A f. and *Legg.* 819 D ff. show conclusively that he was busied with stereometry in matters closely allied to the Delian problem, and it is possible that these passages really led to the mythical stories related by Plutarch (*De Ei.* 386, *de Genio Socr.* 579 B, *Quaestt. Convv.* 718 E f.). However that may be, any reader of Plato must see that the abrupt manner in which the problem is here foisted in is wholly foreign to Plato's wont.

⁶ *Meno* 80 ff. But the *Sisyphus* entirely omits reference to anamnesis, by which Plato sought to refute the ἐριστικός λόγος. We may seize this opportunity to remark that Socrates' appearance in Pharsalus is perhaps due to a vague thought of the *Meno*, for Socrates thus returns Meno's visit to Athens.

⁷ Arist. *Rhet.* 1358^b 13: χρόνοι δὲ ἑκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῷ μὲν συμβουλευόντι ὁ μέλλων· περὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβουλεύει ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἀποτρέπων. Cp. *Sis.* 390 D: οὐχ ἅπαντες οἱ τε εὖ βουλευόμενοι καὶ οἱ κακῶς περὶ μελλόντων τινῶν ἐσεσθαι βουλεύονται;

⁸ *Rhet.* 1359^a 32: ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἀδύνατον ἢ εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή . . . 38: τοιαῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγκη εἶναι ἢ μᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔστιν. Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* Γ 4 ff.

⁹ *De Interpr.* c. 9.

¹⁰ *De Gener. et Corr.* 337^b 3.

¹¹ See *Simplic. Categ.* 103 β. Vd. Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, I, p. 450, n. 136.

¹² This becomes certain from the significance which is attached to Aristotle's dictum. Cf. *z. g.* Ammonius' Commentary to Section II of Arist. *De Interp.* (I quote from Orelli): τοῦτο μὲν τοι τὸ θεώρημα τὸ νῦν ὑπ' Ἀριστο-

Hence, too, they limited divination to necessary results. But their means of knowing what was necessary, as their opponents pointed out, were inadequate. Now this discussion of prophecy became most exhaustive in the school of Carneades, and that the Stoics' account of the disjunctive propositions was singled out by their critics as a weak point is shown by Cicero's *Academics*.¹³ And, though Cicero does not mention this argument among those against prophecy which he borrows from Carneades in *De Div.* II, it can hardly be doubted that Carneades did so employ it. From divination to such knowledge of the future as may serve to give advice concerning it there is but a short step, and it has been taken in the *Sisyphus*.¹⁴ In the first part of the *Demodocus* the conclusion is reached that consulting is vain, and therefore, suggests the *Sisyphus*, one should rather learn of those who know than exchange views with those who do not know. At this point then the question is enlarged upon in *Sisyphus*, and it is said to be impossible to give or obtain competent advice because it is conversant with futures which do not exist and hence cannot be known.¹⁵ The question then 391 D: *πρὸς τί οὖν ποτε ἀποβλέποντες ἄνθρωποι πρᾶγμα ἀποκαλοῦσιν ἄνθρώπους εὐβούλους τε καὶ καχοβούλους εἶναι τινας*; is probably to be answered in the spirit of Carneades by saying that he is a good counsellor who advises what is probable, if he condescend to venture even so far.¹⁶ One can hardly

τέλους κινούμενον, δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι λογικόν, κατὰ ἀλήθειαν δὲ πρὸς πάντα μόρια τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον· κατὰ τε γὰρ τὴν ἡθικὴν φιλοσοφίαν πᾶσαν ἀνάγκη προσλαμβάνειν, ὥς οὐ πάντα ἐστὶ τε καὶ γίνεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τινὰ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, κ. τ. λ.

¹³ Cic. Acad. Prior. II 97. See also *De Fato* passim, esp. cc. 10 and 16. Alexander Aphrod. *De Fato*, c. X, XI, XXVII, and Prantl, I, p. 438, n. 109.

¹⁴ The author shows his latent identification of the two activities in various ways; cf. *διαμαντευόμενον*, 387 D; *εἰκάζοντα*, *ibid.*, with which cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1358^b 20: *τὰ μέλλοντα προεικάζοντες; αὐτοσχεδιάζοντες καὶ διαμαντευόμενοι*, 390 B. Compare Menander, frag. 1, 'Ὁ πλεῖστον νοῦν ἔχων | Μάντις τ' ἀριστός ἐστι σύμβουλος θ' ἄμα. Of course divine foreknowledge and prophecy were intimately involved in this discussion of fate, as was also astrology. Cp. Wendland, Philon's Schrift u. d. Vorsehung, Berl. 1892, and Alex. Aphrod. *De Fato*, ch. XXX ff.

¹⁵ *Sis.* 390 E: *τὰ μέλλοντα οὐπω ἐστὶ . . . δοκεῖ οὖν σοι δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος τυχεῖν τινί*; It is clear that this is a sceptic exaggeration of Aristotle's statements which he would not sanction. Cf. Aristotle's *ὅπότερ' ἐτυχεν* and degrees of probability. See *Minos* 316 B: *ὅς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἀμαρτάνει* κ. τ. λ.

¹⁶ Aristotle who thought: *οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφύκασιν ἱκανῶς καὶ τὰ πλείω τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας* (*Rhet.* 1355^a 15 f.), and who defined *τὸ βουλευέ-*

doubt that we are here in the atmosphere of the New Academy,¹⁷ although the corrupt style of our dialogue makes it improbable that any of Carneades' immediate pupils composed it.¹⁸ Arcesilaus' revival of the Socratic method¹⁹ may have joined with the constant inspiration of the Platonic dialogues²⁰ to call forth those late attempts which we meet in *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Sisyphus*, *Demodocus*, II. A. and II. Δ.

§ VII.—THE LETTERS.

Could the *Letters* be omitted from a treatise on the Pseudo-Platonica, we might perhaps dispense with this section; for, though details may yet be added, their spuriousness is no longer an open question.¹ I shall endeavor to present the arguments against them as briefly as seems consistent with justice.²

εσθαι as συλλογισμός τις (Π. Μνήμης, 453^a 13), would say (as Rhet. 1359^a 14 ff.) ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῷ συμβουλευόντι καὶ τῷ δικάζομένῳ καὶ τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ ἔχειν προτάσεις περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδύνατον, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται ἢ μή. On the Stoics' divergence from Arist. regarding the ἀδύνατον see Zeller, III, a, p. 108, n. 3, and Prantl, I, p. 464 ff., n. 165 ff. I hope very soon to publish a paper in which the connection of this problem, together with others, with the system of Aristotle will be fully discussed. I shall then touch also upon the relation of Dio Chrysostom, Orat. XXVI, to *Demodocus* and *Sisyphus*.

¹⁷ Compare Cic. Acad., II 36, 117: "Finge aliquem nunc fieri sapientem, nondum esse: quam potissimum sententiam eliget et disciplinam? etsi quamcumque eliget, insipiens eliget." *Sisyphus*' mention of Anaxagoras and Empedocles with the rest of the μεταρσιολέσσαι, 389 A, accords well with Carneades' habit as illustrated in Acad. II.

¹⁸ Both Carneades and Clitomachus were noted for their eloquence.

¹⁹ Cf. Diog. L., IV 28: πρῶτος τὸν λόγον ἐκίνησε τὸν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος παραδεδομένον καὶ ἐποίησε δι' ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως ἐριστικώτερον.

²⁰ Perhaps the first definition of βουλευέσθαι in 388 A came ultimately from *Euthyd.* 275 D. It is possible too that there occur a few reminiscences of *Alc. I.* Compare *Sis.* 389 C with *Alc. I.* 106 E and 107 D, and *Sis.* 390 A with *Alc.* 106 D. Attention has already been called (n. 5) to our dialogue's debt to *Meno*.

¹ After the work of Ast, Socher, Hermann, Steinhart, and Karsten, the question becomes one only of detail, though students of the subject will find much new matter in what follows. Besides the foregoing I am indebted to Wiegand's translation and notes as well as to Zeller, and Susemihl's *Gesch. der Gr. Lit. in der Alexandrinerzeit*, ch. XXXVII. Reinhold's *De Platon. Epistulis*, 1886, on which see Zeller, *Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil.*, 1888, p. 614 ff., has vindicated the *Letters* in some points, but could not prove their genuineness.

² I cannot, of course, here cite my authority for each statement or give credit for every suggestion received from the works of predecessors.

Whether or not Aristotle's correspondence is to be considered the first genuine collection, as Wilamowitz conjectures,³ the year 322 B. C. in which Aristotle died is a probable *terminus post quem* for all spurious letters of this sort. And since the catalogue of Thrasyllus (ap. Diog. L., III 61) specifies each of our *Letters* according to the addressee, these—that is, the first thirteen—cannot be dated later than about the first century B. C. *Epp.* V, VII and IX have the previous express attestation of Cicero;⁴ but beyond this point we have little external support, though the fact that Aristophanes of Byzantium (ap. Diog. L., III 62) received certain letters (number not specified) into his trilogies about 200 B. C. may aid the task of criticism.

On what grounds then are we led to reject the *Letters*? In general these points may be stated: (1) The best portion of our collection and that least unworthy of Plato consists in no true sense of letters, but rather of manifestos or harangues,⁵ directed mediately or immediately to a very general public, and often

³ Antigonos von Karystos, p. 151, note 15: "Die Existenz einzelner gleich für die Publication geschriebener Briefe ist wesentlich von einer Privatcorrespondenz verschieden, wie die aristotelische und epikureische war. Die letztere hat ausser dem Schulkreise wenig zu bedeuten gehabt; somit scheint mir die aristotelische das epochemachende Ereigniss. Danach ist dann der platonische Briefwechsel und die übrigen sokratischen gefälscht und diese Fabrication immer weiter gegangen." These Aristotelian letters, be it understood, are *not* those published in Hercher's Epistolographi. The scant fragments of other letters preserved are not sufficient to base a judgment upon as to their genuineness. Wilamowitz appears now to accept some of the *Letters*. Thus he writes of *Ep.* VI: "Den platonischen Brief könnte ich sehr wol für ächt halten" (Aristot. und Athen, I, p. 334). Elsewhere in the same work he declines to decide the question.

⁴ *Ep.* V, 322 A, in Cic. ad Fam., I 9, 18; *Ep.* VII, 331 CD, in Cic. ad Fam., I 9, 18; *Ep.* VII, 326 B, in Cic. de Fin., II 28, 92, Tusc. V 35, 100; *Ep.* IX, 358 A, in Cic. de Fin., II 14, 45, de Off. I 7, 22. The citations in later authors are given in detail by Westermann, De Epistolarum Scriptoribus Graecis; to his list add *Ep.* VII, 325 C, quoted by Julian, 243 A. (Hertlein, Juliani Imperatoris quae supersunt, etc., ad loc. fails to recognize this quotation beginning in Julian χαλεπώτερον and in Ps.-Plato τοσούτω χαλεπώτερον, and so is misled into conjecturing in his note: 'malim χαλεπώτατον,' a reading which is at once to be dismissed when it is seen that χαλεπώτερον stands within the quotation.)

⁵ This criticism dates back to Dionys. Hal. de Demosth. c. 23, and, singularly enough, applies equally to the (in my opinion) likewise spurious *Epp.* I and II of Demosthenes. Cf. Sussehl II, p. 591, n. 47.

conveying as information intelligence of what, if true, must have been quite well known to those ostensibly addressed.⁶ This peculiarity may be explained as due to the purpose⁷ of rendering to the world an apology⁸ for the philosopher's dealings with the court of Syracuse; which object, real or feigned, is attained in VII only at the cost of great length.⁹ The *Letters* (2) also represent Plato as boastful and prone to rather undignified self-assertion,¹⁰ and as ambitious and solicitous for the applause of the multitude and posterity.¹¹ But he becomes even (3) in tone quite oracular and mystical, displaying great anxiety lest his secret lore be divulged by publication to the uninitiated,¹² and correspond-

⁶ See IV, 321 A; VII, 330 C, 334 B f., 337 E; VIII, 352 B f., 353 E f.

⁷ The purpose may have been real if the author (or authors) was a philosopher and a member of the Academy, or merely feigned if he (they) was a skillful rhetorician, as seems more probable.

⁸ See VII, 327 C, 328 C, 330 BC, 337 C, 339 A, 347 B, 353 A. Besides both III and VII (cf. III, 316 B and VII, *passim*) present features which indicate that Plato's *Apology* served the author (or authors) as a model.

⁹ The author indeed feigns a desire to be brief, but this is mere rhetoric, and cheap at that. See 327 E: *εἰ καὶ μακρότερα εἰπεῖν*, and 329 B: *οὐ γὰρ δεῖ μηκύνειν*. This is a trick well known to rhetoricians, cf. *Ep.* XI: *μακρὰς ἐτέρας δέοιτ' ἂν ἐπιστολῆς, εἰ τις πάντα διεξίει*, and XIII, 363 C: *εἰ δὲ μὴ πάνυ μακρὰς ἐπιστολῆς ᾗν, ἔγραψα ἂν ἃ ἔλεγε, νῦν δὲ Λεπτίνου πυνθάνου*. See also *ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστολῇ πρὸς σὲ μηκυντέον* in *Ep. Socraticorum XXX* (Hercher), which is attributed by Mullach (III, p. 83) and others to Speusippus, but is clearly a forgery—probably from the same "Fabrik" with the older Ps.-Platonic, as its rhetorical character, literary criticism, etc., sufficiently prove. See also Bernays' *Phokion*, p. 116 f. Our author finally reverts to his theme (VII, 334 C) with the words quite *à propos*: *ταῦτα εἴρηται πάντα τῆς συμβουλῆς ἔνεκα*, κ. τ. λ.

¹⁰ See II, 310 C: *μέγας ἐγὼ εἰμι*; 310 DE: *ἐμοὶ δὲ δὴ καὶ σοὶ κτλ.*; 312 BC; 314 A; III, 316 D; 317 B: *αἰσχύνομαι δὴ λέγειν κτλ.*; VII, 327 CD; 328 DE; 341 B–342 A; 344 D; 345 C. Against this charge Plato effectually secured himself in his dialogues by concealing entirely his personality behind the masks of various characters, chiefly that of an idealized Socrates.

¹¹ See II, 310 E–311 E; 312 A–C; IV, 320 A ff.; VII, 328 E; 345 B; 347 A. Cf. the spurious letter of Speusippus to Xenocrates (ap. Mullach, III, p. 89): *Πλάτων, καθάπερ καὶ σὺ οἶσθα, καὶ ἐν οὗ τῇ τυχεύσῃ τιμῇ τὴν ἐν Ἀκαδημία διατριβὴν ἤγεν, νομίζων εἶναι τι καὶ πρὸς δόξαν ὀρθήν, καὶ πρὸς τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον (!) καὶ τὴν ὕστερον παρ' ἀνθρώποις μνηεῖαν ἐσομένην*.

¹² In this connection writing is disparaged as likely to result in publication. See II, 312 D: *φραστέον δὴ σοὶ δι' αἰνιγμῶν, ἵν' ἂν τι ἢ δέλτος . . . πάθῃ, ὃ ἀναγνοὺς μὴ γνῶ κτλ.* to 313 E; 314 A: *εὐλαβοῦ μέντοι μή ποτε ἐκπέσῃ ταῦτα εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιδεύτους . . . B: πρὸς ταῦτ' οὐν σκοπῶν εὐλαβοῦ . . . μεγίστη*

ingly hierophantic in his gratuitous expressions of piety, which thereby become degraded to mere cant.¹³

After thus enumerating some characteristics common to the more excellent letters, we may turn to examine them one by one. And, first, we may distinguish three groups according to degree of excellence and probable date of origin. The first begins with VII and includes VIII and III; the second consists of II, IV, V, VI, IX, and X; the third comprises I, XI, XII, and XIII.

Ep. VII is not only the most extensive but also the most important, and upon it depend directly or indirectly all those which have political bearings. Its value as a document for Plato's life would be unique if it were genuine, and even as it is,

δὲ φυλακὴ τὸ μὴ γράφειν ἀλλ' ἐκμανθάνειν • οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ γραφέντα μὴ οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖν. διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πώποτ' ἐγὼ περὶ τούτων γέγραφα, οὐδ' ἔστι σύγγραμμα οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἔσται, τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα Σωκράτους ἔστ' ἰ καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος, ἔρρωσο καὶ πείθου, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ταύτην νῦν πρῶτον πολλάκις ἀναγνοὺς κατὰκασσον! Or is this only a facetious attempt of a littérateur to make game of some of his fellows who had written the other letters? It is absurd enough to lead one so to interpret it. But there are similar mystic passages, *e. g.* VI, 323 D; VII, 341 C-E; 342 A; 344 C-E; VIII, 359 D f.; XIII, 363 B (a cipher). Note, on the other hand, Plato's ridicule of the ἀπόρρητα of the Sophists (*Theaet.* 152 E, 155 E). One might fancy the author of the Ps.-Aristotelian *Ep.* VI was ridiculing these letters; for, when Alexander objects to the publication of the ἀκροαστικά, Aristotle is made to reply: "Fear not"—*ξυνετοὶ γὰρ εἰσι μόνοις τοῖς ἡμῶν ἀκούσασιν*—unless this be a fling at the sketchy character of those writings. There is an instructive parallel to the passages in our letters in Pseudo-Heraclitus' *Ep.* VIII which shows how common such things were in later writings. Heraclitus says to Hermodorus: πάντως ἐντυχεῖν σοι βοῦλομαι καὶ περὶ τε ἄλλων πάνν συχνῶν καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν νόμων <of Hermodorus> βραχεία εἰπεῖν. ἔγραφον δ' ἂν αὐτά, εἰ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἐπινοοῦμεν ἀπόρρητα μείναι. οὐδὲν δὲ οὕτω σιωπᾶται ὥς ἐνὶ λαλῶν εἰς . . . πολλοὶ οὐ διαφέρουσι κεραμίων σαθρῶν, ὥς μὴδὲν στέγειν δύνασθαι ἀλλ' ὑπὸ γλωσσαλγίας διαρρεῖν. Ἀθηναῖοι ὄντες αὐτόχθονες ἐγνοσαν φύσιν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτι γενόμενοι ἐκ γῆς ἔσθ' ὅτε διερρωγῶτα ἔχουσι νοῦν. τούτους ἐπαίδευσαν φυλακὴν ἀπορρήτων διὰ μυστηρίων.

¹³ Note: σὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν (II, 311 D; IV, 320 B f. bis); ἂν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ (VI, 323 C); θεία τινὶ τύχη (VII, 327 E, 336 E); θεία μοῖρα (II, 313 B; VII, 326 B); θεοφιλεστέραν (II, 313 E); συλλαμβανόντων θεῶν (VII, 327 C); μετὰ θεῶν (VIII, 355 E); χάριν οἰωνοῦ (VII, 336 C, prob. from *Menex.* 249 B); ὁρνίθων (VII, 336 C). Of this feature Karsten (p. 27) has well said: "Non aliena quidem talia sunt a Platone; contra omnes eius dialogi, maxime autem libri de Legibus piam deorum reverentiam prae se ferunt; sed ut ibi talia dicta sponte e re nata et loquentis ex animo profluunt, ita hic quaesita et consulto inculcata sunt."

we may hardly doubt the general historical basis on which it proceeds; for, though it is certainly spurious, the rhetorician who wrote it was no mean scholar and must be presumed to have known the outlines of Plato's biography as he undoubtedly did the import and tenor of his works. The letter is later than Aristotle¹⁴ and seems to presuppose the publication of letters forged under the name of Dionysius II of Syracuse¹⁵ and Archytas¹⁶ of Taras; but there is no reason for dating it after Arcesilaus.¹⁷ It betrays its rhetorical parentage¹⁸ by the reminiscences of Platonic passages¹⁹ and the imitation of external tricks of

¹⁴ Note the Aristotelian term. techn. τὸ ποῖόν τι, VII, 342 E.

¹⁵ VII, 339 B: πρὸς γὰρ δὴ πάντα ταῦτα ἦν παρεσκευασμένη τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχονσα ἡ ἐπιστολή, τῇδὲ πη φράζονσα. Διονύσιος Πλάτωνι. Cf. Susemihl, ch. XXXVII, n. 78. There is mention of such letters also in III, 317 B; but it is of course possible that this whole correspondence is purely imaginary.

¹⁶ 339 D: ἐπιστολαὶ δὲ ἄλλαι ἐφοίτων παρὰ τε Ἀρχύτου καὶ τῶν ἐν Τάραντι.

¹⁷ A date fixed by Steinhart because A. wrote nothing and our letter disparages writing. The latter fact is plainly due to a false effort at consistency with the *Phaedrus*, and, strictly on S.'s hypothesis, our *Letters* should never have been written.

¹⁸ The following characteristics appear in all the earlier forged letters, especially *e. g.* Ps.-Demosthenes Epp. I and II, and also in forged speeches.

¹⁹ In the nature of the case these vary in degree of evidence and can not be adequately classified. I therefore give the more noteworthy in the order of their occurrence. *Ep.* VII, 324 A: οὐκ εἰκάζων ἀλλ' εἰδώς, cf. *Men.* 89 B and the spurious *Alc. I*, 105 C; 324 E: Σωκράτη . . . οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνοίμην εἰπὼν δικαιοτάτον εἶναι τῶν τότε, cf. *Phaedo*, 118, and for story of Leon (*ibid.*) see *Apol.* 32 C; 325 E: τελευτῶντα ἱλγυῖαν, cf. *Theaet.*, esp. 175 D ff.; 326 AB: κακῶν οὖν οὐ λήξιν τὰ ἀνθρώπινα γένη, πρὶν ἂν ἡ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων . . . γένος εἰς ἀρχὰς ἔλθῃ . . . ἡ τῶν δυναστευόντων φιλοσοφίῃ (see also 328 A, 335 D), cf. *Rep.* 473 C ff. and Zeller, II A⁴, p. 405, n. 1; 326 C: οὐχ οὕτω θανυμαστὴ φύσει κραθήσεται may have been suggested by the *homunculus*, *Rep.* 588 ff.; 326 E: τῶν κρείττωνων (see also τύχη τις ἀνθρώπων κρείττων, 337 D), cf. *Euthyd.* 291 A (this was a perfect *εἰρημιο* for later rhetoricians; see *e. g.* Ps.-Aristotle *Ep.* V, ἐκ τῶν κατὰ Πλάτωνα κρείττωνων); 328 C: ἓνα μόνον ἱκανώς, cf. *Rep.* 502 B: εἰς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος; 330 C, cf. *Rep.* 425 E ff. and *Pol.* 298 A ff.; 331 AB: ὅταν τίς μοι συμβουλευῇται περὶ τινος τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ βίον, οἷον περὶ χρημάτων κτήσεως ἢ περὶ σώματος ἢ ψυχῆς ἐπιμελείας seems to reflect the spurious *Alc. I*, 118 A to end—a very significant fact (see note 27 to *Alc. I*); 331 C: νόσῳ παραφροσύνης ἐχομένους, cf. *Legg.* 881 B: μανίας ἐχομένους, with νόσῳ possibly suggested by *Alc. II*, 139 D ff., a still more significant fact, if true; 331 B: οὐκ ἀφροσιωσάμενος μόνον, cf. *Legg.* 752 D; 331 D: λέγειν μὲν . . . εἰ μέλλοι μήτε ματαιῶς ἐρεῖν μήτε ἀποθανεῖσθαι λέγων (see *Ep.* V, ἐπεὶ πάντων ἂν ἥδιστα

style,²⁰ while we find quite naturally a fondness for antithesis and other rhetorical devices²¹ together with words and phrases not found in the writings of Plato, some being apparently post-classic and revealing a special fondness for poetic precedent.²²

[sc. Πλάτων] καθάπερ πατρὶ συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ μάτην μὲν κινδυνεύσειν ᾤετο) apparently reflects *Rep.* 496 D ff.; 332 A, for Darius see *Legg.* 694 ff.; 332 B, for the Athenians see *Legg.* 701 AB; 335 B: καθάπερ θηρίον κτλ., cf. *Rep.* 586 A; 337 A f.: ἀναγκάσωσιν αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις διτταῖς οὐσαις ἀνάγκαις, αἰδοῖ καὶ φόβῳ, cf. *Legg.* 647 AB, 698 BC, 699 D, 715 A-D; 341 C: ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας . . . καὶ τοῦ συζῆν ἐξαίφνης οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηρόσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον [cf. *Arist. Rhet.* 1411^b 12 f.: τὸν νοῦν ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἀνήψεν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ] αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει (compare 344 B: μόγις δὲ τριβόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα κτλ.) is apparently taken from *Rep.* 434 E f.: πάλιν ἐπανιόντες ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν βασανιούμεν, καὶ τάχ' ἂν παρ' ἄλληλα σκοποῦντες καὶ τρίβοντες ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρεῖων ἐκλάμψαι ποιήσαιμεν τὴν δικαιοσύνην; 342 A ff. is a rather confused exposition of Dialectic based chiefly on *Legg.* 895 D ff.; 343 A: τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις, cf. *Phaedr.* 275 A; *ibid.*: κύκλος ἕκαστος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι γραφομένων, cf. *Phaedr.* 271 DE, *Soph.* 234 E; 344 C depends obviously on *Phaedr.* 277 D; 344 D: ὑπομνημάτων χάριν, cf. *Phaedr.* 249 C; 345 A: ἴτω Ζεὺς, φησὶν ὁ Θηβαῖος, cf. *Phaedo* 62 A: καὶ ὁ Κέβης . . . ἴτω Ζεὺς, ἔφη (see *Phaedr.* 260 E: τοῦ δὲ λέγειν, φησὶν ὁ Λάκων); 349 A: παντοδαπὰ χρώματα ἤκεν, prob. suggested by *Lysis*, 222 B; 350 E: ὅσα γε δὴ τάνθρώπινα, cf. *Crito*, 46 E: ὅσα γε τάνθρώπεια.

²⁰ Note use of *συμβῆναι γενόμενον* in 327 B, 328 A, 330 B, and also in *Er.* VIII, 353 B (bis) and D; the redundancy of *δεῖν* in 323, 328 C, and of *οἰεσθαι* in 324 B, and the occurrence of *γίγνεσθαι φιλεῖ* in 337 B. In the same spirit *Er.* III uses *ὡ θαυμάσιε*, 318 B, and *ὡ τᾶν*, 319 E. Note also the introduction of conversations, as in 327 E, 329 D, 345 C ff., 348 C ff., 350 C ff., and of a speech, 328 D.

²¹ Observe *litotes*, 324 B: νέω καὶ μὴ νέω, 328 D: οὐ μικροῖς, 325 A: οὐ μικρά, 333 B: οὐκ ὀλίγα; *periphrasis*, 324 B: τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως, 325 B: τὰ κοινὰ καὶ τὰ πολιτικά, 327 B: τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ περὶ Διόνυσιον γενομένου, 328 B: τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν . . . εἶχε φόβος, 329 B: τῆς φιλοσόφου μοίρας, 334 C: ὃ γ' ἐμὸς λόγος, 334 D: ψυχῶν ἦθη; *parallels*, 328 D: ὀπλιτῶν καὶ ἱππέων . . . λόγων καὶ πειθοῦς, 333 A B: ἐξέβαλον . . . κατέβαλον, 333 B: οὐκ ὀλίγα . . . ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, 347 C: ταῦτ' ἐρρήθη, ταῦτα προσωμολογήσαμεν. In 327 D we have the familiar *καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου*. It is certainly quite unplatonic to introduce without some mitigating phrase such expressions as *χρυσόν* in 324 D (this caught the eye of *Plut. vit. Timol. c. XI*), or *ἐργω* . . . ἐνουθέτησεν in 333 B, and *θεῖος*, 340 C.

²² I may mention: *ἡλικίαν, ἦν* . . . γέγονεν, 324 A; *αἰσχυνοίμην* in a curious sense, 324 E (cf. II, 310 D, III, 317 B); *ἐπανήγαγον*, 'retired,' 325 A; *ἐξεργάσατο* for *ἐποίησεν*, 327 D; *ἀποφευξέσθαι*, poet. fut. 329 A; *καταμαλθακίζω*, 329 B; *εἰς ἶχνος ἵεναι*, 330 E; *ἐκβεβλημένος* = 'devastated,' 332 B; *τῶν Διωνείων φίλων*, 334 C, as if Dion had founded a school—a use of proper adjectives which, if I mistake not, became common only in Alexandrian Greek; *παρακουσμάτων*, 338 D, 340 B, cf. *παρακοάς*, 341 B; *ἔμμεστος*, 338 D;

It would seem that the author wished this letter to be viewed as an application of the principles of the *Laus* to Sicilian affairs since those of the *Republic* had been rejected;²³ but the deeper philosophic problems of the *Laus* are not clearly apprehended.²⁴ Considering all this and certain probable historical errors,²⁵ we seem justified in dating this letter not earlier, nor much later, than 290 B. C.

Now that we have done with *Ep.* VII, the most pretentious of all, we may deal more briefly with the remainder of our collection. *Ep.* VIII, like its predecessor, to which it directly refers back,²⁶ is addressed to the adherents of Dion. The theme in both letters is the same, but its treatment in VIII is such as to prove that it everywhere presupposes VII, and this is in itself conclusive as respects VIII,²⁷ in which also the same charac-

ποδηγεῖν, 340 C; βαλεῖν ἐν αἰτία, 341 A; ἐπιχειρήσιν . . . λεγομένην, 341 E, containing apparently a conscious use of an Aristotelian term; ὅτι τάχος, 345 E; νεανικῶς in peculiar sense, 347 E, cf. III, 318 B; the awkward turn, Πλάτων γάρ, ἔφη, 348 C, unless, indeed, we are to read Πλάτων, γὰρ ἔφη, as in the late Platonist quoted in Stobaeus (I, p. 33, l. 6 Wachsm. "οὗτος," γὰρ ἔφη, κτλ; μεταπομπή, 348 D; ἀνεφλέχθη, 349 A. I cannot satisfy myself that διαβολῶν πρὸς τὴν τυραννίδα Δίωνος πέρι, 329 B, is correct Greek; and there are three passages which are insipid or even absurd: (1) οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Λυκεὺς ἰδεῖν ποιήσῃ τοὺς τοιούτους, 344 A; (2) ἀγανακτεῖν τε ἐξῆν <possibly ἐχρῆν?> εἴτε βουλοίμην εἴτε μή . . . ἐδόκει δὲ χαλεπαίνειν μὲν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ Διονυσίῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμαντῶ, 345 D; and (3) 348 C D. It is impossible to discuss here each of these cases.

²³ This seems to be the sense of 337 DE: ταῦτα γάρ ἐστι ἀδελφὰ ὧν τε Δίων ὦν τ' ἐγὼ ἐπεχειρήσαμεν Συρακούσας εὖ φρονούντες συμπράξαι, δεύτερα μὲν · πρῶτα δ' ἦν ἂ τὸ πρῶτον ἐπεχειρήθη μετ' αὐτοῦ Διονυσίου πραχθῆναι πᾶσι κοινὰ ἀγαθὰ, τύχη δέ τις ἀνθρώπων κρείττων διεφόρησε · τὰ δὲ (τὸ δὲ;) νῦν ὑμεῖς πειρᾶσθε εὐτυχέστερον αὐτὰ ἀγαθὴ πρᾶξι μοῖρα καὶ θεία τινὲς τύχη.

²⁴ Particularly in the obscure exposition of Dialectic in 342 A ff., the main features of which are derived from *Legg.* 895 D ff. Both Müller and Karsten failed rightly to interpret it. Wiegand's rendering is essentially correct.

²⁵ I refer to the account of the Thirty in 324 C, of Dion's nephews in 328 A, and Darius' keeping the Persian Empire intact till Plato's old age, 332 AB. Reinhold's attempt to justify these accounts is not very successful; but I cannot enter upon this discussion, as, with the fall of the letter's claim to Platonic authorship, the questions cease to interest me. And that claim seems to me to be exploded.

²⁶ VIII, 356 C: ὡς περ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρήθη, referring to VII, 337 B.

²⁷ Sussemihl says (ch. XXXVII, n. 25): "Mit Recht bemerkt Sauppe: 'Gerade das Vorhandensein des 7. und 8. Briefes neben einander weist auf ein Schulthema hin, von dem wir jetzt zwei Ausführungen vor uns haben.'"

teristics recur,²⁸ though with less to criticise in point of diction.²⁹ One discrepancy from the *Laws*³⁰ is due doubtless to careless reading, and in 355 A: θεὸς δὲ ἀνθρώποις σῶφροσι νόμος, ἄφροσι δὲ ἡδονή there seems to be a quasi-Stoic xenium to the Epicureans. This letter in general tone and in a few details³¹ has much in common with III, and I am inclined to attribute both to some rhetorician ca. 270 B. C. who was a close student of Plato's style.

Ep. III begins by accounting for Plato's use of εὖ πράττειν instead of χαίρειν in addressing his friends,³² a theme taken up again in XIII. The general character³³ of III, which is addressed

But, in view of the reference—specific and general—of VIII to VII without any from VII to VIII, this existence of duplicates would prove only that VIII is spurious.

²⁸ VIII, 352 E: εὐχῇ προσέεικε, a common turn in Plato, cf. *Rep.* 450 D, 456 C, 540 D, etc.; 354 C: φεύγειν φυγῇ, cf. *Symp.* 195 B, *Hipp. Maj.* 292 A (*Epin.* 974 B); 354 C: νόμος ἐπειδὴ κύριος ἐγένετο βασιλεὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνθρώποι τύραννοι νόμων, probably from *Protag.* 337 D: ὁ δὲ νόμος, τύραννος ὢν τῶν ἀνθρώπων (cf. also *Symp.* 196 C); 354 D: μὴ ποτε ἀπληστία ἐλευθερίας ἀκαίρουν τινὸς εἰς τὸ τῶν προγόνων νόημα ἐμπέσωσιν, cf. *Rep.* 562 C–564 A; 355 B: ὄντων τριῶν, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἐτι δὲ χρημάτων κτλ. points clearly to *Legg.* 697 B ff.; for the νομοφύλακες, 356 D, cf. *Legg.* 704 D ff.; 357 B: ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἀδύνατα κτλ., cf. *Rep.* 499 D; 354 A, a *periphrasis*: ὁ γ' ἐμὸς λόγος ἂν εἴη ξύμβουλος; 355 A, a speech introduced; note ξενικαὶ ἐρινύες, 359 A. Here too we meet an historical blunder. Dion's son, who acc. to Plut. *Consol. ad Apollon.* 119 AB, died before his father, is recommended (355 E) by Dion's ghost to succeed him with two other triumvirs.

²⁹ Note ἐκβαρβαρωθεῖσαν, 353 A; ἀείζων, 356 A; ἐπίχαρτος, 356 B; ἀνοσιουργός, 352 C.

³⁰ Lycurgus is here said (VIII, 354 B) to have instituted the board of Ephors, an innovation attributed to another by Plato, *Legg.* 690 D f.

³¹ Compare e. g. III, 316 D: εἴτε ἀνθρωπος εἴτε θεὸς εἴτε τύχη τις with VIII, 353 B: εἴτε θεῖαν τις ἡγείσθαι βούλεται τύχην καὶ θεὸν εἴτε τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων ἀρετὴν εἴτε καὶ τὸ ξυναμφότερον (one feels instinctively this is *too Platonic*!). Compare also VIII, 354 A and 356 B with III, 319 CD.

³² It is difficult to say whether this is based upon a genuine tradition or is a mere inference from *Charmides*, 164 D. At any rate it were absurd for Plato to expatiate upon it in such wise, and, if possible, even more absurd for him to recur to it as in XIII.

³³ The beautiful expression, 315 C: πόρρω γὰρ ἡδονῆς ἴδονται καὶ λύπης τὸ θεῖον may be an echo from *Phil.* 33 B or *Rep.* 377 E ff. (cf. also *Epin.* 985 A); for προῖμα, 316 A, cf. *Legg.* 722 ff.; 316 B, cf. *Apol.* 18A f. (and *supra*, n. 8); 317 D: διανοηθεῖς, ὡς οὐδὲνα δεῖ τῶν ἐμῶν φίλων ἐμὲ αἰτιάσθαι, ὡς διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν βαθυμίαν τὰ σφέτερα πάντα ἐξὸν μὴ ἀπολέσθαι διώλετο, doubtless a reminiscence of *Crito*, 45 E f.; 318 B: τὸν κολοφῶνα . . . ἐπέθηκας, cf. *Legg.* 673 D, *Euthyd.* 301 E; 319 B: ὑπαρ' ἀνθ' ὀνειράτος, cf. *Polit.* 278 E; for Stesichorus' palinode, 319 E, see *Phaedr.* 243 AB. At best the mention of it here is insipid; or is the author threatening Dionysius with blindness?

to Dionysius II, is much the same as that of VII and VIII, though the diction is perhaps purer than that of either of them.³⁴

We have now to consider the second group, viz. II, IV, V, VI, IX, X, which may be dated somewhere between 250 and 200 B. C.³⁵ *Ep.* IV, to Dion, itself an insignificant production, appears to presuppose III and VII,³⁶ and is very similar to them in character.³⁷ *Ep.* V, on the other hand, is more interesting,

³⁴ But note *ἀνταρκεῖν*, 317 C; *ἵνα οὕτως εἰπω*, 318 D; *τὴν ἐμὴν καὶ σὴν λυκοφιλίαν*, 318 E; *εἰς λόγον ὁ λόγος ἡκεῖ μοι*, 318 E; *μεμπνιμένως*, 319 B; *ἀπλάστως*, *ibid.*, unless we are to read *ἀπλήστως*; *ὥς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα μαντεύεται*, 317 E, cf. *Gorg.* 486 E: *ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ δοξάζει*.

³⁵ Vid. *infra*, note 47.

³⁶ The mysterious phrase *τοὺς οἶσθα δήπου*, 320 C, probably harks back to *οὓς οἶσθα σύ*, III, 318 A. Again, 321 B: *μὴ οὖν λανθανέτω σε, ὅτι διὰ τοῦ ἀρέσκειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὸ πράττειν ἐστίν, ἡ δ' αὐθάδεια ἐρημία ζήνοικος*—the last words are possibly a tag from a tragic poet—repeats the admonition of VII, 325 D, 331 D–332 C. I consider this thought, however, to be a tell-tale mark of presumptive spuriousness; for it is an inexhaustible theme of the epistolographi. See *Ep.* I, 309 B: *σὺ δὲ <sc. Διονύσιος> τοιοῦτος ὢν τύραννος οἰκήσεις μόνος*; Ps.-Aristotle *Ep.* IV, *ἡ γὰρ τῶν εἰνούσωντων ὄψις ὥσπερ ἐν πελάγει χειμαζομένη* . . . γῆ; *ibid.* *Ep.* I, *δεῖ γὰρ τοὺς νοῦν ἔχοντας τῶν δυναστευόντων μὴ διὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ διὰ τῶν ἀρχῶν θαναμάζεσθαι*; *ibid.* *Ep.* II, *διὸ πειρώ τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ εἰς ὕβριν ἀλλ' εἰς εὐεργεσίαν κατατίθεσθαι*; and [Periander apud] Diog. L. I, 97: *εἰπέ τε τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀσφαλῶς τυραννήσειν τῇ εὐνοίᾳ δορυφορεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ τοῖς ὀπλοῖς*. The Ps.-Aristotelian letters (except the VI) are only rhetorical variations on this theme. How should we entertain a better opinion of these which claim to be works of Plato?

³⁷ The passage 320 B (note *ἀνδρεία, ἀληθεία, δικαιοσύνη, μεγαλοπρεπεία*) was probably composed with *Rep.* 400–402 in mind. In 320 C: *ξυμφαίη τις ἂν τοὺς ἀντιποιοιμένους τὰ τοιαῦτα τιμᾶν εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρειν. νῦν οὖν δῆλον μὲν ἐστὶν ὁ λέγω, ἀναμνήσκων δὲ ὅμως δεῖ ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, ὅτι προσήκει πλέον ἢ παίδων τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων διαφέρειν τοὺς οἶσθα δήπου* [for *πλέον ἢ παίδων* cf. *Phaedr.* 279 A, *Prot.* 342 E, *Theaet.* 177 B] we have still another favorite theme of the rhetoricians; cf. e. g. Ps.-Aristotle to Alexander, *Ep.* II: *καὶ ὅσον ταῖς ἀφορμαῖς τῆς τύχης διαφέρεις, τοσοῦτον καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τῶν καλῶν πρωτεύειν σε δεῖ*. The same holds good of 320 D: *ὥστε τοὺς ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς οἰκουμένης, εἰ καὶ νεανικώτερόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν, εἰς ἓνα τόπον ἀποβλέπειν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ μάλιστα πρὸς σέ; cf. Psēudo-[Speusippus] to Philip (apud Mullach III, p. 89): νόμιζε δὲ πάντας προσέχειν σοι τὸν νοῦν, and Ps.-Aristotle, *Ep.* II, *αἱ γὰρ καλαὶ τῶν διδασκάλων παρανέσεις καὶ προτρεφεῖς θεατὴν ἔχουσι τὸν αἰῶνα*. Compare also the superlative language at the beginning of *Ep.* IV, *ibid.*—The mention of Cyrus, 320 D, probably points to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*. I note also these expressions: *τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ παρόν*, 320 B; *μήτι δὲ*, without preceding negative, 321 A; *ἀλήθεια* = 'truthfulness', 320 B, a usage foreign to Plato.*

and though apparently later than *Theages*,³⁸ was already current before Cicero.³⁹ The mere fact of its being addressed to Perdicas suffices to mark it as spurious.⁴⁰ In *Ep.* IX we possess another political pamphlet, addressed to Archytas, in which mention is made of letters by the latter, probably at the time when it was written, already in circulation.⁴¹ In the main it is a reminiscence

³⁸ In spite of the once proverbial character of *ἱερὰν συμβουλὴν λεγομένην*, 321 C, I incline to think our author had *Theag.* 122 B in mind when he wrote the words.

³⁹ See note 4 above. This letter also seems to reflect VII. Compare V, 322 B: *ἐπεὶ πάντων ἂν ἥδιστα καθάπερ πατρὶ συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ μάτην μὲν κινδυνεύσειν ᾤετο, πλέον δ' οὐδὲν ποιήσειν*, with VII, 331 D: *λέγειν μὲν . . . εἰ μέλλοι μήτε ματαίως ἔρεῖν μήτε ἀποθανεῖσθαι λέγων*, both passages of course reflecting *Rep.* 496 B ff. and *Apol.* 31 C ff. The curious conceit of the discernible voices of the several polities, 321 D f., is merely a readaptation—not singularly apt, to be sure—of *Rep.* VIII, esp. 544 D ff., with substitution of *φωνή* for *τρόπος*; but it is not improbable that the inspiration to write the passage was derived from Arist. *Rhet.* 1360^a 19 ff.: *ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι πόσα τέ ἐστι πολιτειῶν εἶδη, καὶ ποῖα συμφέρεῖ ἐκάστη, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκεν καὶ οἰκείων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἐναντίων, κ. τ. λ. το ἀρμόττονσιν*.

⁴⁰ I believe that, in the gradual change of sentiment in Greece towards the Macedonian dynasty, Plato's intense Hellenism became obscured in his school; and, when the Peripatetics boasted of Aristotle's services to Philip and Alexander, Academics were keen to invent a previous friendship between Plato and Perdicas or even Archelaus, forgetting the judgment passed on the latter in *Gorg.* 474 D, which applied equally to Perdicas III. On Plato and Archelaus see Bernays' *Phokion*, p. 35 ff., from whose view, however, I dissent; cf. Zeller, II A, 425, n. 2. When once the story had been fabricated, it passed into the hands of the rhetoricians, and we may still discern in the forged letters an echo of the rivalry between the two schools out of which it sprung. So in *Epist. Socrat.* XXX (attributed frequently to Speusippus) this tale is told to refute Plato's inveterate detractor Theopompus (cf. Athenaeus, 508 C, and Zeller, II A, p. 427, n. 3), who may well have caught up the quarrel and disparaged Plato's political inefficiency as compared with Aristotle in relation to Alexander, and Isocrates in relation to Philip. Be that as it may, we have here and in the (probably) likewise spurious letter of Speusippus, mentioned by Athenaeus XI, 506 E,—if he is not referring to the foregoing,—as well as in the *Ps.-Platonic Ep.* V and *Epist. Socrat.* XXXI, the outcome of that rivalry. See for a somewhat different view, Susemihl, ch. XXXVII, p. 586 ff.

⁴¹ Two such are preserved in *Diog. L.*, one to Dionysius regarding Plato, III 21 f., another a reply to *Ps.-Plat. Ep.* XII, in *D. L.* VIII 79 f. *Ep.* VII also mentions such, 339 D, but whether they were merely imaginary or really existed is difficult to decide.

of the *Republic*,⁴² but a few forms⁴³ and the anachronism concerning Echecrates⁴⁴ show its comparatively late origin. *Ep.* X is a brief note modelled after *Theaet.* 176 C ff. Of this entire group II is perhaps the best, and, though more artificial and rhetorical, is clearly related to those of the first series.⁴⁵ *Ep.* VI, finally, like the foregoing, shows knowledge of VII and VIII,⁴⁶ and is

⁴² *Republic*, 347 C, 540 B.

⁴³ Note ὑποδυσφορεῖν, 357 E, in Hippocrates, otherwise late; καταλιμπάνειν, 358 A; οὐδὲ παντελῶς, 357 E. But Cicero's citations (cf. note 4) fix a *terminus ante quem*.

⁴⁴ In 358 B Echecrates is called νεανίσκος, which is of course impossible for the time when the letter, if genuine, must have been written.

⁴⁵ II, 310 C: οὗτος ὁ λόγος σημαίνει . . . ὅτι οὐκ ἄρχω τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτηδείων depends, apparently, on VII, 347 BC; 310 E is derived (like VII, 326 A, 335 D, and possibly mediated by these) from *Rep.* 473 C ff., 499 B f. Dionysius is here asked (314 E) to employ Speusippus and dismiss him homeward, when according to Plut. vit. Dion. §§17, 22, he was in Athens; perhaps the enigmatic passage 312 E: δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα may hark back to *Epin.* 984 C, but see Wiegand ad loc.; for ἡ ψυχὴ φησι, 313 A, vid. *Symp.* 192 C, *Ion.* 535 C, *Gorg.* 486 E, *Hipp. Maj.* 296 D (cf. ψυχὴ μαντεύεται and οἶδεν ἐμὴ σοφία ὁδοὺς φύσεως in Ps.-Heraclitus, *Ep.* V, and μαντεύεται τὸ ἐμὸν ἦθος, ὅπερ ἐκάστῳ δαίμων, *ibid.* *Ep.* IX); for 313 B: καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ὅτι τοῦτο εἰ φαίνοιτό σοι οὕτως ἔχειν, πολλῶν ἂν εἴης λόγων ἐμὲ ἀπολεληκώς, see *Euthyd.* 282 C: εὐ ἐποίησας ἀπαλλάξας με σκέψεως πολλῆς περὶ τούτου αὐτοῦ. Note the cheap rhetoric in 313 A, 311 A, the harsh transpositions in 314 C and D, and the expressions: ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, twice, 310 B and 312 C; μέγας εἰμί, 310 C; ἐκπίπτειν, 314 ABC, 'to be published'; προσφύσεται, 313 D; and the gem: ὁ δ' ἐμπορευσάμενος . . . τῆς ἐμπορίας ταύτης . . . ἐμπορεῖσεται, 313 DE. The phrase ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, 310 C, is characteristic; in Plato it occurs only in speeches, e. g. *Apol.* 37 C, 38 E, 39 C; *Protag.* 322 E; *Gorg.* 450 C. Here it fits into the stilted style; in *Alc. I*, 106 C, Socrates' playful humor somewhat excuses it. Finally τὸ δὲ σφαιρίον οὐκ ὁρθῶς ἔχει· δηλώσει δέ σοι Ἀρχέδημος, ἐπειδὴν ἔλθῃ, 312 D, doubtless has reference to a sidereal globe, which probably did not exist in Plato's day; cf. note 9 to *Axiochus*.

⁴⁶ The enigmatic or mystical passage (cf. also II, 312 D ff.) in VI, 323 D: καὶ τὸν τῶν πάντων θεὸν ἡγεμόνα τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων τοῦ τε ἡγεμόνος καὶ αἰτίου πατέρα κύριον ἐπομνήντας κ. τ. λ. seems to be only an elaboration of VII, 345 C: πῶς ἂν μὴ θαυμαστὸς ὢν ἄνθρωπος τὸν ἡγεμόνα τούτων καὶ κύριον οὕτως εὐχερῶς ἡτίμασέ ποτ' ἂν; cf. also VIII, 354 C. Originally such passages as *Tim.* 28 C, 37 C, 41 AD, *Phaedr.* 246 E, *Prot.* 337 D, *Symp.* 196 C, *Legg.* 690 B, etc., may have given rise to the thought, whatever it may be, on which thought, so hierophantically uttered, it seems bootless to speculate; but see Wiegand's notes to the *Letters*. The words τῇ τῶν εἰδῶν σοφία, 322 D, are plainly post-Platonic, while ἀμυντικῆς, 322 D, as opposed to φυλακτικῆς is an Aristotelian term; cf. *Hist. animal.* 488b, 8, etc. Note also

only a sort of sublimation of the mystical passages contained in them. Once this is perceived, it is clear that it represents a stage on the path from Platonism to Neo-Pythagoreanism. In fixing its date we may be aided by observing the use of *φήμ' ἐγώ*, 322 D, an idiosyncrasy of Arcesilaus much imitated by his adherents.⁴⁷

We come now to the third group—I, XI, XII, XIII. Of these, I is an absurd rhetorical exercitation consisting of commonplaces and citations from the poets,⁴⁸ and XI, also sharing these characteristics, is even worse.⁴⁹ Worst of all is XII, which presupposes the existence of the Pythagorean *ὁπαισμήματα*, especially of Ocellus, which appeared not earlier than 100 B. C.⁵⁰ *Ep.* XIII, on the other hand, is a better literary product, the style and verisimilitude of which are maintained chiefly by the fact

ἀνθέξεσιν, 323 B, the author's coinage and sole property, and *ἀξιοπιστότερα ἦθη*, 323 A, 'characters,' 'persons.'

⁴⁷ Cf. Diog. L. IV 36: *φυσικῶς δὲ πῶς ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐχρήτο τῷ φήμ' ἐγώ . . . ὁ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν μαθητῶν ἐξήλουν καὶ τὴν ῥητορίαν καὶ πᾶν τὸ σχῆμα*. The expression occurs also in *Minos*, 319 D. This dates our letter after, say, 250 B. C. Even *φήμ' ἐγώ* occurs only once in Plato, viz. *Gorg.* 463 C.

⁴⁸ The beginning is a commonplace (see Lysias, XII 93, and Isocrates, IV, §167) which is in substance as old at least as Tyrtaeus, frag. 8, Bergk. In 309 B we have a very awkward sentence and then a threat couched in a contrast sufficiently insipid: *αὐτοκράτωρ δὲ πολλὰκις τὴν ἡμετέραν πόλιν διαφυλάξας ἀπεπέμφθην ἀτιμότερον ἢ πτωχὸν ἡμῶν ἀποστελλόντων προσήκει καὶ κελευόντων ἐκπλεῦσαι, τοσοῦτον παρ' ἡμῖν διατρίψαντα χρόνον. ἐγὼ οὖν περὶ ἑμαντοῦ βουλευέσομαι τὸν <τὸ?> λοιπὸν τρόπον ἀπανθρωπότερον, σὺ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὢν τύραννος οἰκήσεις μόνος* (cf. *supra*, note 36). We cannot wonder that question should have arisen whether Plato or Dion were to be considered as the author of the letter, as it is appropriate to neither. Note the use of *λαμβάνω* for *δέχομαι*, 309 C, and of *διότι* for *ὅτι*, 309 E, which shows the decay of Greek diction. How characteristic is *τὸ χρυσίον τὸ λαμπρόν*, 309 B!

⁴⁹ Susemihl says (ch. XXXVII, n. 22): "Die elendesten von diesen Fabrikaten sind der 11. und 12." Here we have a gem declaring Plato's obscurity, 358 E f.: *συμβουλευσαι μέντοι ἔχω σοί τε καὶ τοῖς οἰκισταῖς, ὁ εἰπόντος μὲν ἐμοῦ, φησὶν Ἡσίοδος, δόξα ἂν εἶναι φαῦλον* (favorite word!), *χαλεπὸν δὲ νοῆσαι*. Socrates is said, 358 E, to be still alive, though ill with *στραγγοῦρία*, while Plato is too old to undertake a voyage: *οὐδὲ τῷ σώματι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἱκανῶς ἔχω πλανᾶσθαι*! Note also *ξυμβάσεων* in 359 B.

⁵⁰ This is shown by the spurious letter of Archytas (ap. D. L. VIII 79 f.) to which our XII is represented as the answer. This was a common trick with the forgers, to float their forgeries by means of others quoting or referring to them. See Diels, on Heraclitus in *Archiv f. Gesch. der Phil.* III 3, and *Ein gefälschtes Pythagorasbuch*, *ibid.* p. 451; and on our letter in particular, Zeller, III B, p. 96, n. 1, and Susemihl, ch. XXXII, n. 462 ff. and ch. XXXVII, n. 21.

that the author is dealing with such trifles as he was conversant with.⁵¹

We need hardly discuss in detail the five remaining letters, XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII. They are all very sorry productions, and are doubtless all of a later date than 300 A. D., some probably as late as the Byzantine period.⁵²

§ VIII.—MINOS.

The *Minos* begins quite abruptly by asking δ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἔστι; The first answer is: $\tau\alpha$ νομιζόμενα;¹ but as λόγος is not $\tau\alpha$ λεγόμενα, nor ἀκοή, $\tau\alpha$ ἀκούόμενα, that definition is rejected.² A second reply identifies νόμος with δόγμα πόλεως or δόξα πολιτική.³ It is agreed, however, that νόμος must be καλόν and ἀγαθόν;⁴ and, since not all δόγματα can be pronounced good, this definition also, at least as it stands, is inadequate.⁵ Yet νόμος seems to be some sort of δόξα, viz., a χρηστή δόξα, which is an ἀληθής δόξα: since, therefore, ἀληθής δόξα is τοῦ ὄντος ἐξεύρεσις,⁶—νόμος βούλεται τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι

⁵¹ It seems probable that XIII was also added about this time, see Zeller, *ibid.*, toward end of note, for here also (360 B) we have mention of $\tau\omega\nu$ τε Πυθαγορείων καὶ $\tau\omega\nu$ διαίρεσεων as in Ep. XII. As in III, but here, 360 A, with greater emphasis, εὖ πράττειν is given as the distinguishing mark of Plato's letters (what need could Plato then have had to mention it?) and in 363 B the words θεός and θεοί (Plato's monotheism!) are marked as signs whereby sincerely meant letters of recommendation are to be distinguished from those not so intended! Plato's mother was still alive (361 E); and then, 363 A: "Why, you must know Cebes—remember the Phaedo!" Cf. mention of Echecrates IX, 358 B. Note also ἐπολιανόμεναι, 363 B. Is the entire letter a burlesque?

⁵² On these see Susemihl, ch. XXXVII, n. 21. Ep. XIV is, I believe, a caricature or misanthropic perversion of *Rep.* 586 AB. Here occurs τυχόν, not found in Plato, but in *Eryxias*, 339 B, and *Alc. II*, 140 A, and ἀποθεν, nowhere found in the canon. In XV is the form ἐνδεχομένην, much affected by post-Aristotelian writers. Again, in XVI we have the Aristotelian term προαίρεσιν, and the very late word συσχολάζειν occurs in both XVII and XVIII.

¹ 313 B.

² 313 C.

³ 314 BC. To be sure, δόξα πολιτική would ordinarily mean only "an opinion on some matter of state," but here both phases of the δόγμα πόλεως and δόξα πολιτική are intended.

⁴ 314 D.

⁵ 314 E.

⁶ This definition is introduced as a Platonic commonplace, and probably was due to *Symp.* 202 A: $\tau\delta$ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυχεῖον πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμάθεια; ἔστι δὲ δὴ πον τοιοῦτον ἡ ὁρθὴ δόξα. That our author used δόγμα πόλεως was,

ἐξεύρεσις.⁷ Why then do laws actually differ so widely in various countries?⁸ Men agree everywhere that just acts are just and unjust acts unjust, precisely as that which weighs more is everywhere the heavier, that which weighs less, the lighter.⁹ Therefore it may be said universally that τὰ ὄντα νομίζεται, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὄντα;¹⁰ and the laws which are not good are not real laws and cannot be said to conflict with such as are.¹¹ In every sphere, therefore also in matters of state, those who prescribe the laws (provided they really *know*, are ἐπιστήμονες) will agree and not introduce changes;¹² wherefore stability is an excellent test of codes.¹³ The laws of Minos, being the oldest known to the Greeks, therefore call forth an encomium on their author. Finally the question is raised, what the νομοθέτης, who according to Homer is a ποιμὴν λαῶν and so a νομεύς, 'distributes' (διανέμει) to improve the souls of men, and it is felt to be a disgrace that no answer is forthcoming.¹⁴

perhaps, owing to *Legg.* 644 D: δόγμα πῶλεως κοινὸν νόμος ἐπωνόμασται; but his reference of a true law to ἀληθῆς δόξα certainly evinces his dependence upon *Meno* 97 A ff., where statesmen are shown to possess ἀληθῆς δόξα in so far as they hit upon the right course, though they lack ἐπιστήμη. It seems strange that, when he comes to speak of the discrepancies in legislation, he does not more strongly emphasize the difference between the ordinary lawgiver and the ideal legislator, and points out only the need of agreement on the part of those who know instead of insisting upon the knowledge of the ἀγαθόν of the state or of true principles (αἰτίας λογισμῶ, *Meno* 98 A).

⁷ 315 A. This statement is identical in meaning with *Hipp. Maj.* 284 D: ὅταν ἄρα ἀγαθοὶ ἀμάρτωσιν οἱ ἐπιχειροῦντες τοὺς νόμους τιθέναι, νομῖμον τε καὶ νόμον ἡμαρτήκασιν, but the abstract statement of the *Minos* is doubtless due to the identification of νόμος with ἀληθῆς δόξα πολιτική. More hereafter of *Hipp. Maj.*

⁸ 315 A. Here, if anywhere, we might expect Socrates to point out clearly the distinction between existing laws and the true laws discoverable only by reason.

⁹ 316 A. The author does not even seem to be aware how sophistical this reasoning is.

¹⁰ 316 B.

¹¹ This conclusion is not clearly expressed, but must be inferred.

¹² 316 B-318 A.

¹³ 318 C: τίς δὲ λέγεται τῶν παλαιῶν βασιλέων ἀγαθὸς νομοθέτης γεγονέναι, οὐ ἔτι καὶ νῦν τὰ νόμιμα μένει ὥς θεῖα ὄντα; (ὥς θεῖα ὄντα seems to be added here only because the same words were used of the tunes of Olympus and Marsyas just previously, and has no special significance.)

¹⁴ 321 CD. We can only guess that the answer expected was δικαιοσύνη. If then the question had been urged, and the full working of δικαιοσύνη had

Such in brief outline is the argument of the *Minos*. The incentive and the leading thought of the dialogue seem to have been derived from Plato's *Hippias Major* 284 B–285 B,¹⁵ though the beginning of the *Laws* doubtless exercised a decided influence on the account of King Minos. Like almost all of the Pseudo-Platonica the *Minos* also betrays its dependence upon *Alcibiades I*,¹⁶ and we seem to be justified in dating it later even than *Anterastae*.¹⁷

The best evidence of its comparatively late origin is found in the spirit of the Alexandrian age which pervades it and manifests itself in various forms. First, we may note a preference for monarchy as it existed, shown in the encomium on King Minos and in Socrates' wholly unplatonic question by which it is introduced, 318 A: οἱ δὲ τοῦ τέως νόμοι ἄριστοι ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; οὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι. The manner, also, in which the remarks about the variation of customs and laws respecting burial and human sacrifice are intruded is as unlike that of Plato as the pedantry displayed in them is foreign to his works.¹⁸ In the

been inquired into, we would have had the demand of the *Clitopho* repeated. The connection of δικαιοσύνη with βελτίω ποιεῖν is developed in *Anterast*. 137 BC, and it is possible that one passage refers to that. See note 9 to *Anterast*.

¹⁵ Mention of this relation has already been made in note 7. In *Hippias Maj.* the discussion formed only an episode, and therefore permitted our author the greater liberty in combining in his discussion the other thoughts which he had culled from various sources. Besides the general conception and the passage cited in note 7, it may be well to call attention to *Hipp. Maj.* 284 E: τῷ μὲν ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ, ὃ Σώκρατες, οὕτως ἔχει· οὐ μὲντοι εἰδῶσιν ἄνθρωποι (so I read for Hermann's ἀνθρωποι) ὀνομάζειν οὕτως. Πότερον, ὃ Ἰππία, οἱ εἰδότες ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, with which compare *Min.* 317 C: ὁ δοκεῖ νόμος εἶναι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν.

¹⁶ *Min.* 316 D: ταῦτὰ δὴπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ τοὺς εἰδότας αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ξυνηνομίζειν (see also 317 B, etc.) applies the test of knowledge so strongly insisted upon, *Alc. I*, 111 BC ff. (see note 14 to *Alc. I*), though it also occurs elsewhere, and in particular in *Hippias Maj.* 294 CD. *Min.* 317 E: οἱ τοῦ αἵματος καὶ καθαριστοῦ. Ὁ νομικώτατος ἄρα ἐν τούτοις, οὗτος αὐλητικώτατος, must likewise, when we regard the entire context, be pronounced a reminiscence of the discussion in *Alc. I*, 108 (note particularly μουσικώτερον, 108 E).

¹⁷ Reference is here had chiefly to the fact mentioned in note 14, though the proof of the *Minos*' later origin does not rest upon so slight a basis.

¹⁸ Socrates says 315 B: ἐπεὶ φέρε ἰδωμεν, ἐὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν ἐνθὺνδε κατάδηλον γένηται, εἴτε τοῖς αὐτοῖς αἰὲν νόμοις χρώμεθα ἢ ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις, καὶ εἰ ἅπαντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἢ ἄλλοι ἄλλοις. This is a direct demand for such information as his companion offers, and yet S. with strange irony replies in 315 D: οὐδὲν τοι θανμαστόν ἐστιν, ὃ βέλτιστε, εἰ σὺ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγεις, ἐμὲ δὲ τοῦτο λέληθεν.

same strain is the claim that Attic tragedy originated, not with Thespis, but in a far earlier time.¹⁹ Such a remark is well suited to a period when Thespis was represented by spurious tragedies and purely mythical predecessors were being invented to rival in antiquity Susarion, Chionides and Magnes in comedy. Similarly 319 A: *μη γάρ τοι οἶον λίθους μὲν εἶναι ἱεροὺς καὶ ξύλα καὶ ὄρνεα καὶ ὄφεις, ἀνθρώπους δὲ μή*, seems to fall in quite aptly with the religious syncretism of the Alexandrian age.²⁰ The influence of the same period is apparent also in the affected interpretation of Homer²¹ and the play on words in which the author indulged.²² It is difficult to decide whether 316 A: *οὐχοῦν καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις οὕτως ὡς ἐνθάδε νομίζεται* was derived from Aristotle or was half proverbial,²³ and equally so, whether or not *φημ' ἐγώ*, 319 D, is due to the well-known mannerism of Arcesilaus.²⁴ But there can be no doubt that our author has borrowed largely, and not always judiciously, from Plato,²⁵ and we may safely affirm that he intended his dialogue to pass for Platonic.

¹⁹ 320 E f.

²⁰ Euhemerus spoke of Zeus as a king of Crete; doubtless he also mentioned Minos in that connection. Did he then advert to his cruelty to show the folly of men in worshipping him? If so, the *Minos* may have been written partly to exonerate him, though its author was himself infected with the views of Euhemerus. The fact that Minos, as a lawgiver and statesman, is included among the *θεῖους ἀνθρώπους* (318 E) is undoubtedly due to *Meno* 99 CD. Only the argument as quoted above indicates the date of the *Minos*.

²¹ 319 B ff. The treatment of Talos is likewise characteristic. Here (320 C) he is a *νομοφύλαξ*, with bronze tablets of the laws, making annually three visits to the villages to administer justice. Elsewhere he is represented as a brazen giant who thrice a day makes the round of the coasts to keep off invaders. See Apollodorus I 9, 26.

²² I shall not here dwell on the juggling with *νόμος*, *νομίζω*, *νόμιμος*, *νομείς*, etc. But *ἐντείνοντες*, 321 A, is clearly a pun, confusing *ἐντείνω* (sc. as *εἰς ἐλεγείον*, e. g. *Hipparch.* 228 D), i. e. 'versifying,' with *ἐντείνω* = 'attack,' 'torture.'

²³ See Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1134^b 26: *ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσαις καίει*. The situation is the same in both passages. Grant, ad loc., thinks the expression proverbial.

²⁴ See *Letters*, note 47.

²⁵ Much evidence of this fact is contained in the preceding notes. Here only the more striking examples not already mentioned can be noted: 314 C: *τάχα δὲ ὧδε ἄμεινον εἰσόμεθα*, cf. *Gorg.* 450 C, *Euthyphro*, 9 E; 314 B: *ἀ δὲ οἱ θεοὶ διανοοῦνται, ὡς φασιν οἱ μάντις, μαντικῇ*, points also to *Euthyphro*, as 314 D: *τὸ μὲν σώζει τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὰλλα πάντα, τὸ δὲ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ ἀνατρέπει* does

We can hardly be far wrong in dating the *Minos* about 250 B. C. Much earlier it cannot have been written, and if it appeared later it would scarcely have been catalogued by Aristophanes.²⁶ The effort to claim this dialogue, together with others which begin by a *saltus in medias res* without scenic introductions, for Pasipho of Eretria is too uncertain to elicit much interest.²⁷

§ IX.—HIPPARCHUS.

The *Hipparchus* displays almost all the characteristics already observed in the *Minos*, but, unlike it, not only wants the express attestation of Aristophanes, but was, in addition, apparently doubted even in antiquity.¹ Its argument clearly seeks to develop

to *Euth.* 14 B; 316 B: *ἕως ἄν σύ τε κατὰ σαντὸν λέγῃς*, κ. τ. λ. is an exceedingly misplaced imitation of such passages as *Protr.* 334 E ff.; 316 C, the absurd phrase *ξυγγράμματί <+τινί>* Boeckh> *περὶ ὑγείας τῶν καμνόντων* and the following discussion may have been suggested by *Pol.* 295 C ff., or *Gorg.* 464 f.; 317 A: *οἱ πολιτικοὶ τε καὶ οἱ βασιλικοὶ*, cf. *Pol.* 259 C ff., and *Euthyd.* 291 C; 317 C: *περὶ πόλεως διακοσμήσεως*, cf. *Symp.* 209 A; 317 D: *οἱ τοῦτον νόμοι καὶ διανομαὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα ὀρθαί εἰσιν*, cf. *Crat.* 430 C, where such etymological puns come more naturally; 318 A: *οὗτος τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος νέμειν κράτιστος*, is a rather absurd abuse of language: Boeckh supposes that the author had in mind *Pol.* 268 B or 274 E, but possibly the suggestion may have been derived partly from *Lysis* 209 A: *οὔτε τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλος ποιμαίνει*; but compare Euripides, *Frag.* 634 (Nauck): *ὅστις νέμει κάλλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν*, | *οὗτος σοφὸς πέφυκε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον*; 318 B: *τούτων τὰ αὐλήματα θεϊοτάτα ἐστί, καὶ μόνα κινεῖ καὶ ἐκφαίνει τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ἐν χρεῖα δυντας* is a bungling attempt to reproduce *Symp.* 215 C; for *Min.* 319 C: *ὁ Ζεὺς σοφιστής ἐστι*, see *Symp.* 203 D, *Crat.* 403 E, *Euthyd.* 288 B; 320 A: *οὐκ ἔστιν οἵτινες ἀπέχονται συμποσίων . . . ἄλλοι ἢ Κρήτες καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι*, merely reproduces *Legg.* 637 A ff.; 321 A: *ἐστί δὲ τῆς ποιήσεως δημοτερπέστατον τε καὶ ψυχαγωγικώτατον ἢ τραγωδία* doubtless reflects *Legg.* 658 D; 321 C: *καλῶς τε καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀποκρινόμενοι*, cf. *Gorg.* 448 E.

²⁶ D. L. III 62. It formed the third trilogy with *Leges* and *Epinomis*.

²⁷ Susemihl (I, p. 20 ff.) has said what can be said upon the subject, and even he finds the case hopeless. Diog. L. II 61, the passage upon which the whole discussion depends, is too vague, and perhaps even inextricably confused, to admit of profitable discussion. I do not believe that there existed in antiquity only one work on each of the subjects *περὶ ἀρετῆς*, π. δικαίου, π. φιλοκερδούς, π. νόμου, and so the conclusions, suggested by the attribution of works so entitled to different philosophers, can of course produce no certainty. On the connection of *Minos* and *Hipparchus* see notes 12 and 13 to the latter dialogue, and compare notes 21 and 22 above with note 7 to *Hipparch.* and the text.

¹ Aelian, V. H. VIII, 2: *λέγει δὲ Πλάτων ταῦτα, εἰ δὴ ὁ Ἱππάρχος Πλάτωνός ἐστι τῶ ὄντι*.

the paradox latent in the ambiguity of *φιλοξεροδής*, which term implies a censure certainly not so prominent in its components, *ξέρδης* and *φιλεῖν*. Given the discussions of the *Eryxias*, one can readily perceive how a later Platonist would desire to utilize them in producing a dialogue in imitation of the founder of his school, and such, in fact, appears to be the relation of *Hipparchus* to *Eryxias*.² On the other hand there is sufficient evidence of the usual kind to prove the desire to copy Plato.³ Yet the imitator, as was but natural, failed signally to catch Plato's habitual delicacy of manner;⁴ and even where success was more readily attainable,

² The subject-matter of itself compels a comparison. Many have remarked upon the uncalled-for rebuke administered by Socrates, *Hipp.* 225 B: μή μοι οὕτως εἰκῆ, ὥστερ τι ἠδικοῦμενος, but nobody seems to note that the author probably had in mind *Eryx.* 395 A: ὥστερ τι ἀδικοῦμενος. So too the discussion of *value* as more important than *quantity* in determining wealth (231 CD) points to *Eryxias*, §III ff. Note also 231 E: τὸ δὲ ἀξίον αὐτὸ λέγεις κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ἀνωφελὲς ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον, where the ὠφέλιμον, as in the *Eryxias*, is made the criterion of value. Even the words of Socrates' companion, 232 B: ἡνάγκακε . . . μᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεκεν, are probably an echo of *Eryxias*' words, *Eryx.* 395 D: ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκратες, οὐ τοιοῦτους ὦμην δεῖν τοὺς λόγους εἶναι, οἷς μήτ' ἀνὰ πείσαι δύναιτό τις μηδὲνα τῶν παρόντων κ. τ. λ., when protesting against Socrates' eristic arguments.

³ Naturally the imitation is not confined to the general structure of the dialogue (though even here, as in the use of *φημί* in 228 A—on which see Stallbaum and Schleiermacher ad loc.—there seems to be lacking the perfect mastery), but extends chiefly to familiar Platonic phrases. *Hipp.* 225 B: μή μοι οὕτως, cf. *Prot.* 318 B; with the play on *ὦρα* καὶ *χώρα* and its justification, ἴνα κ. τ. λ., 225 C, cf. *Gorg.* 467 B: ὁ λῶσθε Πῶλε, ἴνα κ. τ. λ., *Symp.* 185 C; Πασανίου δὲ πασαμενον, διδάσκονσι γάρ με, κ. τ. λ., *Phaedo* 102 D: παρέχων ὑπέρεχον, *Rep.* 498 DE (cf. *Axiochus* 370 DE); for the phrase, *Hipp.* 228 B: ὅς ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο, see *Menex.* 237 B and 239 A: πολλὰ δὴ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἀπεφίναντο, which Dionys. Hal. (de vi decendi in *Demos.* §27) criticises as defective Greek, saying: ἐργάζεται τὰ ἔργα, ἀποφάσεως δ' ἀξιοῦνται τὰ ἀληπτα (cf. also *Alcyon*, n. 3, and *Alc. I*, 119 E); for position of φησὶν, 229 A, vid. *Prot.* 345 D; *Hipp.* 229 E: ὥσπερ πεπεῦναι, cf. *Gorg.* 461 D, *Prot.* 354 E; *Hipp.* 231 C: περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ, cf. *Theaet.* 200 C; *Hipp.* 232 A: ὁ ἀνδρείωτατε πάντων, cf. ὁ πάντων ἀνδρείωτατε in *Pol.* 263 D and *Legg.* 905 C, having the advantage of avoiding the hiatus and producing a metrical rhythm, — — — — — ∪ ∪ ∪. *Hipp.* 228 D repeats the disjunction so much emphasized in *Alc. I* (see note 7 to that dial.), ἦν τ' ἔμαθε καὶ ἦν αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρεν. Considering the turn given to it in *Alc. I*, it seems strange to note the emphasis Leutsch lays upon ἐξηῦρεν in *Philol.* XXX, p. 128, in seeking to use the *Hipparchus* for an authority on the rise of gnomic poetry.

⁴ The repeated charges of unfairness, made with great brusqueness, in 225 D, 228 A, 229 DE, are in themselves quite unplatonic, though intended

in the conduct of the argument, he allowed himself such license as is inconceivable in Plato.⁵

With the dependence of *Hipparchus* upon *Eryxias* there is given also the certainty that it dates from the Alexandrian period. But the entire episode which introduces Hipparchus, and which evidently constituted the most interesting part of the author's production even to himself, is such as could have originated only then.⁶ The literary notices of Homer, Anacreon and Simonides, 228 B.C., and of Hipparchus' epigrams, 228 C ff., breathe the spirit of that time, and the new interpretation of the tyrannicide, 229 C D, is conceivable only in such an age. The use of *ναίχι*⁷ and the ratio of gold to silver 12:1 also point directly to the period of Alexander's successors.⁸ But we should gain an even more definite date if it were certain, as it is probable, that the *Theages*⁹ was already known to our author. Be that as it may, it seems clear that in the distribution of *τροφή* into *ξηρά* and *ὕργα*, 230 E, we have a trace of Aristotle;¹⁰ and if that be so, it becomes

as imitations of such passages as *Meno* 76 A, 80 B, etc., but the absurd way in which they serve at 228 A to introduce the Hipparchus episode makes them quite ridiculous. Then, too, how inept is 227 B: *ἐρὸν δὴ καὶ ἐμέ, εἰ οὐ καὶ ἐγώ!* Possibly this crept in because of an idiosyncrasy of some popular philosopher. Scarcely less unplatonic is the repetition of *μή μοί γε* in 229 E. See also note 1.

⁵ The juggling with *ἄξιος* and its cognates is almost though not quite as bad as that with *νόμος* in *Minos*. To illustrate the argument: After saying *οἶεσθαι δεῖν κερδαίνειν*, 225 D, the *δεῖν* is at once dropped in *οἶεσθαι κερδαίνειν*, 226 AB, only to reappear in 226 D; from the admission: *ἀγαθὸν τὸ κέρδος*, 227 A, he draws the inference: *τοὺς οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦντας φιλοκερδεῖς καλεῖς*, and *πάντες αὐτὸ φιλοκερδεῖς φαίνονται*, 227 C, whereas only *ἀγαθὸν τι φιλοῦντες* would strictly follow. Again Socrates asserts, 227 D: *τὸ κερδαίνειν ἄρτι ὁμολογήσαμεν εἶναι ὠφελεῖσθαι*, while that was only to be *inferred* from the statement in 227 A: *βλάπτονται ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄρα ἄνθρωποι . . . ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ζημίᾳ τὸ κέρδος*.

⁶ See note 4 for the manner of introducing this episode.

⁷ 232 B. The word occurs, aside from Sophocles O. T. 684, only here and in Callimachus, Ep. XXIX, 5, and LV, 3, and is one of those poetical flosculi in which the Alexandrians delighted.

⁸ 231 D. See Hultsch, *Metrologie*, §30.

⁹ The profusion of examples adduced, *Hipp.* 225 B ff., occurs with few variations in *Theages*, 123-127; but it must be said that largely the same list is found in *Alc. I*, 124 ff., from which that of the *Theages* was derived.

¹⁰ This use is common in Aristotle (see Eth. Nic. 1118^b 10 f.; *περὶ ζῶων γενέσεως*, 720^a 4, 725^b 1, 726^a 17; *περὶ ζῶων μορίων*, 671^a 3, etc.), but does not to my knowledge occur before. Of course the fact that Plato—like every

quite probable that the use of *μᾶλλον* and *ῥῆτον* in 230 A-D is an application of his dictum that *οὐσία* does not admit of more nor less.¹¹ The same thought occurs in briefer form in the *Minos*,¹² and from the general similarity of plan and composition, together with special resemblances,¹³ we may safely conclude to an approximately common date if not to common authorship.

§ X.—CLITOPHO.

The *ostensible* purpose of the *Clitopho* is one which Plato might well have wished to carry out, viz., to show the inadequacy of the Socratic ethics; but so soon as it is made clear that the *Platonic* and not the *historic Socrates* is here subjected to criticism, it should also be evident that Plato did not write this harangue. The anonymous reference to various disciples of Socrates is plainly only one of the fictions employed to relieve the monotony of Clitopho's extended recital. It is, therefore, quite fruitless to seek to determine who each or any of his feigned collocutors were, the more because all the answers he reports are found in writings which were regarded as Platonic. That he did not care to whom Plato had attributed the various views, our author has sufficiently shown in treating the question, whether justice consist in doing good to friend and harm to foe.¹ Add to this that

other mortal—spoke of *σιτία καὶ ποτὰ* (*Phaedo*, 64 D, *Euthyd.* 280 B) means nothing, because even *σιτίον* is not dry (as Aristotle says of Thales, *Met.* 983^b 22: *λαβὼν ἰσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν*). The thought does not concern us; it is the *terminology*. With *Hipp.* 229 B: *ἐγγὺς τε ἔξων Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Κρόνον βασιλεύοντος* cf. *Arist. Pol. Athen.* 16, 27 (Sandys): *διὸ καὶ πολλὰκις ἐθρυλλεῖτο, ὥς ἡ Πεισιστράτους τυραννὶς ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνον βίος εἴη*.

¹¹ Our passage might be considered a development of *Meno*, 74 DE, but the reference to Aristotle is more natural. Cf. *Arist. Categor.* 3^b 33 ff.

¹² *Minos*, 313 AB.

¹³ To omit the mass of materials gathered by Boeckh, I mention only *Hipp.* 232 A: *μημυνεύεις οὖν, ὅθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γέγονεν; . . . εἰ δὲ μή, ἐγὼ σε ὑπομνήσω*; *Min.* 318 B: *ἰσως οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ βοῦλει σε ὑπομνήσω*: Compare also the end of *Hipparchus* (οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ἀνειδίξει κ. τ. λ.) with the emphatic caution not to blaspheme in *Min.* 318 E. On the whole it seems more probable that they are both due to one author. On Pasipho see note 27 to *Minos*.

¹ *Clit.* 410 AB: *εἰπές* (sc. Socrates) *μοι δικαιοσύνης εἶναι τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν· ὕστερον δὲ ἐφάνη βλάπτειν γε οὐδέποτε ὁ δίκαιος οὐδένα*. This makes it appear that Socrates gave the definition (and this he never did, see *Meno*, 71 A, *Rep.* 332 C ff.) and that Clitopho refuted him.

he used *Alcibiades I*, *Theages* and *Anterastae*² as genuine sources of Platonic philosophy, and one must be convinced that the *Clitopho* is spurious.

The charge here preferred against the Platonic Socrates is only a modification of that noticed by Xenophon³ as urged against the historical Socrates; viz., that, though excelling in the art of exhorting to a life of justice, he fails—either because unable or unwilling—to specify the precise initial step and conduct of such a life, or even the definite result to which the *τέχνη δικαιοσύνης* leads. This demand goes obviously beyond the sphere of psychological ethics into that of social ethics and politics; and it is needful to remark that no cognizance is taken of the positive doctrines by which Plato, in the *Politicus*⁴ and in the books of the *Republic* subsequent to the first—the only one which is here taken into the account—has supplemented the more or less negative teachings of Socrates. Some critics have therefore inferred that this phase of Platonism was not yet developed, or that the *Clitopho* was either a discarded introduction to the *Republic* or even, in some sort, a part of it.⁵ Of course, these views suppose the impossible

The absurdity of this is at once apparent. The historic Socrates, indeed, may have used that definition, but hardly seriously. See Xen. Mem. II 6, 35, and II 3, 14, and Zeller, II A, p. 171.

² *Clit.* 407 C: διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ ποδὶ πρὸς τὴν λύραν ἀμετρίαν may refer to *Alc. I*, 108 A: τὸν ἄδοντα δεῖ κιθαρίζειν ποτὲ πρὸς τὴν ῥῆδην καὶ βαίνειν, esp. since the following words allude to *Alc. I*, 112 A ff.; *Clit.* 407 E: τοῦ μὲν ἄρξοντος ἀμελεῖν, vid. *Alc. I*, 130 A; *Clit.* 409 D–410 A, the discussion of *φιλία*, *ὁμόνοια* and *ὁμοδοξία* is a résumé of that in *Alc. I*, 126 A–127 D. *Clit.* 408 A: ὅστις γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἐπίσταται τῇ ἑαυτοῦ λύρᾳ χρῆσθαι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος, οὐδὲ ὅστις μὴ τῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐδ' ἄλλω τῶν ὀργάνων οὐδὲ κτημάτων οὐδενί, is a very insipid and much misplaced imitation of *Theag.* 126 B. For the *Anterastae* see my note 13 to that dialogue. I incline to think that *Alc. I* was particularly in the author's mind when he spoke of *protreptic discourses*. At the close of that dialogue Alcibiades says: ἄρξομαι γε ἐντεῦθεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. *Clitopho* says in effect: *Take the Alc. I for granted: what follows then?* Cf. πῶς ἄρχεισθαι δεῖν φαμὲν δικαιοσύνης περὶ μαθήσεως and οἷας θεραπείας δεῖται, *Clit.* 408 E and 410 D, and θὲς τὸν Κλειτοφῶντα ὁμολογοῦντα, etc., *ibid.*

³ Xen. Mem. I, 4, 1 ff.

⁴ *Polit.* 306 ff.

⁵ Ritter held the first view. Hippolytus (ap. Diels, *Dox.* p. 569, l. 26) quotes *Clit.* 407 D, as if from the *Republic*, saying: καὶ λέξις τούτου ἐμφανεστάτη (i. e. the clearest statement of the doctrine that ἀμαρτήματα are ἀκούσια) ἐστὶ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ. He, with others, probably regarded the *Clitopho* as in some sort a part of it; else, why did Thrasyllus (*Diog. L.*

in regarding our harangue as Platonic; and it is far more probable that if its author took the trouble to read those works or the *Laws* he believed those schemes to be chimerical and consequently inadequate as an answer to his demands. It is not our present business to enquire whether such a conclusion was or was not warranted; it is sufficient to know that Plato *did* offer his solution, and that he could not have written such a criticism of his own doctrines and have ignored the real issue.⁶ We do not know who produced this harangue, nor even the time of his writing. We may, however, affirm that he did not desire his work to pass for Platonic; for, though alluding to many passages in Plato's dialogues,⁷ he made clear his own adverse position. And his diction, while generally pure and in harmony with Plato's usage, displays sufficient deviations from the latter to point, as does also his use of *Alcibiades I*, *Theages* and *Anterastae*, to a later age.⁸

III 60) place it just before the *Republic*? [This remark of Hippolytus': λέξις τούτου ἐμφανεστάτη, very pointedly illustrates the most striking characteristic of almost all of the spurious works. Because the thoughts have come to be *commonplaces* they can be *expressed epigrammatically*; and such pointed statements exercised a strong influence on the eclectic minds of later philosophers.] Kunert dates the *Clitopho* ca. 390 B. C. and points out many detailed allusions to the *Republic*, but he tries to prove too much. Had he investigated the relation of *Clitopho* to *Alc. I* he must have seen his error. Yxem's theory I consider even less tenable.

⁶ Plato might well have answered Clitopho's impertinent question by saying: '*No one can tell you just what is your duty*,' and all ethical writers of consequence would sustain the answer.

⁷ In ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων (407 A) allusion is made to *Symp.* 215 C f.; in 407 B: ἀγνοεῖτε οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων πράττοντες, probably to *Euthyd.* 306 D f. or *Apol.* 29 D f.; *ibid.* εἰπερ μαθητόν, *vid. Meno*, 70 A; the locus class. for the involuntariness of wrong-doing (407 D) is *Prot.* 345 D ff.; ἦττον ὃς ἂν ᾗ, φατέ, τῶν ἡδονῶν (*ibid.*) is too much a commonplace to require references; for κρείττον ἢ τὴν τούτου χρῆσιν (407 E f.) see *Euthyd.* 280 C ff., 288 E ff.; 408 C: ὅσπερ καθιεύδοντας ἐπεγείρειν, cf. *Apol.* 30 E f.; the questionable expression ἐπεξεληθῆναι δὲ οὐκ ἐνι τῷ πράγματι (308 D) may have been suggested by *Euthyd.* 306 CD; for cc. V and VI cf. *Euthyd.* 290-293; 409 BC: τὸ συμφέρον, ἀπεκρίνατο, cf. *Rep.* 336 D ff.; 409 D: τὰς δὲ τῶν παίδων φιλίας καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων, cf. *Lysis* 211 E ff., 212 D; for περιεδράμηκεν εἰς ταῦτόν ὁ λόγος (410 A) cf. *Theaet.* 200 C.

⁸ Note κατὰ κράτος (407 A), μελετητόν and ἐξασκῶ (407 B), ἐκούσιον (407 D) in a forced rhetorical application, συμβαίνω (409 D), μακρότερον and καταμελετήσαι (410 B), διότι (410 C), δίδαγμα (409 B). The use of φαίλω in πρὸς σὲ φαίλωσ ἔχειν (406) seems strange at best. A most evident mark of later author-

§ XI.—ANTERASTAE.

This dialogue opens in a grammarian's school,¹ where two noble Athenian youths are discussing the inclination of the ecliptic, while their lovers, an athlete and a professor of polite learning, sit by and look on. The lads are said to be philosophizing, and so, in Socrates' manner, the questions forthwith arise whether philosophy be a fine thing and, ultimately, what it is. The professor of polite learning declares it to be one with *πολυμαθία*. This definition, it appears in the sequel, would make of the philosopher a Jack of all trades and a master of none, and so useless in the presence of specialists; and if useless, then not a possessor of any good. Socrates then takes the matter in hand² and shows that there are some things in which the philosopher must be a true master, second to none. These affairs constitute the broad realm of conduct, and the arts that rule within it are *σωφροσύνη* and *δικαιοσύνη*, which prove to be identical not only with each other but also with *βασιλική*, *τυραννική*, *πολιτική*, *δεσποτική*, *οικονομική* (138 C). Yet at the very close³ Socrates reverts to the first theme to remark that it thus likewise appears that philosophy is not *πολυμαθία*, thereby proving that the principal aim of the dialogue is to refute the first definition.

We have then to enquire what may have been the motive of the author. And in order to an intelligent answer we shall need first to ascertain the approximate date of his writing. It scarcely admits of question that the dialogue is spurious. Aside from the doubts expressed in antiquity,⁴ almost all modern critics have agreed in athetizing it. And this verdict is suffi-

ship is the expression (408 C) τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τε καὶ συνεπιθυμητῶν ἢ ἐταίρων σῶν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ πρὸς σὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀνομάζειν. We find also a very stiff and rhetorical phrase in 406: τοὺς ἐμοὶ περὶ σοῦ γενομένους λόγους πρὸς Λυσίαν. Yxem considers this a fine turn of expression to mark Clitopho's feigned embarrassment.

¹ This circumstance points to an imitation of the opening scenes of *Charmides* and *Lysis*.

² 137 B-139 A.

³ 139 A.

⁴ Clem. Alex. Strom. I 19, 93: εἰ δὲ τοῦ Πλάτωνος τὸ σύγγραμμα, and D. L. IX 37: εἰπερ οἱ Ἀντερασταὶ Πλάτωνός εἰσι, φησὶ Θρασύλλος. The latter passage is corrupt and, as it stands, unintelligible, but it clearly expressed a doubt as to the genuineness of our dialogue.

ciently justified by its dependence not only on *Alc. I.*⁵ but also on *Alc. II.*⁶

But there is a marked violation of Plato's wonted urbanity in the rivalry of the lovers,⁷ which serves to heighten the unplatonic effect; and the language, though generally pure, is not wholly above suspicion.⁸ In addition to this it is to be noted that the argument consists almost wholly of Platonic commonplaces⁹ which are manipulated with foolish subtlety,¹⁰ though apparently in good faith. It is customary to declare the result of the dialogue to be unplatonic, which may indeed be true if it be assumed that it

⁵ 137 ΔΕ: ἤτις ἓνα, καὶ πολλοὺς κ. τ. λ. unquestionably reproduces *Alc. I.*, 114 B ff., where a suggestion of the *Phaedrus* (260 E f.) is elaborated. See note 17 to *Alc. I.* It is not improbable that the following definition of σωφροσύνη as τὸ ἐαυτὸν γινώσκειν (138 A) is likewise due to *Alc. I.*, 131 B, 133 C ff., rather than to *Charm.* 164 D.

⁶ *Ant.* 136 CD, if not the whole dialogue, apparently owes much to *Alc. II.*, 146 E ff.: δεῖ ἄρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μέλλουσαν ὀρθῶς βιώσασθαι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης <sc. τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου> ἀντέχεσθαι, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἀσθενοῦντα ἱατροῦ ἢ τινος κυβερνήτου τὸν ἀσφαλῶς μέλλοντα πλεῖν . . . ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν καλουμένην πολυμαθίαν τε καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένος, ὀρφανὸς δὲ ὢν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἐκάστης τῶν ἄλλων, ἄρ' οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι δικαίως πολλῷ χειμῶνι χρήσεται, ἅτε ἀνευ κυβερνήτου διατελῶν ἐν πελάγει, χρόνον οὐ μακρὸν βίου θέων, cf. *Ant.* 136 D: τί δ'; ἐν γῇ χειμαζομένη ποτέρῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέποις ἐαυτὸν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ;

⁷ *Ant.* 132 C, 133 AB.

⁸ I note ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, 135 A.

⁹ The observant reader cannot fail to recognize this. I will note here some of the imitations. 132 D: ἵνα καὶ εἰ τι δυναίμην παρ' αὐτοῦ ὠφέληθῆην is a very frequent turn, vid. *Hipp. Min.* 369 E, *Apol.* 25 D, etc.; 133 A: ὅ τι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἐπαθον, οὐκ οἶδα, vid. *Apol.* 17 A; *ibid.*: ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε ὑπὸ τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν ἐκπλήττομαι, vid. *Charm.* 155 C ff.; with 133 B cf. *Meno* 71 B, etc.; Solon's γηράσκω δ' αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος occurs also *Laches* 188 B, *Rep.* 536 D; on λεπτόν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν, 134 B, see *Phaedrus* 276 B, *Rep.* 607 C; ὁμολογοῦμεν τρεῖς ὄντες, 134 E, is especially frequent in the *Laws*; the comparison of learning with food (οἰκοῦν ἐν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστί καὶ τὰ μαθήματα; 134 D) occurs in *Legg.* 810 E; ἀπορίας μεστοί, 134 E, is found frequently, vid. Fritzsche ad *Meno* 80 A; 136 E: ἀνομολογήσασθαι τὰ εἰρημένα, vid. *Symp.* 200 E (cf. also *Prot.* 332 D: ἀναλογισώμεθα τὰ ὁμολογημένα ἡμῖν); on the connection of κολάζειν and βελτίστους ποιεῖν, 137 BC, see *Rep.* 445 A and *Gorg.* 511 ff. (cf. also note 14 to *Minos*). Of course the reduction to unity of βασιλική, τυραννική, etc., in 138 C, is due to *Polit.* 258 E, 259 B, and *Euthyd.* 291 B ff.

¹⁰ In 137 B ff., reaching its height in 137 DE.

would make philosophy *wholly* practical;¹¹ but, as representing one aspect of Plato's thought, it proceeds from a basis quite incontestable.¹²

Though we thus find a *terminus post quem* in *Alc. II*, we have not yet discovered a *terminus ante quem*; but this is given in the reference of the *Clitopho* to our dialogue.¹³ We have now to enquire what motive our author may have had in writing the *Anterastae*. On the whole it seems most probable that he was an admirer of the *Socratic* Platonism, if we may employ this term to designate the original philosophy of Plato, which evolved from the ethics of Socrates, in distinction from the Pythagoreanizing tendency of the heads of the older Academy and the empirical methods of Aristotle. Speusippus had said that, to define any one thing, you must know all,¹⁴ thus agreeing in part with the still more inductive Aristotle, who defined philosophy as the knowledge of first principles which οἷδε πως πάντα τὰ ὑποζείμενα.¹⁵ Now, it is not surprising that our author should consider this only a recrudescence of the vain encyclopedism against which Heraclitus had directed his saying, πολυμαθὴ νόον οὐ διδάσκει, and against the Sophists' practice of which Plato had protested.¹⁶ In *Ant.* 135 B we have the scope of philosophy thus defined by the polymath: ἀφ' ὧν ἂν πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν· πλείστην δ' ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοίη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν,

¹¹ This assumption is not justified by the dialogue. It merely asserts that, against the view which would reduce the philosopher to a general ὑπακρος, there is at least one sphere, viz. the 'practical' (in the Kantian sense), in which he *must be first*. And this contention is closely analogous to that of *Gorg.* 459 C ff.

¹² The reduction of the virtues to σωφροσύνη and δικαιοσύνη in connection with πόλις and οἰκία, as in *Ant.* 138 A f., was probably influenced by *Meno* 73 A ff., and is to a certain extent justified by it.

¹³ It can hardly be doubted that such a reference to *Ant.* 137 DE exists in *Clit.* 408 AB: εἰ δέ τις ἀνάγκη ζῆν εἴη, δοῦλω ἄμεινον ἢ ἐλευθέρῳ διάγειν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ τὸν βίον ἐστὶν ἄρα, καθάπερ πλοῖον παραδόντι τὰ πηδάλια τῆς διανοίας ἄλλῳ, τῷ μαθόντι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴν, ἣν δὴ σὺ πολιτικὴν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἐπνοομάσεις πολλάκις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὴ ταύτην δικαστικὴν τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην ὥς ἐστι λέγων. Cf. also *Ant.* 136 B, quoted in note 6.

¹⁴ Arist. Anal. Post. 97^a 6 ff. See Zeller II a, p. 996 f.

¹⁵ Arist. Met. 982a, 21 ff. Compare on this and what follows, Teichmüller, der Begriff des πεπαιδευμένος, in *Aristotel.* Forsch. II, p. 55 ff.

¹⁶ It is noteworthy that in the *Anterastae* there is no reference whatever to the Sophists, a reference which in this connection Plato must surely have made.

εἰ δὲ μή, ὥς πλείστων γε καὶ μάλιστα ἀξιολόγων, μαθὼν αὐτῶν ταῦτα, ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν, ὅσα ξυνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας. It has been observed that if Plato were the author of the dialogue this passage would contain the first distinct opposition of the liberal to the mechanical arts. But the whole sentence reads like a popular restatement of Aristotle's distinction between arts θεωρητικαί and ποιητικαί.¹⁷ So Aristotle says: ὑπολαμβάνομεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὥς ἐνδέχεται, μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν.¹⁸

We shall see, when we come to treat of the *Epinomis*, that Aristotle had early expressed his views on this subject in *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας*, which, aside from a few fragments, we now possess only in the revision presented in the first two chapters of his *Metaphysics*. It seems not improbable that in that popular work we have the real opponent against which the polemic of the *Anterastae* is directed.¹⁹ This would not, of course, exclude the possibility of our author's deriving suggestion from other Aristotelian works,²⁰ and in the second argument against philosophy as πολυμαθία we may perhaps recognize an attempt to reaffirm Plato's position as against Aristotle's criticism: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται

¹⁷ See Arist. Met. 982a 1 [Compare also Alc. I, 131 B].

¹⁸ Ibid. 982a, 8 ff.

¹⁹ Following the words above quoted from *Ant.*, we have the mention of τεκτονική, τέκτων and ἀρχιτέκτων, with which compare Arist. Met. 981a, 30 ff.: διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἶδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους . . . ὥς οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρακτικὸν εἶναι σοφωτέρους ὄντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν. 981b, 31: . . . σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπεύρων, χειροτέχνην δ' ἀρχιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν μᾶλλον. For τοῖς ἐλευθέροις in *Anterastae*, 135 B, cf. Met. 982b, 25 ff.

²⁰ It is just possible that the conceit of the πένταθλος, which struck the fancy of the Alexandrians and made them suspect that Plato intended by it a characterization of Democritus (D. L. IX 37), may have been suggested by Aristotle's appreciation of the pentathlete in Eth. Nic. A, 1361b, 3-26. Be that as it may, the conceit itself has quite the appearance of having originated with the Alexandrians. The names of Πένταθλος and Βῆτα bestowed on Eratosthenes (διὰ τὸ δευτερεύειν ἐν παντὶ εἶδει παιδείας, τοῖς ἄκροις ἐγγίσαντα, Suid.) by those at the Museum are evidence in point, unless these were likewise suggested by the *Anterastae*. See Susemihl, I, p. 413, n. 27. Besides, the remarks on moderation in gymnastic exercise in *Anter.* p. 134 recur almost verbatim in Arist. Eth. Nic. 1104a 11 ff., and 1138b 28 ff. Grant supposes that Aristotle may have borrowed the words from *Anterastae*, but the reverse is decidedly the more probable.

πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτόν, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν.²¹ In this manner also we can the more readily account for the author's misconception of Plato's estimate of learning; for his interest was polemical rather than expository.²²

§ XII.—THEAGES.

Critics have, almost with one accord, athetized this dialogue as a most manifest forgery.¹ Its eclectic character, indeed, and the author's negligence in his extensive and sometimes quite literal quotations from Plato,² amply justify their sentence. Our compiler, however, did not content himself with this, but proceeded to relate anecdotes and make statements concerning the *δαιμόνιον* which do not harmonize with the characterization of it as previously given in Plato's language.³ This test is simple and easily applied, showing the uncritical character of the author's selection of materials, and must not be complicated with the enquiry into the real nature of Socrates' *δαιμόνιον*. Different opinions may be

²¹ Arist. Pol. A. 1252a, 7 ff.

²² For Plato's opinion see *Legg.* 819 A, *Philebus* 62 A ff. and *Soph.* 232 A ff.

¹ Socher, Knebel, and Grote believed it to be genuine; Müller, partly genuine, but with a large spurious addition (127 D to close). All others reject it wholly.

² See *Theag.* 127 E (also 127 A) from *ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος* to *καὶ χάριν πρὸς τοῦτοις εἰδέναι* and compare *Apol.* 19 E from *ὥσπερ Γοργίας ὁ Δ. καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κ.* to *καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι*. Here even the anacoluthon of the original (*τοῦτους πείθουσιν*) is retained, although *πείθουσι* occurred just before. *Theag.* 128 B: *οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐπίσταμαι τῶν μακαρίων τε καὶ καλῶν μαθημάτων, ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἄν, cf. Apol.* 20 C: *ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβερνύομην ἄν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι.* *Theag.* 138 C: *ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα τῶν ἐμῶν ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ ὀλίγῳ πρεσβυτέρων, οἳ πρὶν μὲν τούτῳ συνεῖναι οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι ἦσαν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ συνεγένοντο τούτῳ, ἐν πάντῳ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται ὢν πρότερον χειρόους, cf. Theaet.* 154 D; *Theag.* 128 D: *ἔστι γάρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρετόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἥ ὅταν γένηται, αἰεὶ μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τούτου ἀποτροπὴν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε*—is taken quite literally from *Apol.* 31 D, with a change in the last sentence at once seen to be an unfortunate attempt to vary the phrase. *Theag.* 129 B depends in like manner upon *Euthyd.* 272 E; 129 E, upon *Theaet.* 151 A; 130 A, upon *Theaet.* 150 D and 151 E; 130 D and 131 A, upon *Theaet.* 150 D.

³ This contradiction becomes most conspicuous in 129 E (note *συλλάβηται*), which conflicts with the statement (128 D) that the *δαιμόνιον* has only a negating or veto power. In *ἀλλὰ λαβὼν* (129 C) there is an admission fatal to the prophetic spirit ascribed to Socrates and hardly in keeping with the deification of the *δαιμόνιον* (131 A). See also *ἡ φωνὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου* (128 E).

held on that question, based on the representations respectively of Xenophon and Plato; but we are here concerned only with weighing the claims of the *Theages* to be an authentic production of Plato's. The Xenophontic account, therefore, may be entirely disregarded except as it affects the dating of our dialogue. In this respect, indeed, it may be of value; for, knowing that the prophetic function of the *δαιμόνιον* was already illustrated in the *Memorabilia*,⁴ we shall not follow Stallbaum in assigning 150 B. C. as a *terminus post quem*.⁵

Its author quite evidently sought to impersonate Plato and to have the *Theages* accepted as his work; not only does its scheme of composition generally seem suggested by features of the *Protagoras* and the mention of Theages in the *Republic*,⁶ but it abounds even more than others of this group of forged dialogues in imitations and reminiscences of Platonic passages easily recognized.⁷ I believe, moreover, that the particularly objectionable

⁴ Xenophon, *Mem.* I, i. 3-9.

⁵ Cicero (*De Div.*, I 3, 6) mentions one Antipater of Tarsus (fl. ca. 150 B. C.) by whom "permulta collecta sunt, quae mirabiliter a Socrate divinata sunt." Upon this work Stallbaum supposed the *Theages* to be dependent; hence the date.

⁶ *Rep.* 496 B: καὶ γὰρ θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκεύασται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἣ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει, may have given occasion for the use of his name (cf. also *Apol.* 33 E). The device of beginning the dialogue and then going elsewhere to complete it may be the contribution of the *Protag.*; but here the walk to the Porch of Zeus Eleutherius (also the scene of the *Eryxias*) is awkwardly accomplished in utter silence, with only an asyndeton to mark it. Most of the characters mentioned are otherwise unknown, as Timarchus, Philemon, Nicias, Sannion. Euathlus even (ὁ σταδιοδρομῶν) has the appearance of a name chosen to suit the fictitious character.

⁷ *Theag.* 121 A: εἰ σχολή, κ. τ. λ. possibly after *Phaedo* 58 D, though this is a common form of introducing a discussion—see II. Δ. 374 B, Cebes, Tab. §III, etc.; in writing *Theag.* 121 C: ἣ δὲ νῦν παρούσα ἐπιθυμία τοῦτω πάνν με φοβεῖ· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀγεννής, σφαλερὰ δέ, our author probably had *Protag.* 312 BC in mind. The use and reference (apparently false) to Euripides of the verse σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία (125 B) was doubtless due to *Rep.* 568 AB, while οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλὴν γε . . . τῶν ἐρωτικῶν (128 B) is a misplaced bit of pleasantry derived (doubtless) from *Symp.* 175 D (cf. *Lysis* 204 C). Perhaps *Theag.* 122 B: οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ὅτου θειοτέρου ἂν ἄνθρωπος βουλευσάιτο, ἢ περὶ παιδείας is a reminiscence of *Legg.* 765 E f., and the caution to define the subject-matter of consultation (*ibid.* BC) points apparently to *Legg.* 638 C (but see *Phaedrus* 237 B).

close (from 128 B) was called forth by the end of *Alcibiades I*,⁸ although we have already seen the sources whence the materials were drawn.⁹ In addition to this argument calculated to put a fuller meaning into Plato's frequent parenthesis, ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, it also seeks, like *Περὶ Ἀρετῆς*, to turn to serious account a passing jest let fall by Plato in the *Symposium*.¹⁰ Finally, its affected style¹¹ and impure diction¹² corroborate the verdict of spurious

⁸Theages here expresses his willingness to accept Socrates for his guide, ἐὰν οὗτος ἐθέλῃ (128 C) knowing that his associates make surprising progress; to whom Socrates : οἶσθα οὖν οἶον τοῦτό ἐστι; Theages : ναὶ μὰ Δῖ', ἐγώ γε, ὅτι ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ. Socrates : οὐκ, ὦ γαθὲ, ἀλλὰ σε λέληθεν, οἶον τοῦτό ἐστιν, ἐγὼ δέ σοι φράσω (then follows the exposition of the mysterious offices of the δαιμόνιον). All this is clearly a development of what was rather abruptly broken off in *Alc. I*, 135 D : 'Α. ἐὰν βούλῃ σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Σ. οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη. 'Α. ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν; Σ. ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ (note *Theag.* 130 E : ἐστὶν οὖν, ὦ Θέαγες, τοιαύτη ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία· ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ, πάντῃ πολλὴ ἐπιδόσεις καὶ ταχύ, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐ. Other things also point to the same dialogue : thus *Theag.* 122 E : οὐκ ἐδιδάξατό σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν ἅπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἄλλοι πεπαιδευμένοι . . . οἶον γράμματα τε καὶ καθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν, cf. *Alc. I*, 106 E; *Theag.* 123 C ff. is strikingly like *Alc. I*, 124-5. *Theag.* 125 E : εὐξαίμην μὲν ἂν, οἶμαι, ἐγώ γε τύραννος γενέσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ δὲ μή, ὥς πλείστον; cf. *Alc. I*, 104 B, and *Alc. II*, 141 AB; *Theag.* 126 A : καὶ σὺ γ' ἂν, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἀνθρωποὶ, cf. *Alc. II*, 141 B : ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι . . . κἂν ἄλλον ὄντινόν. This passage, it will be noted, displays a dependence also on *Alc. II*.

⁹See note 2.

¹⁰*Theag.* 130 E, virtue is said to go out of Socrates at a touch of his garment, a mere extension of the ironical jest in *Symp.* 175 D; cf. also note 10 to *Axiarchus*.

¹¹Note the asyndeton in 121 B and C, and again twice in 129 C. Affec-tation is evident in *προσαγορεύωμεν* and *καλὸν ὄνομα*, 122 D, which are quite of a piece and remind one of τὸ χρυσίον τὸ λαμπρόν, *Ep. I*, 309 B. So too ἡ τὰ ἄρματα κυβερνῶσι, 123 C, a metaphor which is poetical and becomes common only in the faded modern languages. See Fritzsche ad loc., who refers to gubernare in Mart. IX 23 and Seneca Hippol. 1069 foll. But Arist. Phys. 203^b, 11 already speaks of Anaximander's ἀπειρον as περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν, and Parmenides, v. 128, mentions the δαίμων ἡ πάντα κυβερνᾷ (cf. also κυβερνήτης as applied to the δαίμων in Diels, Dox., p. 335^b 15). Ammon. Comment. ad Arist. de interpr., §II, c. 7, says, according to the Stoics : οἱ Θεοὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τὰ περὶ ἡμᾶς κυβερνῶσι. See also Polycarp. Ep. ad Philipp. c. 11 : qui autem non potest se in his gubernare (doubtless representing κυβερνᾶν in the Greek original) and κυβερνήτην τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν, Martyr. Polycarp. c. XIX. *Theag.* 126 B : ἀλλοτρίοις καὶ οἰκείοις ἀκοντίοις is a bit of foolish subtlety that was gratefully caught up by the author of the *Clitopho* and elaborated 408 A. See my note 2 to that dialogue. *Theag.* 130 B : οἶον ἦν τὸ ἀνδράποδον is too grossly

passed upon the dialogue by modern scholarship. Its date falls later than that of *Alcibiades II*.¹³

§ XIII.—ALCIBIADES II.

Of the many works inspired by the appearance and success of the *Alcibiades I*, our dialogue stands nearest to the original, though by no means equalling it in excellence. Its subject is prayer, a topic which, as we well know, engaged the thought of Socrates and Plato,¹ and was, therefore, well suited to a Socratic dialogue. Even the conclusion reached is in perfect harmony with Plato's teaching: reasons, consequently, for the rejection of the treatise must be derived from the manner in which the matter is presented. And, first, we have to note its indebtedness to *Alc. I*,² displayed even in the repetition of its peculiarities. Chief among these mannerisms is the catching up every (apparently) chance remark as an opportunity for introducing discussions almost or quite irrelevant to the ostensible purpose. Thus Alcibiades says of Oedipus (138 C), ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἴρηκας· ἐπεὶ τίς ἂν σοι δοκεῖ τολμᾶσαι ὑγιαίνων τοιαῦτ' εὖξασθαι; and Socrates abruptly rejoins: τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἄρα

vulgar to credit Plato with it. Xen. Mem. IV 2, 29, is less objectionable, and even *Alc. I*, 120 B, is not so offensive. The cheap erudition of 124 is more obtrusive than elsewhere in the Pseudo-Platonica.

¹² I note 121 A: ἰδιολογήσασθαι (Cobet's conj. διαλογίσασθαι is rendered improbable by the party sequestering itself in the Porch); δοκῶ μοι, 121 D, where Schanz reads δοκεῖ μοι, without MSS. authority, though retaining δοκῶ μοι, *Alc. I*, 135 C, and *Alc. II*, 150 D, vid. also Hipparch. 231 B; ὁμοῦ τι τούτῳ γ' ἔλῃν, 129 D, a construction apparently not pre-Alexandrian, which Fritzsche has illustrated ad loc. Plato uses ὁμοῦ only in the sense of 'together with.' Finally κάτειπε, 123 B, looks suspicious.

¹³ See end of note 8.

¹ For Socrates, see Xen. Mem. I 3, 1 ff.; for Plato, the *Euthyphro*, with books V and X of the *Laws*.

² The extent of this can be appreciated only after a minute comparison. I can here notice only a few points: The discussion of φρόνιμοι and ἄφρονες (140 E) harks back to *Alc. I* 125 A ff.; Alcibiades' ambitions are described (141 AB) in almost the same terms as *Alc. I* 105 A-C; for οἱ μὲν περὶ πολέμου τε καὶ εἰρήνης (144 E) cf. *Alc. I* 107 D ff., a reference made more obvious by what follows (145 B); for 145 D: τὸ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην βέλτιον, vid. *Alc. I* 108 A-E; for 146 D: λωσιτελεῖ ἄρα τοῖς πολλοῖς μήτ' εἰδέναι (a wrong application of the principle, betraying the imitator) μηθὲν μήτ' οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι, vid. *Alc. I* 116 D ff.; 149 A: χρήματα οὐθὲν ἐλάττω κεκτημένοι (sc. οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι) τῆς ἡμετέρας πύλεως, cf. the glowing description of their wealth, *Alc. I* 122 E ff.

ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν; This is the occasion for the long digression (138 C–140 D) on the paradox: πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται.³ A similarly gratuitous disquisition is that (143 B–144 C) on the text, “Where ignorance is bliss, ’Tis folly to be wise.” Were the experiment worth the pains, one might be tempted to expunge this entire section; for here occur the absurd illustrations of Orestes and Alcmaeon, and the still more grotesque fiction of Alcibiades’ attempt against the life of Pericles. Another mannerism appears in a striking fondness for smart turns of expression, many even bearing the same general stamp.⁴ Our author is also a φιλόμνηρος, possibly by sympathy, but more probably because of Plato’s well-known indulgence in apt allusions to the poet. But, while Plato in this respect also displayed unfailing good taste, this characteristic is here wanting,⁵ and while Plato

³ This paradox had, indeed, its origin in the teaching of Socrates, but was carried to the extreme by the Stoics, cf. Cic. Parad. Stoic. IV, and Alex. Aphrod. De Fato, c. XXVIII. Some have thought our author a Stoic, but that was clearly an error, since he seeks to refute the proposition; but he may well have been led to the discussion because of this contention by the Stoics.

⁴ Note the following: 142 A: ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν πολιιορκούμενοι πολιιορκίαν οὐθὲν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολέμιων (cf. χρήματα οὐθὲν ἐλάττω κ. τ. λ., 149 A); 142 A: εὐχεσθαι ἀστρατηγήτους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐστρατηγηκέναι; 142 C: βουλομένους ἂν ἀγένητα μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι; 141 D: ἐρασθέντα τῆς τυραννίδος οὐθὲν ἦττον ἢπερ ἐκεῖνος τῶν παιδικῶν; 143 D: οὗτοι τὸν λέγοντα, ὥς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις σοι ταῦτα πεπρᾶχθαι, εὐφημεῖν δεῖ σε κελεύειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολὺ, εἰ τις τὰ ἐναντία λέγοι. The verb ἀνεύχομαι (142 D, repeated 148 B, but occurring nowhere else) may be classed with ἀγένητα and the equally forced ἀστρατηγήτους; the reckless indifference of καὶ τί ἂν τις ξυννοοίτο (138 A) and the unmotivated abruptness of πάλιν αὖ μοι δοκεῖ (147 E) are really vulgar. It is hard to say how the Greeks were affected by ἀνδρῶν ῥητορικῶν πολιτικῶν φύσημα φυσῶντων (145 E). Compare Athenaeus 591 F: ἵστε δὲ ὅτι καὶ Δημόδοξος ὁ ῥήτωρ ἐξ αὐλητρίδος ἑταίρας ἐπαιδικοποιήσατο Δημέαν· ὃν φρναττόμενον ποτε ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος ἐπεστόμισεν Ὑπερίδης εἰπών· Οὐ σιωπήσῃ, μειράκιον, μείζον τῆς μητρὸς ἔχων τὸ φύσημα;

⁵ See 140 A: σύν τε δύο (cf. Il. X 224) here inept, suggested by *Sympr.* 174 D; 141 D: χθιζά τε καὶ πρωῒζά (cf. Il. II 303) meant to mend ἐχθὲς καὶ πρῶην in *Gorg.* 470 D, by which passage our author was led into a most striking anachronism; for he thus brings in the death of Archelaus, occurring in 399 B. C., as a subject of conversation between Alcibiades and Socrates, presumably thirty years before (for Alcibiades is surely considered here, as in *Alc. I.*, as still a very young man), whereas both had died before Archelaus. Again, οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῆσιν εἶτε ἀτασθαλίαισιν εἶτε ἀφραδίασι χρῆ εἰπεῖν, ὑπὲρ μόνον ἄλγε’ ἔχουσι (142 D) is from *Od.* I 33 f. with additions from another poet made in Plato’s manner.

never attributes to Homer any works except the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, he is here credited with the *Margites*.⁶ Again, the fictitious war between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, with the embassy to the oracle of Ammon (148 D ff.), is probably only an ill-conceived invention to rival the myth of Critias in the *Timaeus*. Yet, despite this general familiarity with the works of Plato and not infrequent imitation of them,⁷ the diction betrays the influence of a later age.⁸ This last mark is so convincing that it were no wonder if the doubts as to our dialogue's authenticity arose from a sense of this fact. Some one, to be sure, absurdly enough

⁶ First quoted in Plato's manner (147 B) τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, then Homer is expressly named (147 D). The works of some tragic (?) poet probably supplied the phrases ὥσπερ ἂν λαβρότερον ἐπουρίση τὸ τῆς τύχης (147 A) and διατελῶν ἐν πελάγει, χρόνον οὐ μακρὸν βίωσι θεῶν (ibid). The expression μάργον τι (148 A) doubtless contains an extremely insipid pun on Μαργίτης, of which no student of Plato can believe him capable.

⁷ See *Rep.* 474 CD for a list of euphemisms like that in 140 CD. The sentence ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἠνέχετο, οὐδ' ᾔετο (141 A) is on the model of such as *Apol.* 21 D: ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἶομαι, or *Meno* 84 A; the long parenthesis (143 B–144 C) on the value of ignorance seems manifestly based on *Legg.* 638 C, and the abrupt introduction of the idea of the highest good (143 D ff., esp. 144 D) comes just as clearly from *Charm.* 174 B ff. The verse ἢν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνη κράτιστος ὢν (146 A) was no doubt suggested by *Gorg.* 484 E. The clause ἃ τί δεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα λέγειν (138 C, and cf. 140 B: οὐς τί δεῖ καθ' ἕκαστα λέγειν) was surely intended as an imitation of Plato, but betrays its author, since Plato employs it only in referring back briefly to things previously enumerated in detail.

⁸ Among expressions unplatonic or late I note these: ἐσκυθρωπακέναι, 138 A; δίκην δεδωκέναι, 139 D, 'repent of it'; ἀπεργασίαν and διαπράττονται, 140 B; μεγαλοψύχους, 140 C, and μεγαλοψυχίαν, 150 C, deprecatingly; ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, σκεπτέον εἶναι, 140 D; ὡς πάντας, 141 B, and ὡς τὰ πολλὰ γε, 146 C, like ὡς πλεῖστα; the poetic κεκυρηκότα, 141 B, and κατάρρα, 143 B; εἰπεῖν (for ἑρωτᾶν) εἰ ἐνδον ἐστί, 143 E (cf. *Diog. Laert.* VII 172); ἂν δυνηθῶ, 145 A, used absolutely; for τυχόν, 140 A, 150 C, see note 2 to Eryxias; ταύτην, 145 D, for ἐκάστην τούτων; ἀνὰ λόγον τούτοις, ibid., where Plato has ὁσαύτως (cf. *Euthyph.* 13 C, etc.) or οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον (cf. *Lysis* 215 E); ἐκδεδυνκέναι, 148 A; ὃ τί ποτε ἐν νῆ' ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα, 150 B, cf. also 143 A; ἡδέως <ἂν> ἰδοίμι δεξάμενον ἑμαυτόν, 151 B, a curious variant on the usual ἡδέως ἂν δεξαίμεν, intended, I presume, to match the preceding words of Alcibiades: ὅταν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθοῦσαν ἴδω. Besides the foregoing examples, note: οἶδαμεν, 142 A, 145 D (cf. οἶδατε, *Demod.* 311 E); ἀποκριθῆναι, 149 B; ἐπανυλῖς, 149 D, 'camp'; the forms μηθέν and οὐθέν, which, according to Stallb. ad 141 D, are presented by all the best MSS. Hermann and Schanz properly print these forms, though not consistently.

thought of attributing it to Xenophon;⁹ but it is not improbable that Alc. II 147 A: ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης <sc. τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης>, ὅσῳ περ ἂν λαβρότερον ἐπουρίσῃ τὸ τῆς τύχης ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ βώμην ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων, τοσοῦτῳ μείζω ἁμαρτήματα ἂπ' αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι γίγνεσθαι, though the thought is common Socratic property,¹⁰ is only a rhetorical revision of a saying of Aristotle's (frag. 57, Rose, from the Protrepticus?): τοῖς γὰρ διακειμένοις τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς οὕτε πλοῦτος οὕτ' ἰσχυρὸς οὕτε κάλλος τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστίν· ἀλλ' ὅσῳ περ ἂν αὐταὶ μᾶλλον αἰ διαθέσεις καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὑπάρξωσι, τοσοῦτῳ καὶ πλείω καὶ μείζω τὸν κεκτημένον βλέπτουσι χωρὶς φρονήσεως παραγενόμεναι.

§ XIV.—ERYXIAS.

The *Eryxias* is distinctly the most valuable contribution of antiquity to the science of political economy. The thoughts that wealth depends upon value; that value means utility, and utility is measured by the directness with which a given thing subserves the primary needs of meat, drink and shelter; and that intellectual attainments constitute an important part of one's capital, are here clearly enunciated. Owing to its intrinsic worth we should therefore be pleased to know the grounds on which ancient critics agreed¹ to athetize this dialogue. But we may be quite sure that these grounds were external rather than internal; for the form and language² are too like to Plato's to have aroused their sus-

⁹ Athenaeus XI 506 C: ὁ γὰρ δεύτερος <'Αλκιβιάδης> ὑπὸ τινων Ξενοφώντος εἶναι λέγεται. The fact mentioned in note 1 probably accounts for the selection of Xenophon.

¹⁰ There are various passages in which Plato expresses the thought, but none of them corresponds so well as that quoted from Aristotle. If it were not already clear that *Alc. II* is later than Aristotle, there might be room for a possible doubt as to these precise utterances. The *ἐπουρίσῃ* does not occur in Aristotle, but otherwise the equivalence in the two passages is sufficiently plain.

¹ Diog. Laert. III 62.

² In view of the general excellence of style it may seem hypercritical to call attention to the painfully awkward period constituting §X. The diction is less pure; note ὡς ἡμᾶς, 392 C; τὰ εἰς πλοῦτον ἤκοντα, 392 E; ἀντιπαίζοντας, 395 B; ἱππασίας, 396 A; ὑπεδέξω, 396 E; στωμύλον and ἐχλεύαζε, 397 D; ἀλέας, 401 E; γαστρίμαργοι and οἰνόφλυγες, 405 E. So λόγους, οὓς νυνὶ διαλεγόμεθα, 395 A, is strange; τυχόν, 399 B, does not occur in Plato, but see *Alc. II* 140 A, 150 C, *Epist.* XIV, and *Alcyon* §IV; οἱ ὄντες ἄνθρωποι, 394 C,

picion. Yet the evidence of spuriousness is not far to seek. Quite probably this dialogue grew out of the discussions in the *Euthydemus* (278 E-282), from which not only the central idea, but also several lesser details are apparently derived.³ The first part (392-394 E) proceeds in a manner quite Platonic; but thenceforth the argument becomes truly eristic. Were Plato its author we should doubtless find the final paradox characterized as such, whereas we are left with the conviction that the conclusion must stand,—ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν ἡμῖν φαίνοντο οἱ πλουσιώτατοι μοχθηρότατα διακείμενοι. We know, indeed, that Plato rated wealth low in the scale of Goods; but the words of Cephalus (*Rep.* 330 D ff.) are not compatible with those of Critias (*Eryx.* 396 E), and Plato's own utterances in the *Laws*⁴ show that wealth was not in his view ἀνωφελές, the objective point of the argument here. These indications are confirmed by the fact that Plato's immediate successors, Aristotle, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Crantor, opposed that view,⁵ which characterized the Cynics and descended from them to the Stoics. Seeing therefore that the author, though taking an independent position, sought to imitate Plato,⁶ I follow

is noteworthy; φαίνεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, 399 C, and ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτω φαίνεσθαι, 406 B, are decidedly curious; τὰ πρὸς τίνα χρεῖαν χρήσιμα χρῆσθαι χρήματά ἐστι, 401 B, is a sample play on cognate words; the use of ἐξίς, 405 DE, though a word whose meaning in Plato is difficult to determine, reminds one strongly of Arist. Met. 1022^b 10 ff.; finally, λογίδιον, 401 E, is a word characteristic of the Eristics, as may be seen from Isocrates Or. XIII, §20.

³ Compare *Eryx.* 393 E: οἵτινες μάλιστα εὖ πράττοιεν, with *Euthyd.* 280 B; *Eryx.* 397 A: εἰ δέ γε μὴ ὑπάρχοι πλουσίῳ εἶναι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κ.τ.λ., with *Euthyd.* 281 BC. Dümmler (*Akademika*, p. 274) recognizes the similarity of our passage to the *Euthyd.*, but tries to vindicate the argument for Prodicus. In this respect his conclusions may well be doubted.

⁴ 728 E f.: ὥς δ' αὐτως ἡ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων κτήσις καὶ τιμῆσεως κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ῥυθμὸν ἔχει. τὰ μὲν ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ἐκάστων τούτων ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις ἀπεργάζεται ταις πόλεσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τὰ δ' ἐλλείποντα δουλείας ὥς τὸ πολὺ. Vid. also *Legg.* 717 C.

⁵ See Cic. de fin. IV 18, 49: "Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit, quippe qui valetudinem, viris, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant." Plut. adv. Stoicos, p. 1065, οἱ τοῦ Ξενοκράτους καὶ Σπενσίππου κατηγοροῦντες ἐπὶ τῇ μὴ τὴν ὑγίαν ἀδιάφορον ἡγεῖσθαι μηδὲ τὸν πλοῦτον ἀνωφελές. Crantor, ap. Sext. Empir. (*Bekker*, p. 558, l. 4 ff.) τούτων οἷν ἀκούσαντες οἱ Ἕλληνες τὰ μὲν πρωτεῖα τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀποδώσουσι, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τῇ ὑγείᾳ, τὰ δὲ τρίτα τῇ ἡδονῇ, τελευταῖον δὲ τάζουσι τὸν πλοῦτον (imitating loosely the scheme in the *Philebus*) makes the strongest concessions.

⁶ See supra for the *Euthydemus*; 393 B: κέκμηκα κ.τ.λ. is probably a reminiscence of *Theaet.* 143 AB; ἀναγόμενον, ὥς, 392 E, and ἀντανήγετο . . .

Steinhart⁷ in attributing the *Eryxias* to some later Socratic in sympathy chiefly with Antisthenes and the movement that eventuated in the Stoa. The ostentatious display of learning in respect of ancient currency⁸ is in perfect keeping with such origin, a little after 300 B. C.

§ XV.—ALCIBIADES I.

Every age may be said to possess its own peculiar spirit, which in some one of its leaders becomes incarnate. This individual then comes naturally to be the ideal of his contemporaries and for future generations the most adequate exponent of the character of his time. Such was the singular eminence attained by Alcibiades as the type of the Athenian temper during the latter half of the fifth century B. C.; and consequently the relations between him and Socrates acquired a universal significance, as of something not merely individual but representative. That the ancients themselves appreciated this circumstance is shown by the appearance of the Socratic dialogues, entitled *Alcibiades*, which were attributed to men of the next generation.¹ Of these only two remain, both ascribed with little hesitation² to Plato. Modern scholarship, indeed, has tended to pronounce them spurious; but, though this judgment is undoubtedly correct, the

ὥς, 398 E, come evidently from *Charm.* 155 D; 395 B, the checkmating, see *Rep.* 487 C; 395 C, spelling Socrates' name, see *Theaet.* 203 A; in 403 D Critias says: ἐγὼ πάνν σφόδρα τοῦτους τοὺς λόγους ἀκροώμενος, οὗς καὶ σὺ νῦν τνγχάνεις δὴ διεξιὼν, ἄγαμαι. Εἰπον οὖν ἐγὼ <Socrates> ὅτι μοι δοκεῖς σὴ, ὦ Κριτία, οὕτως ἐμοῦ χαίρειν ἀκροώμενος, ὥσπερ τῶν βασιδῶν οἱ τὰ Ὁμήρου ἐπη ἄδουσιν. This seems clearly an elaboration of the situation in *Ion* 532 D: χαίρω γὰρ ἀκούων ἡμῶν τῶν σοφῶν, Socrates' comparison here being suggested by the discussion of rhapsodes there. For 398 C: μαθόντα παρ' ἐτέρων ἢ αὐτὸν ἐξευρόντα, see note 8 to *Alc. I.* On the other hand the *Eryxias* was imitated in *Hipparchus* (see note 2 to *Hipparch.*). The opening sentence of Cebes' *Tabula* also imitates the beginning of *Eryxias*.

⁷ In Müller, vol. VII, p. 14.

⁸ *Eryx.* 399 E ff. I may here add that in 395 C: ὥσπερ οὐ παρὼν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν λελεγμένους we probably have a reference to the proverb found in Heraclitus (ap. Clem. Alex. Strom. V 14, p. 718 P): ἀσύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσιν εἰκάσι· φάτις αὐτοῖσι μαρτυρεῖ παρεδόντας ἀπειναι, occurring also in Nauck's *Frag. Trag. Graec.* ed. II, sub Adespota No. 517, and in Aristophanes' *Knights*, 1118 ff.

¹ Antisthenes, Aeschines and Euclides are named, D. L. II 61, II 108, VI 18.

² See note 9 to *Alc. II.*

final presentation of the case against their claims has not been made.³

It is a significant fact that many of the ancients regarded *Alc. I* as peculiarly adapted to serve as an εἰσαγωγή εἰς τοὺς Πλάτωνος διαλόγους. Its merits are indeed quite considerable,⁴ though it hardly attains the high standard of Ἀπειρόν, εὐχαρεῖ, ἀπέριττον, ἀνευδέες.⁵ The very qualities, in fact, which won for it the unstinted praise of the Neo-Platonists prove its spuriousness beyond a doubt. What then are these characteristics? In the first place, it is clear that the argument leads, with far less deviation from the direct course than any Platonic dialogue, to a result also more positively maintained than is Plato's wont. Furthermore, in its character as a primer of Platonism in regard to ethics and politics, *Alcibiades I* contains a greater number of distinctively Platonic thoughts than can be found in any of even the greater single works of Plato. In this respect the dialogue may be pronounced *too* Platonic. But there is also a reverse side to this picture; for this predominating genuineness of content is purchased at great cost to the form. True to its aim as a protreptic discourse calculated to give philosophy its rightful place in the life of man, it proceeds eclectically, choosing the finished concepts and philosophical commonplaces available for its purpose and combining them cleverly, indeed, but only formally for the attainment of the intended result. It will be interesting to sketch the argument and to indicate the sources of the commonplaces which are so lavishly introduced.

Alcibiades desires to know why Socrates is his most persistent lover. Socrates replies that he has perceived that A. is restlessly aspiring to greater things, and not valuing himself upon his wealth

³ The defense of *Alc. I* by Stallbaum (V, p. 193 foll.) and Steinhart (I, p. 135 foll.) was perhaps sufficient as against the objections of Schleiermacher and Ast; but Steinhart even there perceived the weakness of his case and later gave it up. Zeller (Zeitschr. f. d. Alterthumsw. 1851) mainly restated Ast's criticisms; but Cobet (Mnemosyne, n. s. vol. II, p. 369 foll.) took some good points, though chiefly concerned with reconstituting the text.

⁴ Particularly the comparison of Alcibiades' estate with that of the Persian and Lacedaemonian kings (121 A ff.) is conceived very much in the spirit of Plato.

⁵ Albinus' Εἰσαγωγή in Hermann, Vol. VI, p. 148. Kvičala (Zeitschr. f. oesterreich. Gymnasien, 1863) has pointed out many of the superficialities of our dialogue; but some of his strictures upon it are quite unfounded.

and noble birth. His ambitions are far-reaching, but to be realized only by the aid of Socrates. Hitherto the god had restrained the latter from addressing him, because his hour was not yet come. But now that A., almost twenty years of age,⁶ is about to come forward as a political leader, the silence must be broken. In order to give counsel, he must possess knowledge⁷ of those things with which politicians deal. What knowledge has he? Such only as he may have been taught or may himself have discovered.⁸ He has had teachers only in writing, wrestling and playing on the lyre,⁹ but is not to give counsel in such matters. He intends to advise concerning peace and war,¹⁰ which involve the knowledge of justice,¹¹ a knowledge which he has not discovered, because he never sought, never even suspected the need of seeking it,¹² and of which he can point to no better teachers than

⁶ 123 D: ἔτη οὐδέτω γεγονὼς σφόδρα εἴκοσιν. Yet Pericles is still alive (104 B), so that Alc. must have been born in 449 B. C. at least, if there is not here an anachronism. Ordinarily his birth is dated 445 B. C.

⁷ 106 D. See 107 B: εἰδότος . . . περὶ ἐκάστου συμβουλῇ, which is repeated *Demod.* 381 B. Cf. Dio Chrysostom. *Orat.* XXVI.

⁸ 106 D: οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μόνον οἶσθα ἃ παρ' ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρες; This is the first of the Platonic commonplaces, see *Lach.* 186 CE; *Theaet.* 150 D; *Euthyd.* 285 A; *Phaedo* 85 C, 99 C; *Crat.* 439 B; *Rep.* 618 C; *Hipp. Maj.* 285 D. In Plato there is no strong insistence on it; but here it is one of the principal instruments of the argument. The importance attaching to the disjunction here certainly accounts, in great part at least, for its frequent recurrence in the later spurious works. See *Eryx.* 398 C; *Hipparch.* 228 D; *Demod.* 381 B E; *Epist.* II, 312 B, 313 B; VII, 341 C, 345 B.

⁹ 106 E. With 107 A cp. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1112^b 1 ff.

¹⁰ 107 D, see *Gorg.* 455 B ff. and Arist. *Rhet.* 1359^b 19 ff.

¹¹ 107 D-109 C. In this connection another commonplace is introduced (107 D-109 E): χρὴ δ' οὐχ οἷς βέλτιον (sc. πολεμεῖν); . . . καὶ τότε ὅποτε βέλτιον; . . . καὶ τοσούτον χρόνον ὅσον ἄμεινον; This recurs 108 E, and *Alc.* II 143 BC, which latter passage shows clearly that the thought was derived from *Legg.* 638 C: δοκοῦσί μοι πάντες οἱ λόγῳ τι λαβόντες ἐπιτήδευμα καὶ προβέμνοι ψέγειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπαινεῖν εὐθὺς ῥηθὲν οὐδαμῶς δρᾶν κατὰ τρόπον, ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν ποιεῖν, οἷον εἰ δὴ τις ἐπαινέσαντός τινος τυρούς, βρώμα ὡς ἀγαθόν, εὐθὺς ψέγοι, μὴ διαπυθόμενος αὐτοῦ μήτε τὴν ἐργασίαν μήτε τὴν προσφοράν, ὅντινα τρόπον καὶ οἰστίσι καὶ μεθ' ὧν καὶ ὅπως ἔχοντα καὶ ὅπως προσφέρειν ἔχουσιν. Cp. Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1104^b 22 f. The word ἀκροχειρίζεσθαι, 107 E, occurs also Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1111^a 15.

¹² 106 D. This rests upon the general Socratic commonplace that the confession of ignorance is the beginning of wisdom, and forms the keynote of our dialogue, which attempts to convict A. of a false conceit of knowledge in order to prepare him for entrance upon the philosophical life.

the multitude.¹³ But they are not competent to instruct one in those things on which, as on justice and injustice, they are not agreed.¹⁴ Thus, as he has neither learned nor discovered the nature of the just, Alcibiades admits that he has refuted himself because he has himself made the affirmations which deny his former assertions.¹⁵ But though he confesses to ignorance of the just, he asserts that the Athenians take counsel not concerning what is right or wrong, but about expediency,¹⁶ which may conflict with justice. Socrates challenges A. to persuade him of that as he would the assembly,¹⁷ and proceeds to show that the just is the honorable, the honorable the good, and the good the expedient.¹⁸ A. now becomes bewildered, thus revealing ignorance even of his ignorance, for if aware of it he would not entertain an opinion.¹⁹ False conceit of knowledge is the fruitful source of error.²⁰ If A.

¹³ 110 E. Alcibiades here adduces the example of his vernacular, which was derived from *Prot.* 327 E.

¹⁴ 111 B ff., an argument borrowed from *Laches* 186 D and repeated after *Alc. I* in *Minos* 116 D, 117 B, and *Demod.* 380 A.

¹⁵ 112 D–113 C (vid. 114 E, 116 D). Reference is here made to Eurip. *Hippolytus*, v. 352: σοῦ τὰδ', οὐκ ἐμοῦ κλύεις, which was so greatly ridiculed by Aristophanes, *Equites*. init. The questioning in 112 E certainly was influenced by that in *Meno* 82 A foll., esp. 82 E.

¹⁶ 113 D. This looks like the introduction of an Aristotelian distinction, only to show its inadequacy by identifying the συμφέρον with the δίκαιον. See Arist. *Rhet.* 1358^b 20: τέλος . . . τῷ μὲν συμβουλευόντι τὸ συμφέρον, and *ibid.* 33.

¹⁷ 114 B: ἐμὲ ἐκκλησίαν νόμισον καὶ δῆμον· καὶ ἐκεῖ τοί σε δεήσει ἓνα ἕκαστον πείθειν, and 114 D: ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐμμελέτησον (for which see *Phaedrus* 228 E: ἐμαντόν σοι ἐμμελετῆν παρέχειν οὐ πάνυ δέδοκται). The former passage, with its amplification in 114 B–D (τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλοῖς τε καὶ ἓνα πείθειν) harks back to *Phaedr.* 260 E foll., and was considered sufficiently striking to be reapplied in *Anterast.* 137 D.

¹⁸ 115 A–116 D. This argument occurs with modifications in every ethical dialogue of Plato, cp. e. g. *Gorg.* 474 and also Xen. *Mem.* III, viii 5 ff. There are, however, certain indications of a possible dependence on Aristotle. Note, e. g. 115 C: ὅρα τοίνυν εἰ, ἢ γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν. Then 115 B almost seems to reflect Arist. *Rhet.* 1359^a 3 ff., 1366^b 36 ff. and *Eth.* Nic. 1117^a 28 ff.

¹⁹ 116 E–118 B. This also is a great Platonic commonplace. *Phaedo* 79 C foll. is a very instructive passage which throws light on the whole of *Alc. I*. See also *Hipp. Min.* 372 D: πλανῶμαι περὶ ταῦτα, δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι. *Alc. I* 117 A: οὐ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι περὶ αὐτῶν, διὰ ταῦτα πλανῶ;

²⁰ 117 E: τίνες οὖν οἱ ἀμαρτάνοντες; . . . ἄλλοι λείπονται ἢ οἱ μὴ εἰδότες, οἰόμενοι δ' εἰδέναι; The original of this passage, which sums up another Platonic commonplace, is doubtless *Soph.* 229 C: ἀγνοίας δ' οὖν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ

knew, he could teach,²¹ but he like other statesmen enters politics untaught and ignorant of the real issues.²² He should not consider Athenians his rivals, but rather his co-workers, recognizing as his competitors the kings of Persia and Sparta;²³ for thus he would be led to sobriety of temper and wholesome self-scrutiny.²⁴ This consideration humbles A. and induces him to seek Socrates' aid in his task of self-improvement. (Then follows a long and trifling digression²⁵ on the virtue of a gentleman.) The true self, however, must first be discovered before we can attend to it.²⁶ There is a distinction between the belongings of the body and the body, and between ourselves and our belongings.²⁷ To know what *we* are we should first know the *idea of the self*; but as²⁸

χαλεπὸν ἀφωρισάμενον ὄρῃν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντίστροφον μέρεσιν. Ποῖον δὲ; Τὸ μὴ κατειδόμενα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι· δι' οὗ κινδυνεύει πάντα ὅσα διανοία σφαλλόμεθα γίγνεσθαι πᾶσιν. This thought is also greatly elaborated in Xen. Mem. IV 2, 26 ff. likewise in connection with γνῶθι σαυτὸν (ibid. 24).

²¹ 118 C foll. This tenet underlies almost all of Socrates' ethical questioning. If one have a virtue, he must know what it is, and consequently be able to define and explain it (cf. the *Charmides*, for example). See Xen. Mem. IV 6, 1: Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότες τί ἕκαστον εἴη τῶν ὄντων, ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι. Ability to teach then becomes a test of knowledge. *Alc. I* 118 D: καλὸν γὰρ δῆπον τεκμήριον τοῦτο τῶν ἐπισταμένων ὅτιόν ἐστι ἐπίστανται, ἐπειδὴν καὶ ἄλλον οἷοι τ' ὥσιν ἀποδείξαι ἐπιστάμενον, with which compare Arist. Met. 981^b 7: ὁλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότες τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν. For the application of this criterion to Pericles and the other statesmen, see *Prot.* 319 E foll., *Meno* 94 B foll., *Gorg.* 515 E.

²² 118 B foll.

²³ 119 C foll.

²⁴ 124 AB. Here our author first introduces the Delphic γνῶθι σαυτὸν, which recurs in 131 B and 133 C, always abruptly foisted in as σωφροσύνη ἐστὶ τὸ ἐαυτὸν γινώσκειν from *Charm.* 164 C foll. Repeated *Ant.* 138 A.

²⁵ 124 D-127 E. This excursus serves only as an opportunity for adding an illustration of Socrates' method of interrogation; for the discussion does not in the least advance the argument. The examples here adduced recur almost without change in *Theag.* 123 C ff. and again in *Hipparch.* 126 A foll.

²⁶ 127 E f.

²⁷ 128 A foll. This is a distinction which Plato very clearly made in the *Laws* 717 C, 726 A foll. In this passage there are several commonplaces. *Alc. I* 128 B: ἄρ' οὖν ὅταν τις τι βέλτιον ποιῇ, τότε ὀρθὴν λέγεις ἐπιμέλειαν, cf. Xen. Mem. I 2, 32 foll. For θεραπεία ψυχῆς, σώματος, etc., in 131 B, see *Rep.* 585 C foll. (cf. *Eph.* VII, 331 AB, and note 19 to *Letters*).

²⁸ 129 AB: φέρε δὲ, τίν' ἂν τρόπον εἰρεθείη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό; οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν τάχ' εὐροίμεν τί ποτ' ἐσμέν αὐτοί, τούτου δ' ἐτι ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἀδύνατοί ποιν. That

this is a difficult matter, it may suffice to become acquainted with the empirical self.²⁹ The soul, as the agent using the body and its belongings, is the true self which the Delphic γνῶθι σαυτόν intended; and he alone cares for himself who cares for his soul.³⁰ Self-knowledge is difficult to describe, but the example of the eye beholding itself mirrored in the pupil—the divinest part—of another eye, may present to us in figure the truth that a soul to know itself must look to its most characteristic and divine part in which resides wisdom and knowledge.³¹ And only he who knows

the interpretation is correct follows, I believe, from the use of αὐτόν in 128 E: τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ αὐτόν; Then αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό means 'the self itself,' as αὐτός ὁ ἄνθρωπος means 'the man himself.' Therefore I would read in 130 D: νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτόν (see 128 E) ἑκάστων ἐσκεμμεθα ὅτι ἐστί, καὶ ἴσως ἐξαρκέσει. It is quite plain that our author, finding nothing in Plato to guide him, wrestled desperately with the language to find an expression for his thought. For the concrete self he retained the masc. (αὐτόν), for the abstract, ideal self he used the neut. (αὐτό). Schlottmann (*Das Vergängliche und das Unvergängliche in der menschl. Seele nach Aristoteles*, Halle, 1873) understands Aristotle's νοῦς ποιητικός to be the ideal ego or self, and the νοῦς παθητικός the empirical self. This is a vexed question on which I have no opinion; but I am much inclined to think that the author of *Alc. I* so interpreted Aristotle, and wrote the dialogue largely to illustrate his conception of that problem, with the aid of the figure of the eye-envisaging eye. I venture this statement, however, only as a conjecture. Plut. *Pyth. Orac.* cc. 21-23 illustrates the later development of the doctrine among the Platonists.

²⁹ 130 D, quoted in preceding note.

³⁰ 126 A-133 E. Compare with this passage Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1177^b 30 ff. and 1168^b 28 ff. This argument is foreign to Plato, but the materials worked up into it are borrowed from him. See *Legg.* 726 A foll. But our author has *Rep.* 353 E foll. particularly in mind. Note σμίλη, 129 C, cf. *Rep.* 353 A; 133 B: ἡ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετή, vid. *Rep.* 353 B: ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ἀρετὴ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐστι; cf. *Iambl. Protrept.* §II. *Alc. I* 126 B: ὀψεως μὲν παραγιννομένης, τυφλότητος δὲ ἀπογιννομένης, cf. *Rep.* 353 C; cf. also 130 A with *Rep.* 353 D. With 128 A we may perhaps compare Aristotle's notice of Socrates the Younger in *Met.* 1036^b 24 ff.

³¹ 132 D foll. *Charm.* 167 C foll., 168 D gave rise to this discussion. There the concept of self-knowledge is subjected to criticism and a parallel drawn with 'sight-seeing sight' (ὀψις ὀψεως), which seems inconceivable. Now our author takes up the problem and confesses the insuperable difficulties by substituting the 'eye-seeing eye' for the former example. Thus he hopes at least to convey in figure the outline of his thought. It is at least interesting to compare this with Arist. *de Anima* 413^a 1: ὥς δ' ἡ ὀψις καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου ἢ ψυχῆ (sc. ἐντελέχειά ἐστι)· τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ὄν· ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ κόρη (vid. *Alc. I* 133 A) καὶ ἡ ὀψις, κακεὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ζέον.

himself can know others and the nature and advantage of the state, from true knowledge of which springs happiness.³² Yet, since in order to render the citizens happy A. must give them not only prosperity but also virtue,³³ he must first have it to confer;³⁴ and if he act with justice and wisdom he will please God,³⁵ and not, like the man. of tyrannical soul,³⁶ work the ruin of the state. A. now pledges himself to turn his face toward the perfect life, by the grace of Socrates. "Nay," replies the latter, "say rather by the grace of God."³⁷

Any one who has noted the direct progress of the dialogue and the manner in which the transitions from point to point have been made must be convinced that our author had a definite position to establish, and that the necessary materials were all furnished ready to his hand. The accompanying notes have called atten-

It is of course well known that Plato, at least in his later period, attributed immortality only to the intellectual part of the soul, to which alone therefore he could also in strictness give the name of soul or self. In so far the *Alc.* I develops logically the Platonic position, in which almost all of Plato's followers shared. With *Alc.* I 133 C compare *Arist. de Anima* 410^b 11 ff. and 429^a 23.

³² 133 E f. Compare *Xen. Mem.* IV, ii, 24: σχολῇ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλο τι ἥδεν, εἰ γε μὴδ' ἐμαντὸν ἐγίγνωσκον and the facetious words of Menander apud *Stobaeus* III, xxi, 5 (Hense).

³³ 134 B: οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται αἱ πόλεις, εἰ μέλλονσι εὐδαιμονήσκειν, οὐδὲ πλῆθους οὐδὲ μεγέθους ἀνευ ἀρετῆς. Cf. *Arist. Rhet.* 1360^b 14: ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς. See also *Aristotle, frag.* 57 (from *Protrepticus* ?): νόμιζε δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἐν τῷ πολλῷ κεκτῆσθαι γίγνεσθαι, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῷ τὴν ψυχὴν εὖ διακεῖσθαι.

³⁴ 134 C.

³⁵ 134 D: σύ τε καὶ ἡ πόλις θεοφιλῶς πράττει. In *θεοφιλῶς* our author is adding another characteristic Platonic touch, only not to omit it. Cp. *Rep.* 352 AB and *Arist. Eth. Nic.* X, viii, 13.

³⁶ In 135 A I would read νοῦν ἱατρικὸν μὴ ἔχοντι, τυραννοῦντι δὲ πῶς μὴδ' ἐπιπλήττοντι αὐτῷ, thus with the smallest change yet proposed combining the readings of B and T. Whatever the reading adopted, it is clear that we have here an allusion to the tyrannical soul of Bk. IX of the *Republic*, as in 122 A: ὄντως βασιλεὺς, ἄρχων πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, we have one to the kingly soul. Cf. also *Gorg.* 491 DE.

³⁷ 135 D: εἰν βούλῃ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. Οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδης. Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν; Ὅτι εἰν θεὸς ἐθέλει. Here we have given the conditions of Alcibiades' progress, already hinted at in the saying that the god had prevented S. from accosting him until his time was come. In the present passage, together with the interest displayed in the veto power of Socrates' δαιμόνιον, there lies the basis of the extravagancies of the *Theages* (see notes 8 and 9 to *Theages*).

tion to the passages in which Plato has formulated the thoughts, sometimes by tortuous dialectic processes, which here recur only as finished products grown commonplace.³⁸ He who contrived this cento knew well the externals of Plato's manner as he also knew the import of his teaching; and in his drawing upon Homer, Aesop, and the comic poets³⁹ he has in part well imitated the master. But he has offended grossly against the canons of Platonic taste,⁴⁰ and some of his utterances are to be taken *cum grano salis*.⁴¹ He indulges also in rhetorical ornament which fails at times to beautify,⁴² and numerous turns of expression emphasize

³⁸ Aside from the numerous instances of commonplaces already mentioned, I refer to only two more. The juggling with *εὖ πράττειν* in 116 B ff. recalls *Charm.* 172 A f. and *Euthyd.* 279 A. In 135 B: *πρὶν δέ γε ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἀρχεσθαι ἀμεινον ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ ἀρχειν ἀνδρί, οὐ μόνον παιδί*, there is a general Socratic commonplace, which occurs also in *Arist. Pol.* I 5, 7, *Xen. Mem.* I 2, 49 ff., and in the *Republic* 590 D ff.

³⁹ At 109 DE a reference to *Il.* 15, 39; at 131 E there is an allusion to *Od.* 2, 365, at 132 A one to *Il.* 2, 547, in 112 B a general reference to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. The word *κρήγνοι* = *ἀγαθοί*, 111 E (in *Homer, Il.* 1, 106), occurring nowhere in prose, except here, before the affected Alexandrians and Neo-Pythagoreans, is a most palpable sign of spuriousness (cf. Cobet). Aesop is quoted in 123 A, cf. also *Phaedo* 60 C ff. Plato's fondness for the comic poets was well appreciated (vid. Olympiodorus vit. *Plat.*, Hermann, Vol. VI, p. 192). At 120 A: *Μειδίαν τὸν ὀρτυγοκόπον*, we have an Aristophanic touch; cf. *Aves*, 1297. According to the scholiast there is in 121 CD a quotation from *Plato Comicus*.

⁴⁰ He becomes positively rude in 118 B and 119 B; again, compare 118 E: *τὼ Περικλέους νίεε ἡλιθίῳ ἐγενέσθην*, with *Prot.* 320 A: *ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ περιβύντες νέμονται ὥσπερ ἄφρονοι*, and *ibid.*: *τί δ' ἂν αὐτὸν Κλεινίαν λέγοις, μαινόμενον ἀνθρώπον* with *Prot.* 320 A: *καὶ <ὅς> with Cobet > πρὶν ἐξ ἡμέρας γεγρονέναι, ἀπέδωκε τοῦτω οὐκ ἔχων ὃ, τι χρῆσαιτο αὐτῷ*. See also 120 B. The whole passage 120 AB is purely sarcastic and displays none of Socrates' delicate irony.

⁴¹ 103 A: *ἔγω δὲ τοσούτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσείπον*; *ibid.*: *δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πείσει*, promises what *Alc. I* does not strictly fulfill; a fact which may well have helped to call forth the *Theages*. 121 D and *Legg.* 694 D are in positive contradiction. What is said in 123 B of the lands at the service of the Persian Queen for purposes of ornament is not borne out by *Xen. Anab.* I iv, 8, 9. But Cobet is hardly justified in refusing to accept Xenophon as the authority for the statement because of the phrase *παρὰ βασιλέα*, which, in this indefinite citation, might easily displace *ἐπὶ βασιλέα*.

⁴² Note the ambiguity of reference in *ὦν*, 119 D, and of *οὐσπερ λέγω* in the similar passage, 120 AB. In 124 D is this awkward turn: *ἐπιμελείας δεόμεθα, μαλλον μὲν πάντες ἀνθρώποι, ἀτὰρ νῶ γε καὶ μάλα σφόδρα*. The final burst of eloquence, in 135 E, may not have seemed as amusing to the author as it does to us.

the unplatonic effect of the whole.⁴³ From the character of our dialogue we should naturally expect to find the imitations of particular passages from the works of Plato quite numerous, as attesting its author's minute acquaintance with his original.⁴⁴ All this, and more,⁴⁵ may be adduced to refute the claims of the *Alc. I* to be considered a genuine Platonic dialogue; but some critics have sought to eliminate difficulties by making emendations and excisions. Such procedure would seem at first blush to be favored by the abundant evidence of tamperings with the text;⁴⁶

⁴³ Note λόγον, ῥ ὑπερπεφρόνηκας, 104 A; the abrupt λεκτέον ἂν εἴη, 104 E; αὐτοῦ . . . ἐν τῇ Εὐρώπῃ, 105 B, if ἐν τ. E. be not, as I suspect, a gloss; τί διαφέρει τὸ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε, 109 B, possibly suggested by such turns as *Rep.* 429 B: ἡ τοίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοίαν, etc., cp. *Arist. Eth. Nic.* 1103^b 24: οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως; φράσον καὶ ἐμοί, 109 D, and φράζε καμοί, 110 D; ἵνα μὴ μάτην οἱ διάλογοι <λόγοι? Cobet> γίνωνται, 110 A, for ἵνα μ. μ. διαλεγώμεθα; κοινῇ βουλῇ, 119 B, unless this be a proverbial expression, as it would appear to be from 124 B and *Crito* 49 D; ἀνδρα οἱ δὲ μενον μεγαλόφρονα εἶναι, 119 C.

⁴⁴ 104 D: θαυμάζω, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ σὺν πᾶγμα, vid. *Apol.* 20 C; 104 E: πρὸς ἄνδρα . . . προσφέρεσθαι, vid. *Lysis* 205 B; 107 C ff.: ὅταν περὶ τῶν ἐαυτῶν πραγμάτων κ.τ.λ., vid. *Charm.* 161 B ff.; 109 B: διαφέρει ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν, vid. e. g. *Legg.* 944 C: διαφέρει δὲ ὅλον πον καὶ τὸ πᾶν; 114 D: ὑβριστὴς εἶ, vid. *Symp.* 175 E, 215 B, *Meno* 76 A; 114 E: μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς λέγε, vid. *Meno* 75 B: μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπέ; 115 A: μαντικὸς γὰρ εἶ, vid. *Meno* 92 C: μάντις εἰ ἴσως; 118 A: ἐπονείδιστος ἀμαθία, vid. *Apol.* 29 B (and for κακουργοτάτη, *ibid.*, see *Lach.* 192 D); 119 E: ἔργον ἀποδείξεσθαι, vid. note 3 to *Hipparch.*; 124 B: σὺ μοι δοκεῖς ἐρᾶν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἄλλον, vid. *Lysis* 211 D; 125 E f.: εὐβουλία and the discussion following is prob. due to *Rep.* 428 A ff. (note e. g. 127 D: οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι μαθεῖν οὐθ' ἤτις οὐτ' ἐν οἰσισιν, cf. *Rep.* 428 D: τίς, ἐφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν τίσιν;). 131 C: ὁ μὲν τοῦ σώματός σου ἐρῶν, ἐπειδὴ λήγει ἀνθρῶν, ἀπὶ οὗ οἴχεται (cf. also 131 DE) is from *Symp.* 183 E; 132 A: δημεραστής is due to *Gorg.* 481 D and 513 C. This note contains only the principal instances not already quoted in previous ones.

⁴⁵ Constantin Ritter (Unters. über Plato, p. 89 f.) says: "Es kann kein Zweifel sein dass wir den *Alk. I* in die Zeit . . . zwischen *Symp.* u. *Theätet* setzen müssen, wenn er als platonisch soll gelten können." From what we have already said, it is clear that Plato could have written the *Alc. I* only after his system had been fully developed; yet, on the other hand, it is not likely that after he had written the *Timaeus*, say, he would return to such a work. Ritter's evidence can only mean that our author imitated most successfully in externals the dialogues of a certain period and character; but as for his statement, it only shows the inadequacy of his method.

⁴⁶ At 105 E a few MSS. present an addition plainly spurious; in 128 A, after *vaί*, Stobaeus presents two lines not in our MSS., and likewise in 133 C a much longer interpolation. See Stob. III, xxi, 23, 24 Hense.

yet, while we might gladly dispense with much that is introduced,⁴⁷ the MSS., which serve to detect the later additions, also forbid such violent measures.

We have still to enquire concerning the origin and purpose of our dialogue. It seems clear that it was written, not very long after Plato's death, by some Platonist who wished thereby to exhibit Socrates in his most characteristic attitude of delivering a protreptic discourse. In sketching the character of Alcibiades he evidently had in mind, besides the idea of the type of the Athenian public which Alcibiades presents, the accounts of Xenophon and Plato.⁴⁸ In an age when hortatory addresses were common⁴⁹ the *Alc. I* naturally met with instant success; chiefly because it epitomized the ethico-political philosophy of Plato, and secondly, because it so consciously laid stress on those character-

⁴⁷ At 108 CD (οὐπω δύνασαι εἰπεῖν . . . ἢ τέχνη ἔχει) Hermann and Stallbaum employ brackets to eliminate a passage which is only too obviously unplatonic; but Schanz has very properly omitted the brackets, since they can be justified only on the supposition, which is too improbable, that Plato wrote the dialogue. With equal justice one might propose the following excisions: (1) 107 A: οὐ γάρ που . . . 107 C: ὀρθῶς ἀναστήσει; (2) the absurd but necessary words, 115 D: ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν. Φημί; (3) 117 B: ἄρ' οὐν οὕτω καὶ ἔχει . . . 118 A: οὐ δῆτα; (4) 128 C: γυμναστικῇ μὲν ἄρα . . . 128 D: φαίνεται; (5) 131 A: οὐδεὶς ἄρα . . . C: ὀρθῶς, which adds nothing but the notion of *θεραπεία*, borrowed quite probably from *Rep.* 585 C ff. Yet, though the excessive verbosity is thereby relieved, such procedure is clearly impossible.

⁴⁸ Compare Xen. Mem. I 2, 16, with *Alc. I* 105 A and *Rep.* 494 C. Sokrates' arguments with Glaucon (Mem. III 6) and Euthydemus (Mem. IV 2, 22 ff.) may have contributed somewhat, as well as Plato's *Apology* and *Symp.* 215 E ff. The suggestion seems very natural that Alcibiades is the typical man of good parts (*Rep.* 490 E ff.), by nature marked out for a philosopher, but ruined by corruption in the state; and one who attentively reads *Alc. I* with that passage in mind will be convinced that its author so interpreted Plato's allusions. Note, e. g. *Rep.* 491 E: ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως, cf. *Alc. I* 104 A: νεανικοτάτου γένους. Sokrates' parting words to Alcibiades (*Alc. I* 135 E: βουλοίμην ἂν σε διατελέσαι· ὀρωδῶ δέ, οὐ τι τῇ σῇ φύσει ἀπιστῶν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ὁρῶν ῥώμην, μὴ ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ κρατήσῃ) seem to emphasize this portraiture. Hermann (Onomasticon Platon. s. v. 'Αλκ.) recognizes portraiture of Alc. in 494 B; Jowett and Campbell (The Rep. of Plato, Vol. III, p. 282) likewise in part (esp. in 493 C: καὶ ἐτι εὐειδὲς καὶ μέγας), but associate with him in Plato's thought (wrongly, as I believe) Pausanias and Themistocles; Mr. Pater (in Plato and Platonism, p. 116) seems correctly to refer the whole to Alcibiades.

⁴⁹ On this whole class of productions cp. R. Hirzel, Ueber den Protreptikos des Aristoteles, Hermes X 61 ff.

istics of the master which were, by virtue of their being most external and common, the most tangible aspects of Platonism. One evidence of its success, however, is also a strong witness of its supposititious character. For its novelty, as having but lately appeared, must be presumed to have contributed somewhat to the favor with which the authors of the later spurious dialogues received it.⁵⁰ On the other hand, the priority of *Alc. I* becomes thus firmly established, and we run no risk in dating it not later than the beginning of the III century B. C. However the case may stand in regard to the maturer works of Aristotle,⁵¹ it is not improbable that his juvenile *Προτρεπτικός*⁵² was known to our author; and either his *Μαγικός* or *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας* was all but certainly drawn upon.⁵³ Finally, if Suidas' list of the works of

⁵⁰ It will have been noted that in treating of these works reference was constantly had to our dialogne. See also above, notes 7 ff. The *Epinomis* is perhaps the only one of considerable size on which it would be safe to say that *Alc. I* had had no influence.

⁵¹ Aristotle's *ἀκροατικά* did not become generally known until rather late. But see the foregoing notes which make it seem highly probable that the extant Aristotelian works were known to our author.

⁵² It is barely possible that in 132 A: εὐπρόσωπος γὰρ ὁ μεγάλῃτορος δῆμος 'Ερεχθέως· ἀλλ' ἀποδύνα χρὴ αὐτὸν θεάσασθαι, the "Fru Welt" portrait of Athens may be drawn after Arist. Protrep. frag. 59 (Rose, Teubn. Ed. from which I regularly quote—Iambl. Protrep. c. 8), particularly since, in the Latin parallel, Boethius (de Cons. Phil. 3, 8) mentions Alcibiades as the illustration, quite certainly after Aristotle (cf. Bywater, Journ. Philol. II, p. 60). However this may be, the probability of our author's using the Arist. Prot. is very great. See also above, note 33, and the end of my section on Alc. II. The passage there quoted may well have been referred to Alcibiades by Aristotle, who had, as noted above, used Alcibiades as his example in the Protrep.

⁵³ *Alc. I* 122 A: ὃν ὁ μὲν μαγείαν τε διδάσκει τὴν Ζωροάστρου τοῦ Ὠρομάζου· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῶν θεραπεία. The last clause is consciously novel, and has long been objected to (first, I believe, by Ast). In Π. Φ. Aristotle had spoken of Zoroastrianism (see note 14 to *Epinomis*), and Diog. L. Proem. 8, says: τὴν δὲ γοητικὴν μαγείαν οὐδ' ἔγνωσαν <sc. οἱ μάγοι>, φησὶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ μαγικῷ. It is therefore probable that the preceding words (D. L. Proem. 6) came from the same source, since thus the negative statement is supplemented by a positive definition of μαγεία: τοὺς δὲ μάγους περὶ τε θεραπείας θεῶν διατρίβειν καὶ θυσίας καὶ εὐχάς (frag. 36, Rose). The genuineness of the *Μαγικός* is doubted by many, and by some it was attributed to Antisthenes. Bernays (Abhandlungen I, p. 40 ff.) shows that the work entitled *Zoroastres* and formerly attributed to Heraclitus was written by Heraclides Ponticus; and remarks upon the great interest of the Peripatetics in Magian and Parsic matters (*ibid.* p. 45, n.). For our purpose

Philip of Opus⁵⁴ be trustworthy, it is possible that the culmination of our dialogue (132 D: *κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐδὲ πολλαχούτῃ εἶναι παράδειγμα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ὕψιν μόνον*) may have been suggested to our author in reading his treatises on optics.⁵⁵

§ XVI.—EPINOMIS.

This dialogue would supplement the *Laws*¹ by answering the question: What is true wisdom, or what knowledge makes man blessed? The *Laws* however mention no such agreement on the part of the collocutors to meet again and complete their task, as is here assumed, nor does Plato there betray any sense of the need of it. Our author was probably misled by the words (*Legg.* 818 E): *ἔχει μὲν γὰρ οὕτως, ὧς Κλεινία, χαλεπὸν δὲ αὐτὰ προταξάμενον τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ νομοθετεῖν· ἀλλ' εἰς ἄλλον, εἰ δοκεῖ, χρόνον ἀκριβέστερον ἂν νομοθετησαίμεθα.* At the first blush one might infer that Plato intended a subsequent more detailed treatment; but then the Athenian had said “*εἰ δοκεῖ,*” and on Cleinias' immediate protest he proceeds at once with the argument (819 A–822 C and again 966 ff.). Indeed, Plato distinctly declined to elaborate in advance the education of the *νομοφύλακες*, reserving it for those first elected to that office after the establishment of the commonwealth to regulate by law the conduct of the Nocturnal Council (*Legg.* 968 C): *οὐδέτι νόμους, ὧς Μέγиллς καὶ Κλεινία, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνατόν ἐστι νομοθετεῖν, πρὶν ἂν κοσμηθῇ· τότε δὲ κυρίους ὧν αὐτοὺς δεῖ γίγνεσθαι νομοθετεῖν.*

Though this would of itself suffice to athetize the work, there is not wanting abundant evidence of another kind to prove its fraudulent character. Whatever difficulties the *Laws* present are here aggravated tenfold: Plato's later tendency to mystic statement and prolixity becomes here and there aimless verbosity.²

it differs little who was the author of these works. The accounts which credit Plato with a knowledge of magic and Zoroastrianism are all late and suspicious. See *Proleg.*, etc., in Hermann, Vol. VI, p. 199, c. IV, Pausanias IV, 32, 4, Plin. Hist. Nat. XXX, 2.

⁵⁴ See note 16 to *Epin.*, esp. *ὀπτικῶν, ἐνοπτικῶν.*

⁵⁵ See also above, note 31.

¹ This purpose is sufficiently clear, and is emphasized by the meeting by agreement of the characters in the *Laws*, though Megillus here is a mute figure.

² The opening sentence is intolerably tortuous; 974 A: *καὶ χρόνος βραχύς . . . βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον*, is awkward and obscure; 974 A: *τούτων δὲ τί . . .*

In vocabulary³ and in the manipulation of the dialogue our author closely follows Plato, though the dialogue sinks here to a mere form, and favorite expressions, foreign to his original, meet the eye on every page.⁴ On the other hand, nothing could be more obvious than his dependence upon *Timaetus*⁵ and *Laws*, while he may readily be shown to have made extensive use also of the *Republic*.⁶

τῷ λόγῳ, is a very dubious and unplatonic jest. Note also these examples : εὔρειν τε καὶ εἰπεῖν . . . οὔτε εἶπομεν οὔτε εὔρομεν, 973 B ; διὰ λόγων πάντων καὶ πάντη λεγομένων, 974 C ; ταῦτ' οὐχ οὕτως ἢ ταύτη <+ πη?> ξυμφέσομεν ἔχειν, *ibid.* ; ὁ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν ἐροῦμέν τε, ὡς φαμεν, ὅπη δεῖ τε καὶ ὅπως χρεὼν μανθάνειν.

³ But the author shows peculiarities of his own. Thus, the double sense and the plural of φρόνησις in 974 B ; προσφίλης (may it be an error for προσφερές? see Hdt. V 111) in 976 A ; παρέξ, 976 D, ἀπαξ λεγ. in the canon ; ζῶον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, *ibid.*, is absurd ; τούτων δ' ἐν ἡγεμονίαις, 981 C, and σημαίνειν = δηλοῦσθαι, 989 A, want classic authority. In 987 B, ἔχει λόγον (like αἰτίαν ἔχει) means 'is said,' not 'rationi consentaneum est,' as Stallbaum renders it ; but this usage again is not classic Greek. So στερεμνίας φύσεως, 981 D, is an expression unknown to the classic authors, but it is very frequent in Stoic and Epicurean literature. In view of this it is perhaps worth considering whether τούτων δ' ἐν ἡγεμονίαις, just quoted, does not reflect the Stoic κῆσις δι' ὧν ; cp. also 981 D : τὸ γὰρ πλείστον πυρὸς ἔχει, ἔχει μὴν γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος, ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἀπάντων τῶν ἄλλων βραχέα μέρη.

⁴ Note 973 B : ἀτοπον μὴν ἀκούσεσθαι σε λόγον οἶμαι, καὶ τινα τρόπον οὐκ ἀτοπον αὐτῷ, and 976 E : φράζειν χρή, καίπερ ἀτοπον ὄντα, καὶ πως οὐκ ἀτοπον αὐτῷ, both possibly suggested by *Rep.* 532 D : δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλον δ' αὐτὸν τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι, particularly since (as will soon appear, cf. note 6) our author had closely studied that passage ; but ἀτοπος was a great favorite with him, as appears also from 990 A : σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἀτοπον ἀκούσαντι, and 976 B : λοιπὴ . . . τίς ἀτοπος δύναμις. Another favorite is προστυχής ; cf. 973 B, 985 C, 990 D. In 991 D we read θεὸν ἀμεινον ἀεὶ καλεῖν and in 992 A, τύχην δεῖ καλεῖν. A strange construction may be obviated by reading μακάρων for μακάριος ὢν in 992 B : εἴτε τις ἐν ἡπείροις, εἴτ' ἐν νήσοις μακάριος ὢν ζῇ, as μακάριον immediately precedes.

⁵ I note only *Epin.* 977 B : εἴτε κόσμον, εἴτε δλυμπον, εἴτε οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τῷ λέγειν, cf. *Tim.* 28 B : ὁ δὲ πᾶς οὐρανὸς—ἡ κόσμος ἢ ἄλλο ὃ, τί ποτε ὀνομαζόμενος μάλιστ' ἂν δέχοιτο, and *Epin.* 986 B : οἷους οὐδὲ θέμις εἰπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδενί, cf. *Tim.* 29 A : εἰ δὲ ὁ μῦθ' εἰπεῖν τινὲ θέμις. So too in κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον μῦθον, *Epin.* 980 A, while clearly inept here, we have the language of *Timaetus*, cf. e. g. 29 D. Elsewhere we find the ordinary turns κατὰ τὸν εἰκότα λόγον, 981 B, and κατὰ δόξαν τὴν ἐπιεικῆ, 984 B.

⁶ *Epin.* 977 C : ζῶον δέ, ὃ, τι μὴ γινώσκει καὶ δύο καὶ τρία μῦθὲ περιττὸν μῦθὲ ἄρτιον, may be derived from *Rep.* 522 C : τὸ ἐν τε καὶ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγινώσκειν, but more probably from *Legg.* 818 C : μήτε ἐν μήτε δύο μήτε τρία μῦθ' ὅλως ἄρτια καὶ περιττὰ δυνάμενος γινώσκειν ; for *Epin.* 990 C : ἀριθμῶν . . . σώματα ἐχόντων, cf. *Rep.* 525 E : σώματα ἐχοντας ἀριθμοὺς ; *Epin.* 989 B : τά τε γὰρ τῆς

All this might indeed be taken as corroborating Plato's authorship, were there not a reverse side to this picture. The chief among the considerations to be weighed are the following. First, this cheaply-bought likeness is fully matched by differences only by violence reconcilable with Plato's views.⁷ But, second, a reconciliation is fortunately not needed; for—and this cannot be well conceived of in *Plato*—our author apparently owes as much to Aristotle as to the works already enumerated. The search here instituted for the true σοφία is essentially the same as that under-

βραδείας τε καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως doubtless reflects *Rep.* 526 B: τὸδε ἡδὲ ἐπεσκέψω, ὥς οἱ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα . . . ὀξεῖς φύονται, οἱ τε βραδεῖς κ.τ.λ., though *Polit.* 305 D ff. probably occasioned the different trend of thought; *Epin.* 990 A: σοφώτατον ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀστρονόμον εἶναι, μὴ τὸν καθ' Ἡσίοδον ἀστρονομούντα καὶ πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους, οἷον θυσμᾶς τε καὶ ἀνατολᾶς ἐπεσκεμμένον, looks to be a flat reproduction of Glaucon's words, *Rep.* 527 D: τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὧρας εὔαισθητοτέρως ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ μόνον γεωργίᾳ οὐδὲ ναυτιλίᾳ προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγίᾳ οὐχ ἥττον, with Socrates' reply: ἡδὺς εἰ, ὅτι εἰκοὺς δεδιότι τοὺς πολλοὺς, μὴ δοκῆς ἀχρηστα μαθήματα προστάττειν.

⁷I shall not here insist on our author's ranking mathematics highest among human pursuits while Plato considers this study to be only the best propaedeutic to dialectic; nor on his classing αἰθήρ among the elements (981 C), since we have Xenocrates' word (vid. Zeller, II A, p. 800, note 6), whether true or not, for attributing this to Plato. The occurrence of this tenet in Xenocrates, who generally followed Plato closely, as well as in Aristotle and Speusippus <? cf. Theol. Arithm. p. 62, and Zeller, II A, p. 1008, n. 1>, lends some probability to the supposition that Plato also held it. But does Plato's reputed (cf. Theophrastus ap. Diels, *Dox.* p. 494) repentance of his geocentric system warrant us in accepting as Platonic the earth's motion in its orbit (cf. *Epin.* 983 B)? Zeller, indeed (Vol. II A, p. 1042, note 5), would strike out γῆν τε καί, thus obviating the difficulty; but is this probable? The daemonology of the five orders of life (*Epin.* 984 B ff.) is surely not Platonic; but Stallbaum's attempt (Vol. X, 3, p. 468) to claim it for Stoicism utterly fails, because Macrobius, *Saturnal.* I, 23, whom he misinterprets, doubtless derived his authority only from our passage in the *Epinomis*. Nevertheless it is not wholly improbable that Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions found their way into this discussion. See note 3 above and note 12 below, and with *Epin.* 981 E compare Zeller II B, p. 359 ff., III A, p. 139, n. 5, and p. 136 f., and Sext. *Empir.* IX 85 ff. Proclus' objection (ap. Hermann *Plat.* Vol. VI, p. 218), based on the discrepancy in direction of the planets between *Tim.* 36 C and *Epin.* 987 B, may indeed be met as Archer-Hind in Timaeus (ad loc. cit.) meets it, but only on the supposition that Plato wrote both passages. The words (*Epin.* 980 D) ἐλάβετε . . . ὑπομνήματα, finally, must mean that, at the time of writing, the *Laws* had already been published. On this, again, see Proclus (l. l.).

taken in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, cc. 1 and 2, which scholars⁸ now agree in considering as a more condensed and scientific restatement of the juvenile *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας*. Again, Aristotle's historical method also appears in our dialogue,⁹ and numerous details tend strongly to confirm the presumption thereby created. Thus the words (*Epin.* 975 A): ἡ δ' οὖν ἀλφίτων τε καὶ ἀλεύρων ποίησις ἅμα καὶ τροφή καλὴ μὲν καὶ ἀγαθὴ, σοφὸν δὲ ἄνδρα τελέως οὐκ ἐθελήσει ποτὲ ἀπεργάσασθαι * τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτὸ, ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως ἐπίκλησις τῶν ποιουμένων <= ποιούντων> αὐτῶν, δυσχέριαν ἀπεργάζοιτ' ἂν⁹ rest clearly upon Aristotle's rigid distinction between ποιητικὴ (which becomes ἀπεργαστικὴ—a term foreign to Plato's usage—in *Epin.* 975 B) and θεωρητικὴ, and his restriction of true σοφία to the latter.¹⁰ Again, *Epin.* 977 C: ζῶον . . . οὐκ ἂν ποτε διδόναι λόγον ἔχοι περὶ ὧν αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας μόνον εἶη κεκτημένον, contains a thought *a priori*

⁸ Vid. Blass in *Rh. Mus.* Vol. XXX, p. 481 ff. For the general similarity of *Met. A.* with Aristotle's juvenile works see also Diels in *Archiv I*, p. 490 ff., esp. 491, n. 23.

⁹ Note the rise of civilization sketched *Epin.* 974 B f. (cf. Steinhart, Vol. VIII, p. 147, note 6). This, as well as the similar one in *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας* (cf. Bywater's article in *Jour. Philol.* VII, p. 64 ff.), draws upon Plato's *Law*, 667 ff. Compare *Epin.* 975 C: ὀργάνων, *Legg.* 677 C: ὄργανα; *Epin.* *ibid.*, χαλκεία, *Legg.* 678 D: ἡ τῶν μεταλλῶν τέχνη; *Epin.* *ibid.*: πλαστικῶν καὶ πλεκτικῶν; *Legg.* 679 A: αἱ πλαστικαὶ γὰρ καὶ ὅσαι πλεκτικαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν; *Epin.* *ibid.*: θηρευτικὴ, *Legg.* 679 A; θηρεύοντες; *Epin.* *ibid.*: μαντικὴ, *Legg.* 677 D: Ὀρφεῖ; *Epin.* *ibid.*: τεχνικὴ, *Legg.* 677 D: Δαυδάλῳ, etc. But it is plain that the *Epinomis*, while using (with Aristotle) Platonic material, treats it in Aristotle's manner. This was quite in the spirit of all of Plato's successors, and was continued by Stoics and Epicureans alike. Cf. Zeller *III A*, p. 415 ff.

⁹ Render, say, 'The making—and subsisting on—barley and wheat flour is very good, but may never lay claim to rendering one perfectly wise; for the very fact that they who are engaged in this pursuit call it ποίησις is an insuperable objection.' The principal difficulty in this rendering is that ποιουμένων would naturally at first glance be taken for passive; but the middle is not unknown, as in Plotin. *Enneas I*, I: περὶ δὲ τῶν γιγνομένων ἡ ὄντων μὲν αἰεὶ, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ἐν ἐργείαν ποιουμένων αἰεὶ, κ.τ.λ. Bywater (l. l., p. 65) attributes the following words of Joannes Philoponos in substance to Aristotle's *II. Φ.*: ἐπενδούν ἢ ἀνάγκης τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρεῖαν, ἢ τὸ ἀλῆθειν μύλαις σίτον ἢ τὸ σπεῖρειν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, καὶ ἐκάλεσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπίνοιαν σοφίαν, τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀναγκαῖα τοῦ βίου τὸ λωσιτελὲς ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ σοφὸν τὸν ἐπικνησκότα. πάλιν ἐπενόησαν τέχνας . . . οὐ μέχρι μύνης τῆς εἰς τὸν βίον ἀνάγκης ἱσταμένας, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀστείου προϊούσας, κ.τ.λ. With these last words compare *Epin.* 975 C and *Arist. Met. A.* I, 981^b 17 ff.

¹⁰ *Met. A.* I, 982^a 1 ff.

more probable in Aristotle than in Plato.¹¹ To the *II. Φ.* are also probably due the five orders of life,¹² and if this be true, then possibly likewise the doctrine of the five elementary substances.¹³ If now we add the touch of Zoroastrianism in 988 E: *νεκικηζέσθαι δεῖ καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα*, where the World Souls, good and evil, are under discussion,¹⁴ we shall have little need of referring to other details.¹⁵

¹¹ See *Met. A. I*, 980b 24: *μανθάνει δὲ <ζῶον> ὁ πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην ἔχει τὴν αἰσθησιν <sc. ἀκοήν>.* τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνη καὶ λογισμοίς. Aristotle's statement, one readily sees, comes in due course of argument, and may have been even more extended in *II. Φ.*, while in the *Epin.* the words are introduced unnecessarily.

¹² *Epin.* 981 C ff. Cf. *Arist. Frag.* 23 (Rose, ed. Teubn.) [*Cic. de Nat. Deor. II* 15]: Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aëre aliorum, absurdum Aristoteli videtur in ea parte quae sit ad gignenda animantia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare. sidera autem aetherium locum obtinent, etc. It is indeed possible (as Heinze, Xenokrates, p. 93, suggests) that this arose partly from a misunderstanding of *Tim.* 39 E; but it is far more probable that Philip (?) derived the thought from Aristotle. Xenocrates' variant conception of the *δαίμονες* as *souls* (on which see Heinze, p. 94 ff.) is a different matter, though he too may have derived some suggestion from his friend Aristotle. Compare notes 3 and 7 above.

¹³ See, however, note 7. The *Epinomis* (accepted as genuine) would then be the ultimate cause of the error.

¹⁴ See *D. L. Proem.* 8 (*Arist. frag.* 6): 'Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι <τοὺς μάγον> τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα. It is very probable that A. added the victory of Good over Evil. Such notices are just what we naturally expect from Aristotle. If Philip of Opus had this fact from A. there would be additional reason for regarding the Evil World Soul in the *Laws* as one of his interpolations, as Zeller is inclined to think, cf. *Phil. der Griech.* II A, p. 973, n. 3, and for the contrary view see Susemihl, *Genet. Entw.* II, p. 598 ff. See also Heinze, Xenokrates, p. 26 ff., and Zeller's review of Heinze in *Archiv f. Gesch. der Phil.*, 1894. I believe that, if anything is to be eliminated, the cure must be more radical than that proposed by Heinze and Zeller.

¹⁵ Mention has already been made (note 12) of the five orders of life, and it was seen that Cicero's quotation from Aristotle in *De Nat. Deorum*, II 15, closely resembled *Epin.* 981 C ff. Cicero then continues with arguments which are Platonic or Aristotelian in their general character, but also stand in intimate harmony with the *Epinomis*. In II 16 he again cites Aristotle (*frag.* 24), and this quotation again tallies well with what follows in *Epin.* 982 B ff. It certainly seems highly probable that Cicero here is epitomizing

When and by whom, then, we may enquire, was the *Epinomis* produced? And here, beside the tradition ascribing it to Plato, we find one naming Philip of Opus, the reputed editor of the *Laws*,¹⁶ as its author. The character to be inferred from the *Epinomis* tallies admirably with the report of Suidas. But there, absurdly enough, he is made a contemporary of Philip of Macedon and a personal pupil of Socrates. Since the error clearly lurks in the name of *Socrates*, Praetorius, led by supposed traces of ultra-Pythagoreanism, suggests *Echecrates* instead.¹⁷ But there is no need of supposing Philip indoctrinated with Pythagoreanism by Echecrates in Italy before he came to Athens, where its tenets were sufficiently current; and besides, according to Proclus,¹⁸ it was to Plato that he owed his bent for mathematics. Of greater importance, however, even than this is the consideration that we thus fail to account for Philip's strong literary and historical interest evidenced in the list of his works. Now, though it is not

throughout one of Aristotle's earlier works which may well have been known to the author of the *Epinomis*. Mayor's commentary gathers the materials very well. Then, too, the argument, *Epin.* 988 A ff., to show that the gods cannot look with disfavor on the pursuit of the highest wisdom, may be due to the similar one in Arist. Met. 982^b 28 ff. or its prototype in Π. Φ., and Praetorius (De Philippo Opuntio, p. 7 f.) may be right in attributing to Philip's revision the parallel passages in *Legg.* 821 A and 967 A. Again, *Epin.* 973 D: λέγω δ' οὐδὲν σοφόν, is an expression foreign to Plato, who used οὐδὲν ποικίλον instead (cf. *Meno* 75 E, *Gorg.* 491 D, etc.). *Euthyd.* 293 D, *Symp.* 175 D, *Theaet.* 150 C, are not parallel cases; but in Arist. Met. A. 2, 982^a 12: διὸ ῥᾶδιον καὶ οὐδὲν σοφόν, we find its perfect counterpart. Many other points I intentionally omit.

¹⁶ See Diog. L. III, 37: ἐνιοί τε φασὶν ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ Ὀπούντιος τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῦ <sc. Πλάτωνος> μετέγραψεν ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ. τοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι. Suidas s. v. φιλόσοφος: <Φ. ὁ Ὁ.> φιλόσοφος· ὃς τοὺς Πλάτωνος νόμους διεῖλεν εἰς βιβλία ιβ'· τὸ γὰρ εἴ' αὐτὸς προσθεῖναι. καὶ ἦν Σωκράτους καὶ αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀκουστής, σχολάσας τοῖς μετεώροις. ὦν δὲ κατὰ Φίλιππον τὸν Μακεδόνα συνεγράψατο τάδε: π. τ. ἀποστάσεως ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης, π. θεῶν β', π. χρόνου, π. μύθων, π. ἐλευθερίας, π. ὀργῆς, π. ἀνταποδόσεως, π. Δοκρῶν τῶν Ὁπουντίων, π. ἡδονῆς, π. ἔρωτος, π. φίλων καὶ φιλίας, π. τοῦ γράφειν, π. Πλάτωνος, π. ἐκλείψεως σελήνης, π. μεγέθους ἡλίου κ. σελήνης κ. γῆς, π. ἀστραπῶν, π. πλανητῶν, ἀριθμητικά, π. πολλῶν ἀριθμῶν, ὀπτικῶν β', π. ἐνοπτρικῶν β', κυκλιακά, μεσότηας καὶ ἄλλα.

¹⁷ Op. cit. p. 5 f.

¹⁸ Proclus in Euclid. II, p. 19: Φίλιππος δὲ . . . Πλάτωνος ὦν μαθητὴς καὶ ὑπ' ἐκείνου προτραπείς εἰς τὰ μαθήματα, καὶ τὰς ζητήσεις ἐποιεῖτο κατὰ τὰς Πλάτωνος ἐφήγησεις, καὶ ταῦτα προύβαλεν ἑαυτῷ, ὅσα ζέτο τῇ Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίᾳ συντελεῖν.

to be doubted that Suidas or his predecessor really read Socrates,¹⁹ we may well have here one of the many confusions of ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ and ΙΣΟΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. If Philip then entered the Academy late in life after studying under Isocrates,²⁰ imitation of Plato's obscurer style and assiduous devotion to mathematics would readily account for the literary defects of the *Epinomis*. Seeing, therefore, that his acquaintance with Aristotle's works displayed in our dialogue seems confined to the juvenile *Περὶ Φιλοσοφίας* or the portions of the *Metaphysics* reproduced from it, we infer that he wrote his production shortly after the death of Plato and before the great achievements in astronomy of the Alexandrian age, of which he betrayed no knowledge. This conclusion, while not strictly verifiable, seems on the whole most probable.²¹

¹⁹ It seems quite improbable that Suidas would have said καὶ αὐτοῦ Πλάτωνος unless he had read *Socrates*.

²⁰ Note the pompous ἔπον δὴ καὶ ξύνιδε, ἂν σοι δοκῶ κἀγὼ μετ' αὐτῶν καλῶς τοῦ τοιούτου πέρι λέγειν, *Epin.* 973 C, and the truly Isocratean passage, *Epin.* 987 D: τόδε γε μὴν διανοηθῆναι χρὴ πάντ' ἄνδρα Ἑλλήνα, κ.τ.λ. The close also is declamatory. Is there perhaps intended some criticism of Isocrates' insistence on the need of φύσις in oratory in *Epin.* 976 BC?

²¹ Bergk, *Fünf Abhandlungen*, etc. (1883), p. 53, n. 1, tries to show that Philip edited the *Laws* (and presumably added the *Epin.*) immediately after Plato's death. His reference to Isocrates, Philip, c. 13, may prove this regarding the *Laws*, but will not necessarily hold as to *Epin.* Yet it seems likely that the latter appeared soon afterwards. Cf. in general Zeller, II A, p. 443, n. 1. Objections to this conclusion will probably be based on the recognition of Stoic influences in the *Epinomis*. But the relation of many of the Stoic doctrines to anterior systems is too obscure to warrant a dogmatic decision on this point.

CORRIGENDA ET ADDENDA.

On *φενκτάς* in n. 4, p. 16, see also Zeller, III A, p. 223, n. 4.

P. 18, n. 9 end, add: see also Cic. N. D., II, vii 19 and Sext. Empir. VII 92 ff.

P. 20, n. 1, read *η'* for *η*.

P. 31, n. 19, read *ἐλθῆ* for *ἐλθη*.

P. 41, n. 14, end, for *one* passage, read *our* passage.

P. 44, n. 3, end, reference is to note 8 of *Alc. I*.

P. 45, n. 7, add: See *vaiki* in Aristophanes, Thesmoph. 1183, 1218.

Since my brief section on the *Axiochus* has been in print several discussions of that dialogue have come to my notice. Feddersen's Programm (Cuxhaven, 1895) and Immisch's Axiochus (Teubner, 1895) I know only at second hand. The latter work was reviewed by Wilamowitz in Götting. gelehrte Anzeiger, 1895, and by Wendland in the Berliner philol. Wochenschr. for April 25, 1896. Wilamowitz now abandons his thesis that the *Axiochus* originated in the third century B. C., and believes, as I do, that it is the latest of the *νοσθόμενα* (p. 984). But he still shares the reluctance of Immisch to dating it in the first century B. C. I am of course willing to admit that no definite date can be established, but Wilamowitz's own argument, which is excellent, requires it to be set as late as possible; and I still hold that the beginning of the first century B. C. is early enough.

